Essay on Etemad Newspaper, November 8, 2020 -
The original text is in Persian and the following translation was done by Ai.
The Trump era, like many crises in contemporary history, has passed, and now politicians from other countries around the world are discussing planning for relations with the upcoming government in Washington, which will probably be a government of professionals, as it should be. Friendship or enmity with a government is of course an important issue, but the professionalism and technocratic nature of that friend, rival, or enemy is a matter of course. But what is always the unshakable principle of any country's foreign policy is to secure national interests from the disruption of this friendship, competition, camaraderie, or enmity. Certainly, just as taking it easy and simple in relations with any country is a kind of loss for national interests, directly or indirectly causing unnecessary conflicts and not taking advantage of the opportunities that have arisen will definitely be considered damaging to national interests.
Regarding Iran-US relations, the reality is that this relationship has not been uniform in terms of content throughout the period after the Islamic Revolution: from cooperation, enmity, and secret competition on one issue to the culmination of public negotiations that took place around the JCPOA, which seemed to have opened a new chapter in bilateral relations.
If we look at the latter, the JCPOA negotiations, during which a number of marginal issues were resolved, we can admit that the basis for establishing this new trend, with all its shortcomings and holes, was the presence of two serious and somewhat similar currents in Iran and the US. The Obama-Kerry current in Washington, which emphasized and pledged for the first time that it was not seeking to overthrow the political system in Iran, and also confidence-building measures such as "accepting the principle of enrichment on Iranian soil," paved the way for the start of direct negotiations, and the emergence of the Rouhani-Zarif team in Tehran, which, given their old positions and traditional relations with US senators, were able to advance the issue technically. The common point of both these teams was the recognition of the political will of the other side to negotiate and resolve the issue and play the game with a positive outcome.
The weaknesses that existed in the JCPOA relations and negotiations, as well as the preservation of its achievement before the Trump administration came to power in Washington, are of course numerous, but the most important of them is the lack of a history of official relations between them. This issue itself causes instability in the course of relations. The next weakness in these relations was the existence of assumptions and, of course, an atmosphere of distrust on the part of both countries towards the other, which essentially, as a self-fulfilling prophecy, causes unnecessary problems in advancing the negotiations and preserving the result. In addition, the lack of trade relations between them - which was of course a great expectation for that era - as a factor that strengthens diplomatic relations, largely prevented the issue from becoming a mere political issue into a public and commercial matter that would involve the interests of many groups in society. Ultimately, the annoying and decisive factor was the extremists on both sides who were trying to block the path to continuing to fulfill the commitments. Of course, on the American side, these extremists, after coming to power in the 2016 elections and the emergence of the Trump phenomenon, largely turned the JCPOA’s light toward extinction in terms of content.
It is clear that Trump, who was one of the exceptions in the international arena, had many problems in preserving the JCPOA: one of the most important of them was his insistence on destroying everything that was left of Barack Obama. For those who see technical flaws as the reason for America’s withdrawal from the JCPOA, it is noteworthy that Trump withdrew from many international treaties that in some cases had also been approved by Congress, and therefore, for him, it made no difference in the meaning of what the text of the negotiations and the agreement reached was. Simply being left behind from the Obama era was enough for him to withdraw.
Another important factor was his suffering from the Cold War mentality in international relations, which considered any agreement to be a local victory for one side and an inevitable loss for the other, and he happened to state this explicitly. This point, of course, made Iran more insistent and confident in not accepting any supplementary or renewed negotiations. Pompeo's twelve conditions for Iran to enter the negotiations also confirmed this meaning.
In addition, Trump and the movements that supported him basically do not believe in multilateralism and multilateral agreements in the international space and consider a good agreement to be an agreement imposed by a strong and winning side on a weak and losing side, and this caused this group to fail in everything they tried to achieve in foreign policy. Because it should be noted that, considering the elements of America's traditional power in the world, achieving this amount of failure and isolation in the international space requires fundamental mistakes and is not an easy task.
In any case, the United States today, regardless of its electoral and post-election games, finds itself on the verge of returning to an era that, after the failures of the George W. Bush era, was somewhat committed to multilateralism and a relative retreat from the illusion of unipolarity in the international space. This meaning, of course, carries with it post-Trump sensitivities that are worth noting.
Iran, which has paid one of the greatest costs due to the presence of this exceptional phenomenon in the White House and has of course acquired significant prestige for itself, is now at an important juncture where, if it places its pieces on the chessboard correctly, it can both regain its previous achievements and exploit the weaknesses left over from the Trump era for the benefit of its national interests. Reason dictates that Iran should use the cost it has paid in these four years well for the benefit of its national interests and not lower its position simply by giving it the opportunity to be radical.
For example, one of the most important positions heard during the US elections was the statements of French and German officials, both of whom stated that America would not easily return to its previous relations with Europe and its position in the international community in the same style and context. This is an indication of Europe's willingness to use the defensive stance of the United States, which is the legacy of the Trump administration, and incidentally, this passage is the most important point that Iran can close with an appropriate stance and the activities of its foreign policy expert staff.
Certainly, to solve the country's problems, it is necessary to look inward and find a solution by relying on the country's internal strength and expert staff. However, it should be noted that, incidentally, one of the most strategic human resources available in the country is expert capacity in the field of foreign relations.
Playing the right game in the international space can consolidate Iran's position on the international stage. The fact that Iran has not backed down from its position despite all the pressure against Trump puts this country in a good position today for future relations. Because various governments around the world, including the next US government, have in mind that even the greatest pressure has not been able to force this country to do what it does not want, and therefore this path is closed. On the other hand, with all this expense, there is no reason why we should not use the current crisis in the international arena to consolidate and consolidate our positions, just for the sake of superficial domestic competition.
Today, with more appropriate language from Biden and his team, Iran will be able to enter the field and demand its share of benefits while maintaining the prestige gained from a position of power. In this path, while maintaining the necessary authority and pride in the international arena, it is necessary to avoid throwing the issue into the path of tension and confrontation, which is probably not needed to a large extent, and calmly emphasize its principled positions. Because the presence of people with a more pleasant appearance in Washington is a double-edged sword: Just as it is possible to put them on a path that, for various reasons - including their competition with Trump and the neocons on the one hand, and the passivity left over from the previous administration in the international arena - can lead them to play a rational game with Iran, even if it is for their own interests, the wrong team or the wrong game can easily unite various circles that have never aligned with Trump with Biden and lead them to the path of isolation, which, of course, is not a condition of reason and serving the national interests.
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