



دیپلماسی فصل هفتم

مرکز مطالعات عالی بین المللی
دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی
دانشگاه تهران

خرداد ۱۴۰۵



**Wilhelm 1st > Fredrick (98 days) >
Wilhelm 2nd of Germany (1888)**

- Germany: victim of European wars for 2 centuries;
- Lost 1/3 of its population in the 30year wars;
- Battlefield for many European wars including Napoleonic ambitions;
- Aggressive foreign policy in post-Bismarck era;
- The biggest European power: anxiety for neighbors;
- No philosophical framework: British traditional freedoms, French post revolution public liberation, Austrian global imperialism;
- Overcome any potential European coalition;
- German security at the cost of others' insecurity;
- Germany: European hammer;
- Combination of aggression & uncertainty.


275



- 1898: France and the Great Britain, very close to war on Egypt;
- Hostility between the Great Britain and Russia;
- The GB always pursue ally against Russia: first choice was Germany before Japan;
- In Imperial Germany era, Russia was the main threat to peace;
- In 1913, perception of threat in Germany produced self-fulfilling-prophecy: WWI;



- Russia normally played high risk game in Europe: prefers potential defeat to compromise;
- Russian traditional expansion westwards in Tsar and Communism eras: same behaviors;
- Russian expansion eastward: Japan & China – Chinese unequal equations with Russia (p. 279);
- “Far east is Russia’s exclusive region and no other one can intervene”;
- Russian tradition: no great foreign minister;
- Defeat in the war with Japan, 1905;
- Expansionism: Russian ambition – from the great ocean to Himalaya mountains weakness in the center, more costs



The Marquess of Salisbury

- Corrosion of the two great European powers: Russia and Germany
- The Great Britain: balancer and the peacekeeper force in the continent
- Glorious isolation – no alliance with others
- Marquess of Salisbury
- Declining position of the Great Britain
- Analogy to George Bush, P. 285

فصل هفتم: دیپلماسی اروپا پیش از جنگ اول



German misperception:

- Russia and the Great Britain need Germany;
- No alliance among others;
- No deal with them;
- Inefficient and Naïve foreign policy;
- Deal with Britain (exchange lands in Africa) > Russian tended to France (German miscalculation)
- Bismarck's ambiguity declined (relations with Russia & Alliance with Austria);



Coalitions changed, but in a non-balanced way:

- Germany holds agreement with Russia;
- In 1891, Russia tended to France: Entente Cordiale (mutual diplomatic support) ;
- France was getting out of its Bismarck-constructed isolation. (P. 291);
- In 1894, military convention has agreed between Russia and France;

Balance of power system:

1. Every player feels free to ally with any other;
2. A balancer player avoids the alliances from any hegemony of one;
3. Alliances are fluid.



In 1908
the Great Britain joined the Russia-France alliance and
consisted the trilateral alliance.

UK rejected any agreement with Germany & Austria
The UK came out of its 1.5 cent. “glorious isolation”.

Germany expected a neutrality from the UK and not
active alliance: made the UK more suspicious.



- In 1895, the Great Britain failed in its attacks against Africa;
- In 1902, it approached to Japan: a neutrality agreement toward any Chinese attack;
- The UK preferred Japan to Germany because of its specific Geopolitics v.s. Russia;
- Germany became a geopolitical threat to the UK (P. 302);
- In 1903, the Great Britain started to resolve its difficulties with France and Russia;
- Germany became passive aggressive.



از توجه شما ممنونم