Essay on Shargh Newspaper, June 6, 2020 -
The original text is in Persian and the following translation was done by Ai.
For those familiar with game theory, especially those in international relations, the name of a puzzle – a model of reciprocal action – is familiar, namely the two prisoners’ puzzle, which shows how the egocentrism of two people in an unknowing relationship can act against their will and harm each other’s interests. In an early example of this puzzle, two prisoners who are being interrogated separately about two suspects, if one of the suspects testifies against the other and the other remains silent, the first will be free and the second will be imprisoned for a year. If both confess against each other, each defendant will have to endure three months in prison, but if both remain silent, each will be sentenced to only one month in prison. Therefore, if these two people were able to cooperate and coordinate with each other and it was possible for them to make an appointment, silence would naturally be the best way to cooperate. But in a situation where the connection between the two is severed, each confesses to the greed of obtaining the greatest benefit - that is, immediate release - against the other and as a result both are doomed to endure three months. They recount the conditions mentioned in this game to argue for the need for dialogue to reduce the level of tensions and conflicts of interest.
Without trying to find a direct connection, if we look at the history of non-dialogue and non-cooperation in diplomacy and in particular the relationship between Iran and the United States, in many cases we will see something like the dilemma of two prisoners, where by choosing the maximum options, a higher cost has been imposed on both sides and less achievement has been achieved. However, repeatedly, efforts to build trust and cooperation, the greatest of which can be considered the JCPOA, have been destroyed by extremists on various influential parties.
Despite the fact that diplomats and politicians, due to their profession and position, mostly refrain from blatant interference in the domestic politics of the other country, who doesn't? Today, political relations between Iran and the United States - at least after the JCPOA - are more affected than anything else and even a victim of developments in American domestic politics. Therefore, from the position of an analyst and not a politician, one can consider the famous saying that "foreign policy is an extension of domestic politics": In Iran, significant economic achievements under the shadow of dense and meaningful diplomatic exchanges have almost disappeared and become ineffective with the return of unilateral US sanctions. The Rouhani government, in fulfilling its original promises, has found itself in a predicament in which governing without significant oil revenues and with interference from banks, insurance companies, etc. from the US has become the ceiling of its performance (which, to be fair, is not an easy task). Development activities have faced a resource crisis and the government has faced a budget deficit. Regardless of the reason for its emergence, this issue has not only put the Rouhani government, but also the trend attributed to him in the Iranian political scene, at a disadvantage so far, and has somewhat discouraged his supporters from the results achieved.
On the other hand, the Trump administration in the domestic politics of the United States had not overcome the problems caused by the Corona pandemic and its indefensible performance in that regard, which led to a major and unpredictable challenge: the issue of the murder of George Floyd and the significant anti-racism protests and Donald Trump's ill-considered positions so far, which have made things difficult for his electoral campaign. He, who until six months ago considered himself the winner of an easy election in November of this year, mainly due to his not very equal rivals, now sees a long and difficult road ahead of him to win votes from the American society as the times change.
Therefore, it seems that considering the inferior position of both governments in domestic politics, both see themselves facing an issue that is not the most difficult issue compared to their other challenges. Regardless of the extent to which the Iranian government has the inherent authority to resolve such challenges, it seems that the most rational approach to governance in the Islamic Republic is to play a double game and try to establish its own position, using the other side's various challenges, while managing the issue in the months leading up to the November elections. Although Iran does not view the issue of the Democrats coming to power as an investment, it also realizes with a cursory glance that its action or inaction could affect the outcome in Washington. Moreover, after enduring the difficult conditions of recent years, it is unlikely to accept what is the official and initial position of the United States, which is of course a position commensurate with the hegemony produced for Iranian sovereignty, both domestically and in the region.
On the other hand, the Trump administration is witnessing the fact that Iran, despite being under maximum pressure and accepting economic pressures that have in some cases even caused internal unrest, has not given in to what he has asked for and therefore will not do so in the remaining months. In addition, the issues that have arisen for Trump will also make Iran more determined and confident in this process. In addition, the Trump administration has not only failed to deliver any achievements in foreign policy, but has also seriously damaged America's relations with political allies (such as European countries) and major economic partners (such as China). Trump's unilateral withdrawal from many international treaties and threats such as his confrontation with NATO, along with bilateral disputes with countries, have minimized the desire of the United States' allies to continue his presidency, and signs such as Angela Merkel's rejection of Trump's invitation reveal that these allies are also refusing to give the current US president as much credit as possible on the eve of his second term.
Therefore, logically, with each day we get closer to the election, Trump's desire and appetite for an agreement with Iran that can turn the tables in his favor increases. On the other hand, Iran is in a dilemma that must both manage the issue and possibly not miss a serious opportunity, and not cause Trump to win without investing in his loss. That is why we see events such as the release of prisoners - whether it is a prisoner exchange or something else mentioned on official pages - taking place with greater frequency in the current days and weeks. These signs, although they should be considered as a mutual use of what both sides can do to benefit their positions, cannot be taken more seriously than they are. The question that should be raised in all of these analyses is that, even in the weak assumption that Trump becomes president again, won’t Iran’s job of gaining concessions in any negotiations be harder than it was in the first round? What if he loses? Will the Democrats immediately return to the JCPOA and inject hope into Iranian politics before the Iranian elections in the spring of next year, or will they risk and accept that a government from the opposite faction of the current Iranian government will come to power again, making it difficult for everyone to return to operational adherence to the JCPOA and use its political concessions as a democratic government?
Shargh Daily link
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