


British Philosophy

+ its political aspects
+ a little bit more

3rd session



Finished




Niccolò Machiavelli
(1469-1527, Florence)

- diplomat
- Politician
- Philosopher

- *The Prince*
- *Discourses on Livy*

- Power philosophy
- Realism, Humanism





Hereditary states:

Hereditary states accustomed to their prince's lineage are retained with many fewer difficulties than are new states, because it is enough for the hereditary prince merely to observe the customary practices of his forefathers and then to use delaying tactics when faced with unforeseen events. Hence if this kind of prince uses normal diligence, he will always retain his power unless an extraordinary and extreme force deprives him of it.

An hereditary prince has fewer reasons and less necessity for causing trouble; hence it follows that he will be more loved. If unusual vices do not make him hated, it is reasonable that his subjects will naturally be well disposed toward him. Recollections of, and reasons for, reforms fade away with the permanence and duration of his sway: one change always leaves indentations for the construction of another.




Mixed Princedoms:

Men are willing to change their ruler if they expect improvements.

This expectation induces them to take up arms against the prince; but they deceive themselves by so doing because with experience they subsequently realize that matters have become worse.

Everyone whom you have inconvenienced by taking possession of that princedom is your enemy.





Colonial settlements:

- In-expensive
- More loyal
- Less troublesome; the troublesome people can do no harm because they are indigent and scattered.

A prince in a region with heterogeneous customs and language ought:

- make himself the **leader** and **defender** of his less powerful neighbors,
- **endeavor** to weaken the powerful ones, and
- take care lest a foreign invader as powerful as he come in unexpectedly.



To avoid **war** you must never allow disorder to persist; for you do not thus avoid war, you only postpone it-to your disadvantage.

A general rule which never, or rarely, fails: **whoever causes another to become powerful is ruined** because he creates such power either with **skill** or with **force**; both of these factors are viewed with suspicion by the one who has become powerful.



Tuqs' King:

Difficult to acquire
Easy to hold

French King:

Surrounded by a host of time-honored
lords acknowledged
Can't retract lords' vest rights without
endangering his position

Easier to acquire
Difficult to hold



Persian/Tuiks' King:

The reason for the obstacle in taking possession of the Turks's is that there is no possibility of being called in by the local rulers of that kingdom, and there is no hope of facilitating your attempt by means of a revolt of those men the local ruler has around him.

Once the Turks have been conquered and so devastated on the battlefield that they can not rebuild their army, **there is nothing else to be concerned about except the prince's family**. Once they are wiped out, there is no one left to fear, since the rest have no influence with the populace; just as, before his victory, the conqueror could expect nothing from them, so afterwards he need not fear them.

French King:



You can **invade them easily** once you win over some of the kingdom's barons-because **you always find disgruntled men and those anxious to reform**. These men, **can open up your way** into that state and facilitate your victory. Subsequently, if you want to **retain your power**, the situation **entails countless difficulties** with both those who have aided you and those whom you have overwhelmed. **Nor is it enough to wipe out the prince's family**, because **there still exist those lords** who become leaders of new insurrections; since **you can neither satisfy them nor wipe** them out, you lose that state whenever the opportunity arises.





Methods available for holding acquired cities:

- Devastate them
- Go personally and live in them
- Let them live under their own laws, exacting tribute and creating within them a government consisting of a few men who keep the state well disposed toward you.

There are actually no sure methods to keep possession of such states except devastation.

Whoever becomes master of, but does not destroy, a city used to living as a free community may expect to be destroyed by it, because during an insurrection the city can always take refuge in invoking the name of freedom and its traditional institutions, which are never forgotten, whatever the course of time or whatever favors be accorded.

Further chapters:

- Concerning New Princedoms Acquired by Ones Own Arms and Virtu
- Concerning New Princedoms Acquired by Other Mens Armed Forces and Fortune
- Concerning Those Who Became Princes Through Iniquity
- Concerning the Civil Princedom
- How the Strength of Any Princedom Ought to be Assessed
- Concerning Ecclesiastical Princedoms
- Concerning the Various Kinds of Armies and Mercenaries
- Concerning Troops That Are Auxiliary, Those That Are Mixed, and Those That Are a Prince's Own
- ...

Gal. g. n. a.

NICHOLAS MACHIAVEL'S
P R I N C E.

ALSO,
The life of *Castruccio Castracani*
of *Lucca*.

AND
The meanes Duke *Valentine us'd*
to put to death *Vitellozzo Vitelli, Oli-*
verotto of Fermo, Paul, and the
Duke of *Gravina*.

Tranflated out of *Italian* into *English*;
By *E. D.*

With some Animadversions noting
and taxing his errors.

LONDON,
Printed by *R. Bishop* for *Wil. Hills* and



Thanks for your attention.

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