Essay on Shargh Newspaper - September 4, 2019 -
The original text was in Persian and the following translation was done by Ai.
Last week, due to the events in the text and the margins of the Group of Seven meeting in Paris, for us Iranian audiences, a political news story began and continued, even for hours the excitement of news and lack of news was not unlike the anxieties of the JCPOA negotiations. But what is the reality? Why is the audience not seized by the words of both sides of the country's most important foreign policy challenge - namely the issue of Iran-US relations - nothing but dizziness?
Basically, it must be emphasized that politics, and especially foreign policy, especially during unusual negotiations and diplomacy of challenges, has no meaning other than "one foot forward and one foot back." That is why one should neither be so warmed up by the immediate openness nor cold by the frowns of the parties towards each other. Neither will the other side run to the head with a single gesture, nor will the frowns be such that the doors will be closed completely. Because these are both the simplest things in politics and do not require any politicians or complexities.
Negotiation time: As the negotiations heat up, the first question that arises is: if negotiations were supposed to take place, why were negotiations not started from the beginning? A question that comes to the mind of both the general foreign policy audience and analysts who are intentionally trying to show Iran's foreign policy apparatus as oblivious to national interests. But the fact is that Iran pursued several goals with its one-year strategic patience, which it completed with measures related to reducing its JCPOA obligations:
Legitimization: By unilaterally observing the JCPOA and receiving repeated confirmations from the International Atomic Energy Agency, Iran succeeded in establishing its mild behavior and good faith in international public opinion and among world politicians. It did not lose its temper as soon as the other party slipped, and the utmost effort and good faith were expended in giving the other parties to the JCPOA a chance - which of course is mostly the European side of Iran.
Buying time: Iran’s strategic patience has brought Trump closer to the 2020 election as the main opponent, and with the failure of his other foreign policy issues (i.e. North Korea, the trade war with China, the Mexican wall, the tariff tensions with Europe, and the deal of the century), he now finds himself in need of a major foreign policy success more than ever before, and the least expensive of these issues will probably be Iran. The point is that the issue of negotiation and possibly a photo-op between him and Iranian leaders could be important not only in itself but also as a demonstration of success.
Economic stability and reconstruction of conditions: Whether we like it or not, the fact is that Iran has managed to gain some control over its economic conditions during its one-year patience without making any concessions to the United States. Although inflation and economic growth rates are still in unfavorable conditions, there is no sign of an unbridled growth in the exchange rate or financial and economic management confusion. With all the pressure that came on people and businesses and still continues to some extent, it must be admitted that the other side not only did not achieve its goal in the financial-economic issue, which was to break the bones of the country and bankrupt the economy, but this itself caused it to completely despair of the illusory policy of regime change and to lean more towards reality on the ground. This change in strategy is more evident than ever in comparing his behavior at this year's G7 summit with last year, a policy that can be said to mean Trump's further ascendancy over his inner circle.
Concession-making: Following a year of strategic patience and with the start of major oil sanctions, Iran has implemented another stage of its strategy, which is the gradual and reversible reduction of JCPOA commitments. This action has taken Iran out of the position of demanding and passiveness towards its European partners in the JCPOA and has consequently forced them, especially the French, to take consistent and active actions. It should be kept in mind that, first, entering into negotiations without concession-making will cause the other party to progressively demand extensive concessions from a superior position, and second, concession-making of the type of actions that Iran has taken in the past few months has no meaning other than the intention to negotiate.
Form of negotiation: The form of negotiation is generally important, but the level and format of negotiations between Iran and the United States in the current circumstances and with regard to the upcoming elections is the main issue for the Trump administration. First, in order to suppress his Democratic rivals as much as possible, he needs to crush the JCPOA as the most important foreign policy achievement of Obama and Kerry (and in this matter he needs to save face considering his previous statements and his withdrawal from the JCPOA, so perhaps returning to the JCPOA is not entirely realistic in terms of form) and second, he is trying to give the appearance of bringing Iran to the negotiating table by distorting the phrase, and this appearance will certainly be his best moment in a bilateral, face-to-face meeting at the highest level. This form of confrontation is of course not impossible, but it is both unlikely and has a completely concessional value: Trump must and will probably be willing to spend from the United States' pocket for what he wants and make concessions. Of course, if the Iranian side ultimately intends to do so, it can announce to him, first, the possibility and second, the cost of this item by delivering public and other messages.
Content of the negotiation: The most important part of the negotiation, which does not necessarily require the presence of the presidents and is mainly carried out at the expert level, is its content. Regardless of the positions that sometimes sidestep the main issue by not backing down, it is important to know what each side is demanding: for Trump, as mentioned, the denial of the Democrats and reaching whatever is called the "Trump Agreement" along with symbolic appearances such as the meeting between the two presidents; for Iran, the lifting of sanctions and pressures while maintaining its domestic and international image; and finally, for Europe (and most of all France), the restoration of its "independent" political image in international relations, strengthening the negotiating axis in Iran along with a return to trade with Iran.
If, in content, Trump inevitably talks about issues beyond the JCPOA due to the denial of Democrats or pressure from those around him, instead of paying a higher price for the same concessions within the JCPOA or refusing any negotiations on the above issues, these talks can be tied to concessions beyond the JCPOA from the other side - for example, the initial US sanctions - which Trump will probably not refrain from talking about due to his personal projects. Of course, this could be a way of turning a threat into an opportunity and freeing Iran at the lowest cost, not from the sanctions of the past year and a half, but from the burden of the oldest pressures. Let us remember that if an agreement with extremists has one feature, it is that the moderates will not disrupt it later. At the same time, with a few things we know and hundreds of things we do not know, it must be admitted that giving advice is the easiest part of the story.
Shargh Daily link
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