Essay on Shargh Newspaper October 28, 2020 -
The original text is in Persian and the following translation was done by Ai.
On the eve of the tumultuous elections in the United States of America, which will either end the presence of the most controversial president of this country or continue it for another term, the situation in Iran is also getting hotter every day. In the meantime, a few facts should be mentioned in order to be able to extract analysis and prescriptions from it:
The fact is that Iran is one of the countries that faced the most pressure after Donald Trump came to power in the United States: sanctions that are much more intense and more pressing than during the Obama era, which have included almost all major aspects of the economy and life of Iranians. This maximum pressure, some of whose designers, such as John Bolton, are no longer in the ruling team today, has been most evident in Iran's economic indicators, but at the same time, it is also clearly seen in other issues such as health and treatment.
The second fact is that despite the developments briefly mentioned, maximum pressure has not come close to achieving its "determined goals" in any way: no catastrophic crises such as those that have arisen in the past in countries such as Zimbabwe and Venezuela have occurred in Iran, no shortages of food and health supplies, no shortages of basic goods, and most of all, Iran has not retreated from its positions in the JCPOA and rushed to negotiate with Trump on its knees.
Meanwhile, while the US power-oriented policy largely implements its hard goals unilaterally, it must be acknowledged that in these years, the political and diplomatic victory has almost always been with Iran: from the Hague Tribunal to the Security Council, the failure of the anti-Iran meetings in Poland and Bahrain, numerous Security Council votes, and all the items on the long political list, all of which ended to the detriment of the United States and, collectively, can be considered the most important axes of the Trump administration's isolation on the political and diplomatic scene. All of these show that Iran has been able to defend its interests to an acceptable extent in this regard, commensurate with its strong economic and strategic power, as well as the international power-axis system in the current circumstances. Another important fact is the principle of the US elections, and that in any case, according to most reliable polls, Trump will lose the election by a significant margin. It seems that the criticisms and doubts arising from experiences such as the previous elections have basically made the audience skeptical of this type of analysis, but if we consider that what the polls claimed at the national level came true, we arrive at the analysis that without investing in one of the expected results in Washington, all situations are worth analyzing as possible options.
Another thing that has engulfed the world today is the coronavirus. A pandemic that both imposes a great depreciation on financial resources and has indirectly caused serious damage to medium and large economies in the world: a reality that can be observed in the recent report of the International Monetary Fund.
Contrary to many mostly superficial analyses, it is almost certain that Iran will be able to continue its integrated life even in the worst short-term situation, i.e. Trump's re-election. But if there is a question, it will not be based on Iran's power and threat, but rather on Iran's choice whether to negotiate on various national and sovereign axes or to emphasize its current positions: something that will be difficult to guess, at least without scientific polls, as if each ideology is trying to present the tendency close to its own opinion as obvious.
If we want to go beyond official positions and to some extent slogans, we must admit that part of the issue of foreign policy and the impact it will have on the US elections will be due to the competitions in domestic politics and, most importantly, the election scene next year. While there will be few candidates for power when Trump is in the White House due to all-round pressures and lack of sufficient resources, as the probability of Joe Biden's victory increases, the number of candidates for the 1400 elections will increase, and the tension between the different factions will also increase. Because on the other hand, the analysis of the Democrats' victory assumes that he will immediately and unconditionally return to the JCPOA, and if that does not happen, there is probably a will within the system to take advantage of the opportunity for him to be in power. Therefore, the main political tendencies, and above all the traditional and staunch critics of the JCPOA, are determined to use this opportunity to their own reputation and efficiency by attacking it and the Rouhani government, by taking over the government and the issue of possible negotiations.
At the same time, it seems better to open one's hand and take the initiative in the field of foreign policy by preparing plans for different situations, instead of guessing and investing in the outcome of the US elections and adopting a rigid position early. Because it provides Iran with the opportunity to play games in possible situations, and even if the Democrats win, their behavior can be managed to some extent. This plan and the design of various options for different scenes should, above all, be designed in a professional manner with the principled positions of the government in previous years, and should also set its goal, instead of competing in the field of domestic politics - that is, the mechanism of seizing power, winning elections in the hope of reforming things, and ultimately wasting opportunities due to procrastination and trial and error - to sustainably secure national interests in the field of foreign policy, so that in the future it will not be fundamentally profitable for different governments to place Iran at the center of their foreign policy tensions. This issue, of course, requires the use of elites in both design and implementation. So that the traditional administrative body may not be able to meet the needs ahead, and it may be necessary to utilize the country's academic capacity to design and implement the scenarios desired by the relevant institutions, as the American team did in the JCPOA negotiations.
The best help that unspecialized and unqualified political forces can provide to the country and national interests in such junctures is to withdraw from fierce, unprofessional competitions and not impose costs. Because except for those whose education and work experience are at the highest level in the world - regardless of political orientation - there is no possibility of victory for the country and the permanent removal of the shadow of sanctions and threats from the country. Even the former companions, if it is decided to continue the path with a restored combination or another format, it is better to stop seeking political participation for the sake of consensus and avoid creating unnecessary tensions.
The fact is that Trump is an exception in international politics. Of course, this does not mean the goodwill of other American politicians. Rather, it is his annoying and rebellious form in the face of international treaties that has led to childish positions such as withdrawing from the JCPOA. We too should not allow such a lowly exception in American and international politics to change our domestic and foreign policy equations in the medium and long term and to remove us from the will and procedure we had adopted before he came to power.
In short, despite all the pressures, Iran has been successful in its resistance to Trump up to the present moment, and translating this success into the language of long-term national interests is by anticipating and preparing serious and realistic versions of an active, innovative and independent foreign policy program in advance and for various possible conditions with the will of the system and using the country's elite power - in the real and up-to-date sense in the world.
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