It is said in history that at least since the Safavid era, when European orientalists first set foot in Iran, Iranians, who avoided returning trips as much as possible and considered it a futile task, had a highly suspicious view of the good intentions of these orientalists. It is as if it cannot be denied that despite the negative effects that these trips and travel writers have sometimes had on our ancient works, the very act of daring to travel to a distant and extremely different country, and in fact, not being afraid of the unknown, has been what has bequeathed a treasure trove of knowledge as the future foundation of politics, trade, and economics for Europe and Western civilization.
In more recent times, perhaps, with a brief look at history, the successive defeats by Russia and others and the treaties imposed by it during the Qajar era, the two occupations of Iran during the world wars by Russian and British forces, the determination of Iran's role in 1941 and the coup of 1953, and then the unilateral relations in the twenty-five years leading up to the revolution can be considered a series of bitter memories that have confirmed this negative attitude of Iranians towards "the other": implicit suspicion towards foreign merchants, tourists, and professors is still seen in the context of society, and this reaches its peak when interaction or a treaty is involved; something that regularly becomes a place for internal competition, slander, and intimidation; all this in a situation where Iran is not one of the most visited and most interactive among its similar countries.
However, with all the years that have passed, perhaps it is time for us to take a more comprehensive and "normal" view of the rest of the world in the context of society. Because competence in foreign policy and national interests does not lie in "not playing games", but in a state where we optimize our interactions with friends and enemies every day and can pursue maximum national interests through this. What is certain is that isolation in today's world brings inevitable defeat and, in a way, it remains to erase the issue out of fear.
In this regard, the discussion that has been circulating in circles today is the twenty-five-year agreement that is to be concluded between Iran and China. Regardless of the content of this agreement, which cannot be rejected or approved until the details are published, we must look at the main issue, namely the strategic closeness of Iran and China: Can China be a suitable strategic partner for Iran?
What is recorded for various economic and strategic experts is China's early economic overtaking of the United States and its sitting at the top of the world economy until further notice. This certainly increases the desire of any partner to be economically close to this country. In addition, China, due to its population of nearly one and a half billion, its large productive economy, and its lack of oil resources, is a guaranteed consumer of oil in large quantities. Iran, as one of the largest holders of oil resources in the world, can of course be one of the main sources of China's energy supply, as it is. But guaranteeing this relationship for both sides is something beyond its existence.
Furthermore, from a strategic point of view, China also has the least presence in the Middle East. Although this country has a more economic temperament and has a different approach than other superpowers, it always evaluates its interests and resources in terms of the threat of the mischief and competition of the United States, and therefore is forced to establish a balance in the strategic sense - and not necessarily its military - in the Middle East against the heavy presence of its main rival.
Apart from this, Iran is a relatively large market for China. Because having a market called Iran does not mean a market of eighty million people, but Iran, by being at the center of a market of about four hundred million people and exporting downstream to the countries around it, makes it easy for an economy like China to work as a middle link in many fields. Whether for high-level exports such as technology and main cycles in various industries, or in downstream industries, being present in the Iranian market can be the best way to reach the margins of this market.
Finally, one of the most important factors that makes China very attractive in deeper cooperation with Iran is pursuing its political competition with the United States in the long term. In any case, in the constant competition between these two superpowers, regardless of regional presence, being in a political and economic alliance with medium powers on the scale of Iran is a matter of primary interest.
On the other hand, Iran needs serious financial resources to modernize its oil industries in the medium term, and China may be one of the best options for this provision, which, due to its real interests - as explained above - is willing to do so. Capital that even in the best conceivable conditions, i.e. maximum oil sales, will be extremely heavy for the Iranian economy.
Furthermore, ensuring oil and gas sales for Iran is also considered vital and obligatory: whether in the current sanctions situation or even in the conditions of pure market competition. On the other hand, it seems that Iran, in the long term, sees China as the world's leading economic power and considers it to its advantage to accelerate its promotion on the global stage through greater economic and industrial cooperation with this country.
The threats that Iran perceives from the United States and its regional allies are also effective in this regard. Iran's closeness to China and the interests of this superpower in the Iranian economy and industry have a high deterrent effect. In addition, it will lower the position of the other party, the United States, in any direct or indirect dialogue or confrontation, and in a way, it will have an effective function in Iran's favor in resolving the issue between Iran and the United States. Also, completing the production and distribution cycles of various industries in Iran can also be considered an attraction for Iran. Finally, providing Iran with weapons, whether through technology transfer or direct supply, is also one of the most important interests that can be pursued through close interaction with China.
After all these calculations, special attention should be paid to two things: First, Iran needs to establish a balance in its foreign policy between the behavior of the four poles: the United States, Russia, Europe, and China, the first two powers having strategic, political, and military relations with Iran, friendly or hostile, and the second two powers focusing their relations with Iran on the economy, industry, and trade. It seems that the right option for us is to neutralize the first two forces by establishing a strategic balance between them on the one hand and exploiting the economy, trade, and industry of the other two powers through close contact.
The second point, however, which seems to be noted in the approach of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in recent years, is that today's world has moved beyond traditional patronage and definitive and permanent favoritism, and a kind of multilateralism has penetrated the lower layers of countries' foreign policies. For example, in today's world, working closely and having a long-term treaty with China, contrary to superficial analyses, is not incompatible with cooperation with Europe, as it is with India, Korea, even the United States, and others. Witness that these poles and their satellites themselves are also cooperating with each other in various ways.
In short, it seems that an approach free from bias and prejudice requires us to distance ourselves from historical prejudices and traditional pessimisms that have a kind of passivity in their nature and to look at the issue with an open and up-to-date perspective and to try to develop Iran's relations with various parties that have their own special importance. Of course, this principle is bound to protecting national interests and concerns, which is the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and society can also show its sensitivity to the detailed observation of these issues at the appropriate time by publishing the details of the agreement.
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