Essay on Hamdeli Newspaper - May 14, 2018 -
The original text was in Persian and the following translation was done by Ai.
In the past week, we have witnessed the withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA and the subsequent reactions, which are very interesting in their own right and require special attention both at the national and elite levels.
What should be noted and understood at the beginning of any analysis is that the United States, like other power structures and non-autocratic systems, is not a single and coherent whole, contrary to what many believe; because in fact, part of the stubbornness displayed by the current, awkward US president is his opposition to everything that is considered the legacy and achievement of the Barack Obama administration. The evidence for this claim is the much more baseless negotiations with the most dangerous nuclear military power, North Korea. It seems that someone who considers direct, bilateral negotiations with such an unpredictable regime permissible should not rationally disrupt a multilateral, solid, and successful agreement like this, not with a regime that has a nuclear bomb, but with a country whose understanding of the international community, for whatever reason, demanded greater oversight of its peaceful nuclear activities.
At the same time, the most important event that is easily visible in today's comparison of the "nuclear" confrontation between Iran and the United States compared to the years 2005 to 2013, is the type of reaction of other countries in the world, including the European Union, East Asia, China, and Russia, and even a country like Canada.
If during the peak years of the Iranian nuclear tension, for reasons including the global legitimacy of the Obama administration and the less than professional and coherent behavior of Iran's nuclear and non-nuclear diplomacy, not only US allies but also neutral countries and even Russia and China, as well as the United Nations Security Council, supported Obama in approving and implementing various sanctions, today all members of the nuclear agreement except the United States immediately come to their defense due to Iran's active diplomacy during the achievement of the JCPOA and its tens of billions of euros worth of trade agreements with Iran.
In addition, due to the balanced and rational behavior and positions of the Iranian government and diplomatic apparatus and the unilateral and illegitimate disruption of the JCPOA by the United States, the issue has gone beyond mere commercial-political interactions and exchanges and is becoming an identity-sovereignty issue for governments and the European Union as well.
From what has been said above, it can easily be concluded that in today's conditions, Iran can potentially have the upper hand in relations surrounding this issue. The effectiveness of this force depends on calmness and the continuation of the rational position that has created the gap in question between our opposing sides (i.e. Europe and the United States).
Rushing to make decisions, reactive actions, and any ill-considered stance can bring these divergent positions closer together again and rob us of the initiative.
At a superficial glance, it may seem that "Kadkhoda" has left the JCPOA, but if we pay more attention, it becomes clear that today's situation is fundamentally different from the situation in the Saadabad and Paris agreements. Because today, due to all these years of conflict and the resulting results, the description of "Kadkhoda" is being separated from the United States.
If rationality and concentration in command are preserved in all areas of the country's security, the gap that has emerged between the great powers can be fully exploited.
This issue, of course, requires an acknowledgement of the country's need to continue to maintain balance in diplomacy in the style of the Rouhani administration, which has been able to carry out matters technically at the highest and most up-to-date international standards, due to the quality prevailing at the highest level of diplomacy, and has brought many achievements to the country, some of which were mentioned above.
But the most important achievement of the nuclear negotiations leading to the JCPOA is the country's withdrawal from Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, which, prior to Resolution 2231, had officially condemned our country as a threat to international peace and security due to its status and had received several Security Council resolutions (including Resolution 1929). Resolutions that could potentially pave the way for countries and regimes seeking excuses to create tension, give military conflict legal legitimacy, and lead the world to any crazy action.
This is the same issue that, due to its conflict with Resolution 2231, the war-mongering regimes in the region are seeking, with media-psychological fervor and sometimes military moves, to provide a reason and excuse to put Iran in the corner of condemnation and then harm it without disturbing the international community.
These threats can lead to working with Europe, China, Russia, and subsequent powers such as India, Korea, Turkey, etc. as long as the rationality and efficiency of the diplomatic apparatus continues at the highest levels, and the same standard spreads to the lower layers of the Foreign Ministry, and the authority of the diplomatic apparatus and its head is maintained. The opportunity must be cherished in the best possible way and the existing rift must be exploited in the interests of national security.
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