Post-Election Diplomacy

۰۷ مهر ۱۴۰۱ Essays

Essay on Etemad Newspaper September 28, 2020 -

The original text is in Persian and the following translation was done by Ai.

Today, Iran's foreign policy has become a scene of repeated positions and simultaneous silence and expectation due to various circumstances. Who does not know that more than anything else, this upcoming election in Washington will affect the major decisions of Iran's foreign policy as the main bottleneck of the country today? And who does not know that today's agents and disruptors of Iran's foreign policy also define themselves as men and political directions in the competition to elect the 13th president? Therefore, obtaining a correct analysis of US policy and what will happen in the election can be important and effective for everything that is considered action in Iran's domestic and foreign policy.

The fact is that the tradition of elections in the United States, according to what experts say, is less affected by foreign policy in peacetime. But at the same time, with the increasing influence of international news on the domestic audience, this influence is basically increasing in the United States, as in other countries.

Therefore, if we leave aside the domestic conditions of the United States, issues related to health and Corona, insurance and unemployment, the economy, internal security and such, a few points in the international space will be considered as the major issues of the Trump administration, which will in any case also affect the aforementioned issues as dependent variables.

What the current US president initially considered in international politics as his foreign policy goals had clear axes: the issue of trade relations with China and the European Union (the issue of the tariff war), the issue of North Korea, the issue of Iran and the withdrawal from the JCPOA, and finally the "Deal of the Century": issues that each failed to come to fruition in some way and as a result contributed to the isolation of the United States on the international stage to this day. Tensions with China and even Europe over the issue of tariffs did not go anywhere and ultimately the issue was suspended. What the United States started for was not achieved and its trade threats did not force China to retreat. Europe, although it has less autonomy and independence of action, is clearly dissatisfied with the trade policies of the United States and has not yet given in to them. Of course, in the latter case, the Brexit issue has ended up benefiting America's anti-European policies, and the more severe and violent this separation is, the more it will serve America's unilateral interests in weakening the European Union.

But the other two issues, North Korea and the "Deal of the Century" issue, were both mountains that gave birth to mice: the North Korea issue, while it initially progressed lightning-fast and even made hasty analysts see the fallacy of Trump's achievements, subsequently became slower and more tense. To the point that today, few people think that the North Korea issue has improved or is being resolved. What Trump was trying to sell to domestic and international audiences with great noise is today almost the most calm and quiet of issues.

The same goes for the issue of Israel: the plan that was proposed as the Deal of the Century, although initially proposed by Trump's entourage in the region, reached a point where, with the tacit rejection of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, Trump has been drawn into the lap of countries the size of Bahrain and the UAE to exploit it as an electoral achievement of his foreign policy. However, the intelligent audience does not forget that the claim was something else: a solution as grand as the Deal of the Century that would solve the entire Palestinian and Arab issue with Israel together.

But on the issue of Iran, the JCPOA and a new agreement: It is clear that in this case, Trump's main rival was not Iran but the Democratic Party and, in particular, Barack Obama himself. Therefore, at the insistence of his extremist advisors, the most famous of all, John Bolton (according to him in his recent book called The Room Where It Happened), and of course, according to him, in the hope of a better, i.e. more unilateral, agreement, he withdrew from the JCPOA so that any agreement with Iran would have his signature.

Of course, it is true that Iran has been subjected to unprecedented pressures in many dimensions, but it should be noted that Trump has also been completely unsuccessful in bringing it to its knees as a result of these pressures and, as a result, obtaining a unilateral agreement - of the kind he had set in the twelve preconditions - instead of the JCPOA. Especially when we look at the literal meaning of the phrase "maximum pressure", which means that America has used all its power to put pressure on Iran and is powerless to do more. It is as if, in the words of the White House officials themselves, the expectation was that Iranians would "snatch bread from each other", the government would not be able to pay its salaries and the country and its economy would completely fall apart: a goal that has been completely defeated with all the difficulties that have arisen.

This withdrawal from the JCPOA was not without cost for Trump: from the disagreements within his cabinet that led to the dismissal or resignation of his defense and foreign ministers before the withdrawal, to an unprecedented distance in international affairs since World War II that was created between the United States and its European allies (the Troika and the European Union as a whole), and even successive diplomatic, legal, and political failures:

Both cases such as the conviction of the United States in the Hague Tribunal, the change of topic of a meeting in the Security Council under Trump that was supposed to become an "Iran trial" in the last hours and the near-unanimous votes in contradiction to the United States' opinion in the UN Security Council that we have witnessed repeatedly, and the failed projects such as the Warsaw Conference and the Manama Conference to create a global consensus against Iran have collectively brought things to a point where today can be called one of the most isolated periods in American history in the international arena after World War II. A consensus that, despite its strong superiority over Europe, China, and Russia, has today turned against this country politically and has even shaken the country's will in harsh reactions and transformed its actions into stealthy moves such as the assassination of General Soleimani, and neither a harsh and tooth-crushing response to Iran when it shoots down an American drone nor the threat of targeting fifty-two points in Iran in response to any shot fired at American assets. These recent positions, meaning the lack of consensus behind them and therefore the wavering in the will to make harsh threats, have also caused rifts between Trump and the most radical parts of the Republican bloc, such as John Bolton, and people like him have become Trump's staunchest opponents on the eve of the elections. Now, what Trump is taking advantage of is the personal weakness of his opponent (Biden) and the security games he has launched on the streets of America to hide the issue of Corona and his own mismanagement behind potential and actual security crises.

With all these, because the main question in Iranian foreign policy is always how to deal with the United States if either candidate wins, and which one is in our favor? Should Iran invest in a Democratic victory and has it done so? The reality is that the way the Islamic Republic of Iran operates in its foreign policy is actually neither independent of its own domestic issues nor the domestic issues of the United States. Just as the 2016 election and Trump's rise to power have had an impact on the fate of the JCPOA, sanctions, the economy, and even social and security issues of this country, the upcoming elections will not be without impact on the continuation of the current trend or its change, and even on domestic policy issues such as next year's presidential election. But what must be known is that despite what is seen on the surface, Biden's victory may not necessarily turn the tables in Iran's favor, and Trump's victory may not necessarily benefit this country's position in the world. Of course, the hope of lifting sanctions and creating openings, especially in the oil and banking issues, is closer and more likely with the victory of the Democratic Party, but the depth of the problem in a strategic perspective may be somewhat distant from this logic.

Experience shows that the foreign policy of the United States has a "rigidity" aspect that makes it difficult to change it in a reactive manner. So that making such changes by Trump when he first came to power was also costly and noisy, as described above; something that seems unlikely from a person with Biden's characteristics, age, spirit, and background. Therefore, regardless of his recent announcements about raising human rights issues with Iran - which never seem serious - US foreign policy towards Iran will largely proceed as it is now. Therefore, the important change that seems significant to the analyst is that the Democratic Party and Biden himself, especially the moral support of Barack Obama, will have the ability to build a major consensus against Iran in the international arena: Trump's current loneliness, with Biden coming to power, can easily lead to a consensus that includes not only Europe, Japan, and others, but also, as in the Obama era, members such as China and Russia, and can make this task extremely difficult for Iran.

On the other hand, although Trump's re-election will contribute to America's isolation in the world in the long run and, in a broader perspective, to the transition of the international arena to a multipolar order and the complete withdrawal of America from the position of "hegemonic superiority", in the coming years and on the issue of Iran, it will make Trump less motivated to be soft on Iran than in the past and therefore more stubborn, because he is no longer waiting for any elections. Therefore, continuing the current course of the economy, oil, and banking will automatically lead to security and social challenges, and the task will become more difficult as time goes on.

Therefore, we can logically conclude that despite all the interdependence of foreign policy on Iranian domestic policy and US domestic policy, it is not right for Iran’s national interests to make decision-making and planning in foreign policy dependent on the US presidential election. Rather, what is essential for the country can be categorized and stated as follows:

1. Avoiding turning the issue of foreign policy into an electoral matter,

2. Making timely decisions and having ready scenarios for different events and postponing decision-making until after the November elections,

3. Playing the right game at the national level and with a governance appropriate to external events, because the victory of either side, as described, can be to the benefit or detriment of Iran’s national interests, and this will not depend on who wins, but on how Iran plays (choosing the right game).

4. Continuing the path of preventing consensus building against Iran in international forums through active diplomacy, 5. Entrusting the work to the experts in electoral crises and even in foreign policy by attracting the maximum number of elites (choosing the right actor), 6. Creating greater national consensus by exercising patience and suppressing short-term anger and petty issues on the part of all parties.

Etemad link