




Iran Foreign Policy Course

Foreign Policy Analysis

Session six

Making choices 2

Review: RAM



Foreign Policy as the Product of Political Battles

Instead of cognitive or social – psychological factors

Hagan 2 theories:

1. Coalition decision-making
2. Review of bureaucratic / governmental politics:
 - a) Bureaucratic politics: political battles among low-level, civil servants
 - b) Governmental: political battles in minister/politician level

Figure 5.1 Summary of decision tree for coalitions in foreign policy-making

Coalition and foreign policy decision making:

Applicable to:

Multi-party cabinets in parliamentary democracies


Split government in presidential system

Authoritarian systems

Minimum coalition vs. content.

Pivotal actor?

Willingness



Source: Based on Hagan *et al.* (2001: 180).

Political institutions: bureaucratic and governmental politics

Politics: result of internal bargaining games among decision makers

Box 5.2 Core propositions of Allison and Zelikow's governmental politics model

1. Policies are the result of political battles instead of a coordinated governmental strategy.
2. Actors perceive issues differently.
3. Preferences matter, with where you stand depending upon where you sit, although there are also differences between 'Chiefs' and 'Indians'.
4. The relative power of actors and who participates depends upon which action-channel is being used.

Source: Based on Allison and Zelikow (1999).

Bendor and Hammond's critique of Allison's original model of bureaucratic politics:

What is a good map?

Action channel:

Regularized means of decision taking governmental action on a specific kind of issue:

Pre-selecting the major players

Determining their usual points of entrance into the game

Distributing particular advantages and disadvantages of each game

Bargaining skill, experience intragovernmental political games, personality, trust etc.

Example:

Robert Kennedy in Cuban Missile Crisis





Critiques against bureaucratic/government/organization politics:

- McNamara in Cuban Missile Crisis (non-organizational self-interest)
- President Bush Sr. in 1st Persian gulf war (no bargaining)
- Informational asymmetries, over estimated



Table 5.4 *Bureaucratic politics theory*

What is being explained?	How decisions are affected by the ‘pulling and hauling’ between different bureaucratic actors
Type of theory	Analytical model that can be used heuristically, but that does not provide ‘testable’ hypotheses beyond the ‘where you stand is where you sit’ argument. However, Welch has tried to use the theory in a more explanatory fashion
Core argument	The preferences of bureaucratic actors are affected by parochial, organizational self-interest (‘where you stand depends upon where you sit’). Decision-making is a bargaining situation between different bureaucratic actors, whose power is determined by the institutional position
Hypotheses	Welch has described four theoretical hypotheses that can be seen as the essence of the bureaucratic politics model: <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Player preferences should correlate highly with their bureaucratic positions2. Player perceptions of problems should correlate highly with their bureaucratic positions3. Player influence in bargaining games flows from their bureaucratic positions4. A decision-making process should be understood as a bargaining situation where players ‘pull’ and ‘haul’ to promote their organizational interests, with the net result not reflecting the intentions of any particular player (Welch 1992: 128)
Example (Mitchell and Massoud 2009)	US decision-making during the post-invasion of the Iraq War (2002–03) Mitchell and Massoud find substantial evidence for bureaucratic in-fighting between the Departments of Defense and State. Defense was put in charge of planning for the post-invasion situation despite State having extensive expertise and already developed contingency plans. Throughout 2003 Defense ‘did everything it could to protect its influence when it came to the control of postwar Iraq’ (p. 276)



Organizational culture

Relatively stable propensities concerning priorities, operational objectives, perceptions, and issues.

Cooperation between individuals in an organization

Table 5.5 Organizational politics theory

What is being explained?	How organizational capabilities affect what options are chosen
Type of theory	Analytical model
Core argument	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Organizational capabilities affect what options are chosen Implemented policies often diverge from what was intended
Hypotheses	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Of which organizations does the government consist? What capabilities and constraints do these organizations' existing SOPs create in producing information about international conditions, threats and opportunities? What capabilities and constraints do these existing SOPs create in generating the menu of options for action? What capabilities and constraints do these existing SOPs establish for implementing whatever is chosen? (Allison and Zelikow 1999: 390)
Example (Author's research)	<p>The organizational model and the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001</p> <p>The implementation of the US intervention in Afghanistan in 2001 illustrates how the availability of instruments affects the policy chosen, and that this can result in unintended consequences that risk undermining the very rationale behind the original decision. After the 9/11 attacks by al-Qaeda, the Bush administration asked the Taliban regime in Afghanistan to both hand over the perpetrators and stop giving al-Qaeda sanctuary. Once the Taliban refused to stop harboring al-Qaeda groups, the Bush administration took the decision to topple the Taliban regime by force. However, the US lacked the organizational capabilities to invade Afghanistan by itself, as they could not get land troops for an invasion through Pakistan or another neighboring country, and there were no bases from neighboring countries that could logistically support a risky airborne invasion. The US was forced to rely upon air power, covert action and materials supplied by the CIA to support Afghan allies on the ground. These allies were the Northern Alliance, which was a loose group of various brutal warlords that had lost the struggle for control of Kabul to the Taliban regime prior to 2001. One of the primary reasons for this was that they represented the Tajik minority, whereas the Pashtun majority supported the Taliban. Once the Northern Alliance toppled the Taliban regime they took control of Kabul, bringing an unpopular Tajik-dominated governmental coalition to power whose ethnicity was the very reason that the Taliban regime had come to power in the first place. The intention of the US intervention in Afghanistan had been to remove the safe haven for al-Qaeda offered by the Taliban regime that threatened US interests. An optimal solution could have involved a US-led invasion of Afghanistan with ground troops that removed both the Taliban and the Northern Alliance warlords. Thereafter a broadly representative Afghan national government could have taken charge. While it was by no means certain that this solution would have succeeded in fulfilling US objectives, the strategy chosen by the US due to a lack of organizational capabilities undermined the goals that the policy was intended to achieve. This has resulted in a weak and unpopular Afghan regime supported by large numbers of US troops that became embroiled in a bloody internecine power struggle, costing US and NATO countries thousands of lives and billions of dollars</p>

Social constructivism: different logics of action

Most foreign policy decisions are not dominated by rational, cost-benefit calculation as assumed by the RAM.

Rules, identities, habit (ready-made responses)

Example: bank robbing



Table 5.6 *The social constructivist theory of a logic of appropriate action*

What is being explained?	Why decision-making is dominated by a logic of appropriate action when deeply embedded norms exist
Type of theory	Analytical tool
Core argument	When the logic of appropriate action dominates decision-making, actor decisions are based upon habitual compliance with embedded norms for appropriate behavior. Actors become socialized into a community of actors holding an intersubjective norm that becomes part of the interests and even identity of the actor, producing decision-making dominated by the logic of appropriate action
Hypotheses	Actors that are socialized (logics of appropriate action) make different decisions than non-socialized actors (RAM)
Example (Tannenwald 1999)	The US and the norm of nuclear non-use In a comparative case study, Tannenwald (1999) investigates four cases of use and non-use of nuclear weapons (Japan (1945), Korea (1950–53), Vietnam, 1991 Gulf War). She investigates whether there is evidence of decision-making in the four cases that is dominated by a logic of appropriate action, expecting to see ‘taboo talk’, examples of which include ‘we just don’t do things like this’ or ‘this is simply wrong’ in internal governmental deliberations. She finds that in the Korean War, the emerging norm of non-use had an inhibiting effect, shaping how US leaders defined their interests. By the time of the Vietnam War the norm was so entrenched that US decision-makers did not even contemplate using nuclear weapons even though their use could arguably have staved off defeat, and possibly even resulted in a military victory. Decision-making during the 1991 Gulf War illustrates that the norm is so deeply entrenched with US decision-makers that it is virtually unthinkable that the US would drop a nuclear weapon on an adversary unless it was retaliating against a nuclear strike upon itself





از توجه شما متشکرم

ساسان کریمی