Pezzekian's assets for constructive interaction with the world

۱۳ مرداد ۱۴۰۳ Dialogues

Interview with Iran Newspaper, reported by (Noor News) August 4, 2024 -

The original text is in Persian and the translation below was done by Ai.

Noor News-International Group:

Constructive interaction is the main axis of Masoud Pezzekian's foreign policy. What are the basic conceptual characteristics of constructive interaction?

Karimi:

Foreign policy in Iran operates under a general framework, namely the proposition "neither East nor West" and the principle of "honor, wisdom, and expediency." Constructive interaction is also a concept that has been mentioned in Iran's top-level documents and all governments have made it their slogan, but realizing constructive interaction in practice requires great courage and having skilled agents. We see that prominent figures who have such courage in their records are always criticized and paid for.

Do you mean Mr. Mohammad Javad Zarif?

Yes, Mr. Zarif, Hassan Rouhani, Seyyed Abbas Araqchi, and Ali Akbar Salehi are a team that has been attacked a lot. But another point is that you interact with countries with which you either have tension or at least do not have warm diplomatic relations. In order not to fall behind the development caravan in the West Asian region, Iran needs other countries to behave normally and not in a tense manner with it. Therefore, the Iranian side must also regulate its foreign policy in a way that does not give an excuse to ill-wishers and regional rivals. Constructive interaction makes sense where we can meet three goals. The foreign policy of the doctors is also based on these principles, namely national interest, national security, and national dignity.

Abedi:

The constructive interaction plan in the new period has been proposed in contrast to the orientalist policy of the previous government (Raisi). The country's national goals and interests are constant and do not change with the change of governments or ruling factions. As I believe, the constructive interaction policy was also proposed in the Raisi government, but due to international restrictions and pressures, the orientalist approach was very prominent as the declared policy of the government. Iran shares interests with the eastern powers for various reasons, including geographical constraints. Our security is almost interconnected, and when the security issue regarding Iran arose, we have witnessed the supportive reaction of China and Russia. For example, after the Iran-Israel confrontation, when Iran's security was threatened, the two countries tried to lower the level of conflict and help Iran's security against Israel, as they sided with Tehran in the Security Council.

So you consider constructive engagement to be the approach of the Pezizian government against the policy of orientalism of the Raisi government?

Abedi:

I consider constructive engagement to be in line with the policy of orientalism and not in opposition to it, with the explanation that both approaches are the fixed strategy of the Islamic Republic's foreign policy, and one of these approaches or a combination of both is used at any given time, depending on the regional and international conditions.

After decades of trial and error in Iran's foreign policy, it has reached a fixed strategic line, which means that we cannot have complex strategic relations with eastern powers, but we have close relations and common interests, and we also have geographical requirements and security links, and we are united in important organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS. The policy of orientalism has been in line with Iran’s interests, and now, in the approach of constructive engagement, it should be noted that this approach does not mean relations only with the West and turning our backs on the East. Similarly, Iran’s principled policy of supporting the axis of resistance will not be overshadowed.

Mr. Karimi, you mentioned that the main direction of interaction is usually with countries with which we have problems in relations. Specifically, there is currently a clear distrust between Iran and Europe and Iran and the United States. How do you see the foreign policy outlook of the Pezizian government in dealing with the West?

Karimi:

The most important part of the new government's foreign policy, as Pezkashian emphasized, will be that the government avoids imposing a single-option foreign policy on the country. For example, before this, there was a strategic alliance perception of the orientalist approach, meaning that China and Russia are Tehran's strategic allies against the West. However, in the post-polar world, the East-West bloc has become ineffective and today's world is not a world of all-inclusive alliances. Rather, today's world is a world of issue-based alliances. That is, you may have an alliance with a country on one issue while at the same time having a disagreement with the same country on another issue. Therefore, each issue must be examined separately. For example, Russia once avoided giving the S-300 defense system to Iran before the JCPOA agreement, but now the same Russia is giving the S-400 system to Turkey, which is a member of NATO. Foreign policy must be balanced in order not to be a single-option. That is, you can also have relations with the West to the same extent as you can have relations with major countries in Asia or the East. Of course, the contexts are different and you need to de-escalate. De-escalation does not mean Westernization, but because you have the most tension with Western countries, de-escalation is usually highlighted in constructive interaction with Western countries. A multi-option foreign policy, with a diverse portfolio of choices, requires maintaining current relations and developing relations with other countries. De-escalation based on a balanced foreign policy has enemies in the form of radicalism both at home and abroad. In the United States, radicals such as right-wing Republicans, and in the region of Israel and some other countries, and also at home, extremist tendencies are opposed to de-escalation.

Ms. Abedi Western countries, and specifically Europeans and Americans, did not have a very clear opinion or welcome the results of the Iranian elections. Does this indicate the continuation of distrust between the two sides?

Abedi:

The way Westerners confront the results of the Iranian elections is due to their acceptance of Iran's political identity and its strategic line. They have accepted that there is a stability in Iran's political system and its foreign policy that is in conflict with the West. We have an identity conflict with the West on several levels. The identity of the ideological and independent policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran has been in conflict with the system of domination and domination of the West and international institutions over the world since the beginning of the revolution and its continuation for 4 decades. Therefore, they know that this fixed identity does not change with the change of governments in Iran and that decision-making on macro-political issues is in the hands of the government, not the government.

At the regional and international levels, the interests of Iran and the West are also opposite to each other. The role that Iran plays in the regional order is by forming the axis of resistance and its spiritual leadership against the American-Israeli order. We have had a separation between the United States and Europe several times, but under the leadership of the United States and NATO, they tried to introduce Iran as a common threat. Concerns about Iran's missile capabilities and nuclear program, etc., cause the atmosphere of distrust to increase.

Therefore, do you think that the outcome of the elections in Iran and the announcement of Mr. Pezzekian's engagement plan will not have an effect on breaking the distrust between Iran and the West?

Abedi:

Now, there are some agreements on a case-by-case basis. The West, and specifically the United States, has come to the conclusion that if they do not move towards ad hoc agreements with Iran, the nightmare they themselves are proposing, namely an alliance between Iran, Russia, and China, will be formed, and this alliance will affect the interests of the West in West Asia and Southeast Asia.

We will soon have Mr. Pezzekian’s speech at the UN. What do you think the focus of his speech will be? Do you think he will present an innovative plan to end conflicts that have also involved Iran, such as the Gaza or Ukraine wars, or do you think he will continue everything in silence for now?

Karimi:

The axis of resistance is part of the elements of power in the Islamic Republic of Iran, so there is no reason for the new president to want to reduce the level of support. This was also the case in the Khatami and Rouhani governments, and it does not conflict with Pezzekian’s foreign policy. Just as Saudi Arabia, having friendly relations with major powers in the region, carries out its intended actions, the Islamic Republic will also have its own actions in the region. The other side also does not expect Iran to retreat from the axis of resistance through an election.

But regarding the UN speech, it is very hasty for Mr. Pezzekian to present a plan for the region or the international system. At the same time, the government's real program will be determined by the proposal and introduction of the proposed foreign minister to the parliament and the speech that the minister proposes. We must wait until then. If the proposed minister votes, it will show that the parliament is also with the proposed program of the new government. In the case of Pezdikian, a change is also going to be made in foreign policy, but this does not mean the loss of elements of power in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Pezdikian is going to repair the existing gaps. What we have witnessed in the past few weeks is also influenced by the election-torn atmosphere in the United States. Let us note that in Washington we are heading towards ambiguous and uncertain elections. With Mr. Biden's withdrawal from the election, this ambiguity has become even more pronounced. The Europeans (meaning the Troika) also criticize their behavior in dealing with Iran. We should also remind you that when Mr. Rouhani handed over the government to Mr. Raisi, even though Iran was not in a good position internationally and sanctions had been reimposed by Trump, during the Trump era, the Rouhani government was able to keep the Europeans politically on its side and, of course, indebted to Iran. We even saw legally in the Security Council votes that the Europeans did not go along with Trump's demands against Iran. During these three years, however, it gradually happened that the European Troika's approach towards Iran became negative and harsh, and this requires rebuilding relations with them in the process of bilateral and multilateral dialogue. They must also admit that the mistake began on their side. But Mr. Pezzekian is pursuing an opportunistic foreign policy, so if other countries want to welcome this issue, they have an easy task ahead of them. Because both they and Iran will benefit from the new relations. Implementing the JCPOA is an important example, and confronting Iranophobia is another example.

Mr. Karimi said that the politics of the doctors is opportunistic. Considering the complete replacement of Harris with Biden, who has always been on the side of Israel, is it possible that Harris will have a difference with Biden in this regard, and what effects will this have on Iran?

Abedi:

Iran is seeking acceptance by the West and the world from alternating games or alternating strategies from orientalist politics to constructive interaction. Iran is always seeking to be accepted as at least a medium and regional power, and each time, alternating with alternating strategies, it has sought to consolidate its position between the East and the West. Iran was able to achieve some of its goals against the Eastern powers under the influence of international developments such as the war in Ukraine. Regardless of the criticisms that there are against China and Russia. But Iran consolidated its position in West Asia with China and Russia, and now it is seeking to have the same consolidation of its position against the West. The discussion of constructive engagement that was raised in Mr. Pezzekian's article was accompanied by a critical approach towards the West, of course, with a different language and the fact that we are seeking to build trust. Therefore, if we want to talk about the text of Pezzekian's speech at the UN, we will still witness a critical approach towards the West, while at the same time opening windows for dialogue. Iran has moved towards creating a gap between Europe and America, or at least using this language and space to declare that Iran is a normative actor. America's unwavering support for Israel in the Gaza war has certainly contributed to Iran's discourse both regionally and internationally.

All the goals that Pezzekian pursues may be in newer language, but they are the same established goals that strengthen the Islamic Republic’s principled discourse and strategy.

Iran can use the space created between Europe and the United States to its advantage. Iran can raise the issue of the JCPOA without the United States again. Overall, I am optimistic. We have reached a strategic line. Mr. Pezzekian has also shown that he supports this line. The government’s diplomatic apparatus must implement the same strategic line. I think that government institutions will play a more decisive role in foreign policy from now on, such as the Strategic Council for Foreign Relations and the Supreme National Security Council.

Ms. Abedi is trying to paint the differences between Iran and the West as identity-based and conflict-based, and that Iran has a fixed strategy in foreign policy, with the government only having an executive role in foreign policy. If we accept this idea, the implication is that governments in Iran are not much different from each other, and Mr. Pezzekian, for example, will not be any different from Mr. Raisi in foreign policy. Of course, we have also had cases in the confrontation between Iran and the West that violate Ms. Abedi's position.

Karimi:

The law says that the general framework of foreign policy is determined by the leadership, which is not necessarily fixed and may change based on international developments and the need to secure Iran's interests. In any case, when you have a foreign minister who is introduced by the head of state and receives a vote of confidence from the parliament, the minister is the result of a presidential and parliamentary election. Therefore, the developments and situation in the country are supposed to be determined based on elections in areas that are under the government's purview. A large part of our country's problems are due to foreign policy. Therefore, if in an election the people vote for a faction or approach that is against the status quo, not changing the conditions is turning their backs on the people's vote. If there were to be no change in foreign policy with the election of a new government, Mr. Raisi should not have changed the foreign policy of Mr. Rouhani's era in the previous government, even though we know that this change occurred. Therefore, this right is also conceivable for Mr. Pezzekian.

What the law says is that the implementation and practical policy-making of foreign policy is the responsibility of the government, while the upstream institutions that the leadership has instructed are also responsible for decision-making in upstream institutions, the most important of which is the Supreme National Security Council, whose 6 members are members of the government, in addition to the fact that its chairman is also the president. In the past, we have also seen that the leadership, in accordance with international conditions and the requirements of national interests, has sometimes allowed entry into the JCPOA negotiations and allowed direct or indirect negotiations with the United States.

Ms. Abedi said that decision-making in foreign policy in the new period will be under the authority of the governing institutions.

Karimi:

No, I do not agree. The government is also part of the government, and in addition to the fact that, for example, the Supreme National Security Council is also the chairman and a number of its members are the government. If the meaning of governance includes the leadership and all institutions under the governance, then the government is also part of the governance. The government is the most important pillar of governance after the leadership. For example, the Seventh Development Plan was written by the government as a upstream document.

What are the advantages or assets that the Pezizian government can rely on to succeed in the policy of engagement?

Abadi:

The policy that Iran has pursued for the past three years has been to revive the nuclear deal. Mr. Pezzekian’s coming to power, especially by playing the role of Mr. Zarif, will help strengthen Iran’s position to revive the nuclear deal, regardless of what obstacles there are from the West or even inside Iran. Iran is seeking negotiations with the United States, and the new government will consider direct or indirect negotiations with the United States, but if that doesn’t work, Iran can substitute the European option for both economic exchanges and agreements and the revival of the JCPOA or the resolution of the nuclear issue.

Karimi:

Pezzekian’s most important asset is his electoral portfolio. Based on his electoral positions, Pezzekian and his government are seeking to de-escalate tensions and lift sanctions and international pressure on Iran. It has now become clear that it is impossible to separate the economy and foreign relations. I think the most important element that Pezzekian has that the late Mr. Raisi did not have is the voter turnout and social base. Mr. Raisi’s vote base was those who were not very interested in de-escalating tensions, lifting sanctions, and engaging with the world in the sense that Mr. Pezzekian suggests. The second asset is that prominent and so-called high-ranking officials are willing to work with Pezzekian. This is a good advantage for a president who can use experts in any field.

How stable and receptive will regional and global relations and developments, such as the Gaza war or the Ukraine war or the ongoing competition between the United States and China, be to the interactive approach of the Pezzekian government?

Karimi:

I would like to start by saying that the regional and international environment from 2019 to 2020 is much less prepared for reaching a nuclear agreement. Because Iran has been wrongly securitized, and we were oblivious to this issue in the past 3 years and allowed it to happen that, although the West eased sanctions and oil sales, our debt to the JCPOA was lost. The work of doctors is much more difficult. Due to the unpreparedness, the situation is as if the world has adapted to Iran's absence or absence from transportation corridors and oil and gas supply chains. Iran's role has been reduced to that of a security actor, whether positive or negative. If the government's or foreign policy's powers are to be limited in issues related to the nuclear file, as was the case during Mr. Rouhani's term, it will be very difficult. But if the negotiator is to be able to negotiate and give and take in different areas, it will make it easier to find a solution. Of course, our principled policy is not to link nuclear and non-nuclear issues, but it may be necessary for the negotiators to be more open to resolve the issue of sanctions. The issue before us is the issue of snapback and the October 2025 sunset in the JCPOA, and we must formulate policies in such a way that the remaining period of the JCPOA dispute resolution mechanism, i.e., snapback, is not implemented.

Abedi:

Following Mr. Karimi’s words, I would like to say that the change of governments and the change of agents are an opportunity for approaches to change. Fortunately, the change of governments in Iran has now become symmetrical with some European countries, and in the near future with the United States, and possibly in Ukraine if elections are held. There is even the possibility of a change of government in Israel. These are effective and create an opportunity for interaction so that the crises can at least subside through negotiations.

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