Diplomacy on the Brink

۰۹ آبان ۱۴۰۵ Interviews

Interview with the Donyaye Eqtesad newspaper – October 31, 2026 - 

 

 

In a discussion with Sasan Karimi, a professor at the University of Tehran, the question is explored: Can the exchange of letters prevent another war?

Saeideh Sadat Fahri: The delivery of a letter from the U.S. Vice President to Mohsen Rezaei, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, has once again fueled speculation regarding a shift in the communication channel between Tehran and Washington—and the potential opening of a new path for dialogue. This development, occurring against a backdrop of persistent military threats and a fragile diplomatic landscape, raises questions about the true objectives of the United States. Sasan Karimi, a professor at the University of Tehran, points to Washington’s desire to secure a political achievement ahead of the U.S. midterm elections; he believes the Trump administration is seeking a swift agreement with Iran—even if it is merely temporary and limited in scope. According to Karimi, Tehran should not sacrifice its long-term interests for the sake of Washington’s electoral considerations. Instead, he argues, Tehran should take the initiative by proposing a comprehensive and sustainable framework—one that addresses all points of contention from the outset, thereby avoiding the creation of fragile, multi-stage agreements.

 

- Why was Mohsen Rezaei chosen to receive the letter from U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance? Does this choice signify a change in the communication channel between Washington and Tehran—suggesting an attempt to engage with a specific figure or faction within Iran’s power structure—or is it simply a matter of designating an official to deliver a message?

It appears that following the violation of the Islamabad understanding and the disruption of the communication channel established between Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf and the American side—specifically regarding his contacts with J.D. Vance—Washington has sought a new avenue to convey messages to Tehran. The selection of Mohsen Rezaei can be analyzed within this context. Given the nature of the issues under discussion—such as a ceasefire, the war, and potential future relations—it is natural that defense, security, and political dimensions play a decisive role in this process. From this perspective, the Americans have likely concluded that they need to engage with a different figure on the Iranian side. Of course, the final decision regarding Iran’s representatives and key figures in negotiations rests with Tehran itself. The Foreign Minister, the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), the Speaker of the Parliament, and the President each play a role within their respective capacities; however, it seems that under current circumstances, the American side views the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council as the central figure for the operational handling of matters concerning the war and negotiations.

 

- Could the selection of the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council as the recipient of American messages influence the course of negotiations?
Undoubtedly, agents and negotiators—by virtue of their personal temperaments, backgrounds, and individual perspectives—can influence the advancement of policies. However, I believe that the choice of the specific individual is not the core issue at present. At least in terms of their public stances, there is no significant divergence in the views held by Mr. Araghchi, Mr. Qalibaf, Mr. Mohsen Rezaei, and Mr. Pezeshkian. The primary challenge for Iran lies in ensuring that its interests are secured on a sustainable basis, while the United States seeks to ensure it can present a narrative of the conflict in which it has not "lost." Achieving such an objective depends less on the individual negotiator and more on the structural design of the agreement, the terms of the deal, and the willingness of both sides to engage in a reciprocal exchange of concessions. In essence, a mechanism must be established that recognizes the interests of both parties and enables each to present a credible narrative regarding the outcome of the negotiations.

 

- In your view, what is the primary objective behind the Donald Trump administration’s decision to send this letter? Is Washington genuinely seeking to reopen a path toward negotiations, or is it attempting to compel Iran to accept its terms by combining the threat of military action with an offer of dialogue?
Negotiations typically involve each side striving to secure its own interests—and, at times, attempting to impose certain conditions upon the other; this has long been a characteristic of traditional diplomacy. A more contemporary approach, however, focuses on identifying a solution that maximizes benefits while minimizing costs for all parties involved. Yet, thus far, there has been no clear indication in the statements or actions of the American side that they are moving toward such a model. Conversely, Iran must also be capable of proposing a framework that yields an outcome tolerable and acceptable to all involved parties. In my view, the core issue at present is the U.S. desire to secure a political achievement in the near term—particularly with the country’s midterm elections approaching. It appears that Washington is aiming to reach an agreement—whether temporary, limited, or preliminary—prior to the elections. ...an agreement that could be framed as a political achievement. Conversely, Iran must assess whether such an agreement would truly serve its long-term interests. From this perspective, a limited and temporary agreement—whether in terms of its scope or its duration—does not necessarily meet Iran’s needs. It appears that Tehran should take the initiative and present a comprehensive, sustainable proposal—one that addresses the points of contention from the outset and leads to a permanent agreement, rather than fragmenting the resolution process into several distinct and fragile stages.

 

- Given the approaching U.S. midterm elections and the Trump administration’s efforts to secure a political achievement, what scenarios lie ahead for relations between Tehran and Washington? Is it possible that a partial or limited agreement might be announced before the elections?

I do not believe that a partial, temporary agreement could serve Iran’s interests under current circumstances; in fact, I would not recommend such a model at all. Iran’s position should be that either no agreement is reached, or any agreement formed must be comprehensive, durable, and backed by a solid foundation. An agreement designed solely for a quick result would likely serve only the short-term needs of the United States—unless the American side is prepared to reach a comprehensive and permanent accord. Given Washington’s time constraints and electoral considerations, however, achieving such an outcome in the short term seems unlikely. In reality, an agreement that addresses only a portion of the disputes while deferring the resolution of other issues to a later stage would be inherently fragile from the outset. Such a model cannot guarantee the stability of relations in the long term.

- In light of assessments suggesting that Iran could be on the verge of a new round of conflict, could accepting a temporary agreement—even if it fails to secure the country’s long-term interests—at least prevent the outbreak of war?

It is not necessarily the case that a temporary agreement would prevent war. What can actually avert conflict is an agreement that is robust rather than fragile—one that entails a genuine exchange of concessions and secures the interests of both parties in a sustainable manner. In other words, preventing war depends less on the principle of negotiation—or even the mere existence of an agreement—than on the content of that agreement and the benefits it generates for the parties involved. If an agreement can yield genuine, lasting benefits—and, crucially, neutralize Israel’s incentives to move toward war—it could prove effective in reducing the risk of conflict. Therefore, I believe that a partial or interim agreement would not, in itself, be particularly effective for Iran. What matters is crafting an agreement capable of eliminating the underlying conditions that fuel persistent tension and war.

 

 

 

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