Can Japan play the role of mediator between Iran and the United States? This question and its implications are becoming more and more the subject of speculation as the president and his delegation’s trip to Tokyo nears at the end of this month. It seems that Shinzo Abe has now picked up what Macron left behind and is now continuing his initial action in the first half of this year, namely his trip to Tehran to mediate between Iran and the United States, with a break, hosting Hassan Rouhani. An action that is said to have occurred in general at Trump’s request and in details with his green light to take practical steps, and on the sidelines, there are also steps from Switzerland and even Qatar. The issue of the exchange of two prisoners, which was successfully carried out through Swiss mediation and has now led to the proposal for a comprehensive exchange of prisoners, was of course a constructive step in practice and to some extent confidence-building between the two sides, but its dimensions cannot be exaggerated.
What is considered a threat in diplomacy of the kind that is taking place between Tehran and Washington is an incomplete understanding and miscalculation of one's own and the other's positions. Because the great distance between the parties, the existence of different mediators, conflicting interests, and negative and distrustful assumptions make such threats more significant and effective than usual. Although it seems that both sides have the necessary motivation to advance the diplomatic path in Tokyo, there is also a serious threat of miscalculation regarding these diplomatic moves: on the one hand, the United States has long been waiting for the effects of sanctions and maximum pressure to soften Iran's position, and now, considering the unrest in November, it feels that this lever has come close to its effectiveness to some extent, and also, in its opinion, Iran's position in the region is facing a challenge. On the other hand, Iran's sovereignty finds itself in a position of overcoming these unrest - regardless of its origin - and after dominating the market and military success in the Persian Gulf, and Trump is in a defensive position between impeachment and elections. Basically, what has caused the minimal consistency of the talks and political will towards it are also the motives related to these issues: lifting sanctions and economic prosperity for Iran, and using the negotiation and outcome with Iran for election propaganda for Trump. At the same time, these same issues can cause the failure of these moves by magnifying its own position of power and the weakness and needs of the other side; An exaggerated perception of Iran's weak economic and security position on the one hand, and an excessive perception of the role of engagement with Iran in the US elections, can take what should be limited to the dimensions of the negotiator's initial position out of its mold and turn it into the real position and issue of the parties.
Avoiding this eerie contradiction and preventing the emergence of unnecessary deadlocks typically in face-to-face negotiations is the special task of think tanks, non-governmental organizations and associations. But movements such as what is expected from Tehran and Washington at best are more difficult for various reasons: think tanks close to the current US administration are mostly not only not in favor of negotiations and achieving a diplomatic outcome with Iran, but most of them have a spirit of increasing pressure and belligerent approaches. On the other hand, due to the maximum distrust and lack of direct communication between politicians, it is not possible to leave facilitation and persuasion, along with the main negotiations, to organizations and individuals on the sidelines who may divert the main direction of communication towards their own desires. Therefore, the task of translating the position and discourse of the two sides to each other as the principle of communication has been entrusted to a government, and that government is highly respected and trusted by both countries. So it is clear that while recognizing one's own strengths and the weaknesses of the other side, one should try to obtain a comprehensive and realistic picture of the scene. If a government of the size of Japan accepts mediation, one should think and act towards it with a minimum of trust and goodwill. Also, the entire issue should be entrusted with the decision-making authority appropriate to the issue to the country's first executive and accompanying delegation, so that the perception of lack of decision-making authority for the other parties does not arise: an issue that itself could be one of the cases that could put the country in diplomatic isolation and a position of passivity. With all the aforementioned preparations and delays, one can be confident that at least in the current Trump administration, this movement is the most appropriate and realistic opportunity that can be given to resolve the maximum challenge to diplomacy and resolve the issue at a low cost, and perhaps through that, the current situation of the United States government (impeachment and elections), the preoccupation of a saboteur like Netanyahu with his domestic politics, and the glimmers of compromise from Saudi Arabia, can be translated into the benefit of national interests.
Shargh Daily link
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