




## Session#2

### What States Want

# System-level factors & Domestic factors in FP



*The three-stage framework for foreign policy*


(Both offensive and defensive )**Structural realists** agree that national preferences are based upon the need to survive in the competitive anarchical international system

**System-level liberal theories** are split into those that analyze the impact of the level of interdependence upon what states want and those that investigate the effects that institution-rich environments have upon state goals.

**Constructivist theorists** have a broader conception of national preferences, arguing that the ideas embedded in different ‘cultures’ of the international system can impact on what states want (interests) and, even more fundamentally, on the very foreign policy *identity* of the state (‘who’ the state believes it is). At the most extreme, identities fully constitute how a state conceives of its interests and its role in the world, with little (or no) impact from material factors.



# France & Germany during WWII






Table 2.1 *Waltz's defensive structural realism*

Core motivation of states	To maintain their relative position in the international system
Type of theory	Can be used both as an explanatory theory, but it can also be understood as an analytical tool, where balancing is an ideal-typical behavior that is an intentional oversimplification of reality (Jackson 2011)
What do we need to measure to know the foreign policy goals of a particular state?	The strength of a state and the distribution of power in the international system, focusing primarily on the great powers, measured using size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capabilities, military strength, political stability and competence (Waltz 1993: 50)
Example	France's foreign policy goals in the 1990s <i>What do we need to know about France?</i> Its relative capabilities and regional/global rivals <i>What should we expect to see?</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Based on Waltz's theory, we should expect that the core French goal is to maintain its position in the international system relative to other states</li> <li>• France in the 1970s and 1980s enjoyed a position of parity with Germany in the European balance-of-power</li> <li>• In 1980, the population was 54 million in France and 61 million in Germany; GNP was \$633 billion in France and \$838 billion in Germany; military expenditure was \$26.4 billion in France and \$26.7 billion in Germany</li> <li>• German reunification increased German capabilities (population and economic capabilities)</li> <li>• We should therefore expect that the dominating French national interest post-reunification (1990s) would be to maintain a position of parity despite the shift in relative power</li> </ul>

Table 2.2 *Walt's defensive structural realism*

Core motivation of states	To protect themselves from threats
Type of theory	Explanatory theory
What do we need to measure to know the foreign policy goals of a particular state?	The 'threats' faced by a given state, defined as a combination of the relative power of states (as in Waltz's theory), geographic proximity, offensive capability and historical perceptions of other states
Example	Pakistani foreign policy goals (2010) <i>What do we need to know about Pakistan?</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Relative power of states in the region and globally, including power of Russia, China, India and the US, measured using capabilities (population, economic wealth, size of armed forces, resource endowment)</li> <li>• Geographic proximity of powers, in particular the proximity of China and India, along with size of US forces based in Afghanistan</li> <li>• Offensive capabilities of China, India and the US</li> <li>• Historical perceptions, in particular the historical animosity between Pakistan and India</li> </ul> <p>Capabilities of India and Pakistan: relevant data includes: population for Pakistan is 180 million and for India is 1,200 million; GDP for Pakistan is \$175 billion and for India is \$1,430 billion; military budget for Pakistan is \$5.2 billion and for India is \$38.4 billion; armed forces for Pakistan is 0.55 million and for India is 1.1 million</p> <p><i>What should we expect to see?</i> Based upon historical animosity with India, we should expect that the dominating goal of Pakistani foreign policy will be to protect against a perceived threat from India</p>



Table 2.3 Mearsheimer's offensive structural realism

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Core motivation of states	Maximize state power, and if possible achieve regional hegemony
Type of theory	Analytical tool aimed at understanding great power behavior
What do we need to measure to know the foreign policy goals of a particular state?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• The distribution of power in the system, both at the regional and global level (measured using capabilities of states)</li><li>• Geographical factors, in particular features that limit the ability of a state to project land forces (e.g. oceans or mountain ranges)</li></ul>
Example	<p>US foreign policy goals (current)</p> <p><i>What do we need to know?</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Relative power of the US and major regional rivals throughout the world (measured using capabilities of states)</li><li>• How geographical factors limit US ability to project land forces</li></ul> <p><i>What should we expect to see?</i></p> <p>The US wants to maintain regional hegemony in the Americas and prevent regional powers from attaining regional hegemony in important regions such as the Middle East, Northeast and Southeast Asia</p>

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Table 2.4 *Weak liberal theory of interdependence*

Core motivation of states	Survival; but when there are high levels of economic interdependence, state goals become more focused on preserving mutually beneficial economic ties
Type of theory	Explanatory theory
What do we need to measure to know the foreign policy goals of a particular state?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The distribution of power in the system, both at the regional and global level. In particular salient threats to security of a particular state</li> <li>• The level of economic interdependence measured as trade as proportion of national GDP</li> <li>• For bilateral relations, levels of trade (imports + exports) between two states measured using bilateral level of trade with country X divided by GDP</li> <li>• A more inclusive analysis will include levels of bilateral investment (e.g. levels of Taiwanese direct investment in the Chinese economy)</li> </ul>
Example	<p>Taiwanese foreign policy goals <i>vis-à-vis</i> China <i>What do we need to know?</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Distribution of power in region and level of 'threat' emanating from China against Taiwan (measured using realist measures in manner similar to Walt's theory)</li> <li>• Levels of bilateral trade (imports + exports) and direct investment between China and Taiwan, measured as bilateral trade and investments as ratio of GDP</li> </ul> <p><i>What should we expect to see?</i> As levels of commerce between the two countries increase we should expect that Taiwanese foreign policy interests <i>vis-à-vis</i> China become more cooperative, focusing upon preserving beneficial cross-border commerce</p>

Table 2.5 *Strong liberal theory of interdependence*

Core motivation of states	When there are high levels of social exchanges, states can become socialized into a 'pluralistic security community', where the sense of community is so strong that war becomes unthinkable. Anarchy between states is replaced with a form of 'society'
Type of theory	Explanatory theory
What do we need to measure to know the foreign policy goals of a particular state?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Levels of social exchanges between two or more countries (trade, patterns of communication (letters, internet, etc.))</li> <li>• To determine whether a pluralistic security community exists we also need to know:             <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(1) if the two societies have compatible values</li> <li>(2) the capacity of governments to respond to one another's messages, needs and actions without resort to violence</li> <li>(3) the mutual predictability of the relevant aspects of the societies' political, economic and social behavior</li> </ol> </li> </ul>
Example	<p>Danish foreign policy identity <i>vis-à-vis</i> neighboring Scandinavian states <i>What do we need to know?</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Levels of exchanges across Scandinavian borders</li> <li>• Degree to which core Danish values are compatible with those of other Scandinavian countries</li> <li>• Capacity of the Danish government to respond to other Scandinavian countries' messages, needs and actions without resorting to violence</li> <li>• Mutual predictability of the relevant aspects of Scandinavian countries' political, economic and social behavior</li> </ul> <p><i>What should we expect to see?</i> Denmark as part of a pluralistic security community with a shared Scandinavian identity that fundamentally changes the nature of Danish foreign policy interests <i>vis-à-vis</i> its Scandinavian neighbors</p>

Table 2.7 *Neoliberal institutionalist theory*

Core motivation of states	To survive, but, in an institution-rich environment where survival is assured through institutions, state goals become more focused on absolute gains
Type of theory	Explanatory theory
What do we need to measure to know the foreign policy goals of a particular state?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The distribution of power in the system, both at the regional and global level</li> <li>• The strength of international institutions in an issue-area and geographically</li> </ul>
Example	<p>German foreign policy goals in trade policy</p> <p><i>What do we need to know?</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The strength of institutions that Germany is a member of in trade policy (regional and global)</li> <li>• The degree to which major international competitors are also members of the same trade-related international institutions</li> </ul> <p><i>What should we expect to see?</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Germany has cooperative goals related to absolute gains in trade with states that are also members of the same trade-related institutions (such as the EU)</li> <li>• Germany has goals related to relative gains in trade with competitors that are not members of institutions</li> </ul>



Table 2.8 *Wendt's social constructivism*

Core motivation of states	Varies depending upon the culture of anarchy: <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Hobbesian: survival</li><li>• Lockean: maximizing economic gains relative to rivals</li><li>• Kantian: maximizing absolute gains</li></ul>
Type of theory	Explanatory theory, especially given Wendt's interest in making his theory 'testable' and his focus on empirical indicators. The theory tends however more toward a critical realist position than a strongly empiricist neopositivist position (Jackson 2011)
What do we need to measure to know the foreign policy goals of a particular state?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• The 'culture of anarchy' present in a given region at a given time</li><li>• The degree to which a given culture is internalized (first, second or third degrees)</li></ul>
Example	Chinese foreign policy goals <i>vis-à-vis</i> the US <i>What do we need to know?</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• The culture of anarchy present in Asia</li><li>• The degree to which China has internalized the culture</li></ul> <i>What should we expect to see?</i> <p>As China increasingly participates in the international community, Chinese leaders will become socialized into a more cooperative 'culture' of anarchy (perhaps even a Kantian culture if Chinese economic development results in the democratization of the country), viewing its relations with the US and other countries less as a zero-sum game and more as a cooperative, positive-sum game (Friedberg 2005)</p>





# Question Case: Austria vs. Switzerland post-1989

# Black box of state

how factors related to societal inputs matter for state in FP?


# Points of view

- Neo-classical realism vs. Structural realism
- Liberalism
- Social constructivism at state level



# Neo-classical realism

anarchy with a domestic face





# Neo-classical realism

anarchy with a domestic face

## National interest

- To ensure survival and the broader security of the state
- The desire to protect physical, political and cultural identity against encroachment by other nations (Morgenthau)
- Having examined its security requirement, it try to meet them (Waltz)

# National identity

(vs. national interest)

how a given states understands its national interest and the role in the world?

Classical (structural) point of view: the same

# FP Doctrine: FP interest + identity

# Monroe doctrine

any manipulation by European powers in the affairs of independent states in the Western hemisphere would be viewed as an unwanted intrusion into the US sphere of interests.

# Truman doctrine

Protection of free peoples throughout the world that were resisting Soviet pressures, resulting in the overarching US grand strategy of containment of the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

# de Gaulle doctrine

saw the country as an independent great power despite possessing low power relative to the Soviet Union and the US...arguably did not match the imperatives of their structural environment



# Sources of national identity


humans are social beings

naturally form groups

identity: differentiating from other groups

# Liberalism: Opening the black box

Public opinion, interest groups, bureaucracy  
Reflect societal demands



National preferences are the result of the aggregation of societal demands through a country's political system



# Public opinion

conclusions came to be termed the Almond–Lippmann thesis. The thesis implied that the US government should not listen to public opinion, as the uninformed mood swings would result in foreign policies that do not reflect the national interest, however defined. These findings neatly dovetailed into the then popular classical realist theorization, where figures such as Morgenthau and Carr believed that state leaders would best follow the national interest by ignoring public opinion.





# Public opinion

Turning back to the more general theoretical discussion of *how* public opinion is aggregated into national preferences, there are two mechanisms that have been investigated in the US context for how public opinion can theoretically matter: one is the direct electoral channel and the second is the more indirect one through the popularity of the president and the ensuing political capital in Congress that high approval ratings give the president.



# Election & FP

lenged. Aldrich *et al.* (1989), however, found that public opinion on foreign affairs mattered for voter choice when: (1) voters actually held attitudes toward the foreign policy, (2) citizens accessed those attitudes for use when evaluating and choosing between candidates, and (3) when parties and candidates presented citizens with different foreign policy choices. The scholarly consensus today is that public opinion does use of military force (Knecht and Weatherford 2006). Further, public opinion matters most in crisis situations, whereas it matters less in more routine, non-crisis issues such as foreign trade or aid. (See Table

# Media: framing effects

# Interest groups

economic, ethnic, business, labor, cultural, religious, racial...







We Support  
our South African  
Brothers And Sisters

Free  
N...

THE Highland  
Support our  
Sisters' in

Support  
Majority Rule

We Support  
South Africa  
FOR THE





3/3/2024





# Domestic political institutions

At the heart of this literature is the assumption that executives want to remain in office, making them dependent upon societal support to varying degrees. In **autocratic** systems, this can entail ensuring support from institutions such as the **military** or **key bureaucratic** actors, whereas in **democratic** systems an executive needs the support of a larger set of **societal and governmental actors**.



# Domestic political institutions

legislature in foreign policy-making. Most important is the number of 'veto players' in foreign policy-making, with 'veto players' defined as actors that have the power to veto a given decision (Tsebelis 1995). This factor is especially crucial when executives negotiate international agreements that have to be ratified by domestic legislatures, where decision-making rules for approval determine how much the executive must listen to domestic veto players (Milner 1997). In parliamentary systems where a government enjoys a large majority, the prime minister as head of government has quite free hands to negotiate deals, whereas in minority or coalition governments the executive is forced to accommodate the interests of a parliamentary majority. Veto players are usually more influential in presidential systems such as the US, where powers are split between the president and Congress (see Box





# Domestic political institutions

research is that the US president enjoys relatively strong powers *vis-à-vis* Congress in foreign policy in comparison to his weaker powers in domestic law making, leading some scholars to comment on the nature of the 'dual presidency' (strong foreign policy and weaker domestic

# Strong liberalism: fundamental transformation

fundamental *transformations* in the nature  
of relations between and within states can  
take place

Neo-functionalism is a theory that explains how the participation of governmental and non-governmental elites in international institutions can **transform state interests** from being purely centered on **national interests** toward a more **cooperative understanding of interests**.



# Social constructivism

## interest and identity construction

importance of ideas, norms and culture for foreign policy and international relations

Discursive formations<sup>†</sup> are the product of processes of domestic identity construction, influenced by external events. Looking at Russia, Hopf (2005: 238) argues that ‘while Russian identity has deep daily roots, its great power identity is in a daily construction project with the external world, especially with the US and Europe. Interaction with the US and Europe produces, reinforces, and counteracts the discourses of Russian identity at home’.



# Post-structuralism

the politics of identity and securitization theory

no single 'objective' truth or reality  
perceive the social world through language

language is not a neutral medium

threats are not just 'objective' threats

# Securitization

A threat has been constructed when an audience believes that 'if we do not tackle this problem, everything else will be irrelevant



از توجه شما متشکرم

سازگار کریم