Essay on Shargh Newspaper - October 28, 2019 -
The original text is in Persian and the following translation was done by Ai.
International politics in its empirical and general sense is inherently both formative and evolving, and based on reality and practice. One of the important changes that have occurred in the international system in the four decades since the revolution is the transition from a bipolar to a multipolar system, which has been adequately developed and explained theoretically. In this context, one of the points that can and should be overcome from this theoretical development and put into practice is not giving in to examples of one pole (such as the United States) trying to increase its power. However, the other side of the coin of moving away from the bipolar system and promising a multipolar system is not giving in to consensus or constant confrontation with the powers as a matter within the framework of the same bipolar system, which, according to intellectuals and the science of international relations, we have long since passed from. It should be noted that today, even close trade and strategic allies of countries neither expect nor observe this alliance. As a result, it can be said that observing such requirements, the season for which has passed, is paying for nothing. If we go beyond exceptions such as the current US administration and other right-wing governments, the overall and long-term outcome of international relations continues to seek multilateral diplomacy, cooperation, and de-escalation based on national interests and international peace more than ever.
With this introduction, if we look at the current scene of relations between Iran and the world in general, the issue of the JCPOA in particular, and the relationship between Iran and the US in more detail, the following things appear:
In the past year and a half since the US withdrew from the JCPOA, Iran, while exercising strategic patience and then taking subsequent countermeasures, has managed to largely manage the severe and heavy economic and financial pressures and has also advanced both sides of its diplomacy, namely legitimizing and consolidating its authority. To the extent that, first in Biarritz, France, and then on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, he forced the other side to be flexible and others to make efforts as much as possible. The first achievement of this diplomacy, which was originally built through the Foreign Minister’s numerous trips and his continuous scouting in the international space, was to instill the position that Iran will not change its position under any circumstances based on the effect of maximum pressure. At the same time, it should be firmly reminded that just as “negotiating for the sake of negotiation” is meaningless, “not negotiating for the sake of not negotiating” is also politically devoid of content. Both of these tactics are tools solely aimed at advancing the country’s position and promoting national interests; without the compass of national interests, both become pointless efforts and insistence. Also, just as negotiation can be considered irrational as a tactic from a point of weakness, this same tactic can become a completely rational choice after building sufficient leverage and advantages and from a position of strength. No country’s national interests have been secured by the continuation of a state of confrontation and war; In other words, it should be understood that not negotiating should never and cannot be a strategy in foreign policy, but rather, by definition, a tactic for making concessions, stabilizing a position, and entering negotiations from a better position, although everyone agrees that this issue is not a cheap matter as a "necessary tactic."
Today, we are in a better position in various respects (economic, strategic, political, nuclear, etc.) than in May of last year, and the opposing sides are in a weaker position for various reasons: In the United States, Bolton has been fired from the cabinet. Trump is also under serious pressure in American domestic politics and faces the threat of impeachment on the eve of next year's elections. In the region, the strategic military success of the front close to Iran over the Saudi-UAE axis and the internal differences between the two on the one hand, and Netanyahu's departure - albeit temporary - from the political scene on the other, have put us in a better position than last year.
The above are issues that, given the international environment (especially Europe, Turkey, China, India, and even Russia), bring to mind the point that perhaps it is time to think about the issue once again and, while maintaining the strategy, update our tactics, and before the US elections, put ourselves in a position to open up matters and expand our interests with scientific methods and utilizing the expertise available in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; because incomplete utilization of expertise in foreign policy is more damaging than abandoning any other body of expertise in specialized fields. It is imperative to skillfully prevent Trump from using this issue for propaganda purposes as much as possible or sell it to him at the highest price. Certainly, if there is political will to do any diplomatic work to untie this knot, the country's body of experts in the field of foreign policy will be able to design the playing field in such a way that it is potentially dangerous for the other side and its goals instead of a complete opportunity. Meanwhile, an agreement made with the right-wing will typically be more sustainable, because the next president in the United States, if it is Trump, will defend his agreement, and if it is a Democrat, he will not have the audacity to do with the agreements as the current president did.
If the United States has become addicted to sanctions, Iran is probably also accustomed to managing sanctions and reducing their impact every day: Although the country's development under conditions of restriction is largely impossible, sanctions will no longer be "paralyzing" for Iran. However, while maintaining this position, it should be explained that in today's world politics, using the negotiation tactic means ending one stage and entering a new one, putting down one tool and taking up another, and this is not only not a sign of failure, but above all a sign that Iran's hands are full of different options and tools for various scenes. In other words, it is a sign of the comprehensiveness of foreign policy and is a source of pride because the use of this tool in the current crisis is not due to weakness due to maximum pressure or paralysis due to sanctions, but rather to see the scene for itself.
In short: In any case, the scene of international politics is not a desirable scene, but it is real. Therefore, it can be said that the current moment, considering the departure of Bolton and Netanyahu, the weakness of Saudi Arabia's position, Trump's pressure, and the support of other countries, is a good time to seize the initiative and impose the maximum possible demands on our part; a season that may not last very long. The best introduction may be active de-escalation in relation to Saudi Arabia and bringing it together with a front that believes in international cooperation on the issue of Iran. We have paid a lot of money to reach this strategic point and enter the issue from a position of power, and now is the time to use the privileges and tools that have been created; how much better that this application of the appropriate tactic at the appropriate time is from a position of power.
International politics in its empirical and general sense is inherently both formative and evolving, and based on reality and practice. One of the important changes that has occurred in the international system in the four decades since the revolution is the transition from a bipolar to a multipolar system, which has been adequately developed and explained theoretically. In this context, one of the points that can and should be overcome from this theoretical expansion and put into practice is not to give in to examples of one pole (such as the United States) trying to increase its power. However, the other side of the coin of moving away from the bipolar system and promising a multipolar system is not to give in to unanimity or constant confrontation with the powers as a matter within the framework of the same bipolar system, which, according to the rationalists and the science of international relations, we have long since passed from. It should be noted that today, even close trade and strategic allies of countries neither expect nor observe being limited to this alliance. As a result, it can be said that observing such requirements, the season for which has passed, is paying for nothing. If we go beyond exceptions such as the current government of the United States and other right-wing governments, the overall and long-term outcome of international relations continues to seek multilateral diplomacy, cooperation, and de-escalation based on national interests and international peace, more than ever.
With this introduction, if we look at the current state of relations between Iran and the world in general, the issue of the JCPOA in detail, and the relationship between Iran and the US in more detail, the following things appear:
In the past year and a half since the United States withdrew from the JCPOA, Iran, while being strategically patient and then taking subsequent countermeasures, has managed to manage both the severe and heavy economic and financial pressures to a great extent, and has also advanced both sides of its diplomacy, namely legitimizing and consolidating its authority. To the extent that, first in Biarritz, France, and then on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, it forced the other side to be flexible and others to make efforts as much as possible. The first achievement of this diplomacy, which was originally built through the Foreign Minister’s numerous trips and his continuous lobbying in the international arena, was to instill the position that Iran will not change its position in any way based on the effect of maximum pressure.
At the same time, it should be strongly reminded that just as “negotiating for the sake of negotiation” is meaningless, “not negotiating for the sake of not negotiating” is also politically devoid of content. Both of these tactics are merely tools to advance the country's position and advance national interests; without a compass of national interests, both become pointless efforts and insistence. Also, just as negotiation can be considered irrational as a tactic from a point of weakness, this same tactic can become a completely rational choice after building sufficient leverage and advantages and from a position of strength. No country's national interests are secured by the continuation of a state of confrontation and war; in other words, it should be understood that not negotiating should never and cannot be a strategy in foreign policy, but rather, by definition, a tactic for making concessions, stabilizing a position, and entering into negotiations from a better position, although everyone agrees that this is not a cheap matter as a "necessary tactic."
Today, we are in a better position in various respects (economic, strategic, political, nuclear, etc.) than in May of last year, and the opposing sides are in a weaker position for various reasons: In the United States, Bolton has been fired from the cabinet. Trump is also under serious pressure in American domestic politics and faces the threat of impeachment on the eve of next year's elections. In the region, the strategic military success of the front close to Iran over the Saudi-UAE axis and the internal differences between the two on the one hand, and Netanyahu's departure - albeit temporary - from the political scene on the other hand, have put us in a better position than last year.
The above are issues that, given the international environment (especially Europe, Turkey, China, India, and even Russia), bring to mind the point that perhaps it is time to think about the issue once again and, while maintaining the strategy, update our tactics, and before the US elections, put ourselves in a position to open up matters and expand our interests with scientific methods and utilizing the expertise available in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; because incomplete utilization of expertise in foreign policy is more damaging than abandoning any other body of expertise in specialized fields. It is imperative to skillfully prevent Trump from using this issue for propaganda purposes as much as possible or sell it to him at the highest price. Certainly, if there is political will to do any diplomatic work to untie this knot, the country's body of experts in the field of foreign policy will be able to design the playing field in such a way that it is potentially dangerous for the other side and its goals instead of a complete opportunity. Meanwhile, an agreement made with the right-wingers will typically be more sustainable, because the next president in the United States, if it is Trump, will defend his agreement, and if it is a Democrat, he will not have the courage to do with the agreements as the current president did. If the United States has become addicted to sanctions, Iran will probably also get used to managing sanctions and reduce their impact every day: although the country's development is largely impossible under conditions of restrictions, sanctions will no longer be "paralyzing" for Iran. But while maintaining this position, it should be explained that in today's world politics, using the negotiation tactic means ending one stage and entering a new one, putting down one tool and taking up another, and this is not only a sign of failure, but above all a sign that Iran has a full complement of options and tools for various scenarios. In other words, it is a sign of the comprehensiveness of its foreign policy and a source of pride, because using this tool in the current crisis is not due to weakness due to maximum pressure or paralysis due to sanctions, but rather to seeing the scene for oneself. In short: In any case, the international political scene is not a desirable scene, but it is real. Therefore, it may be said that the current moment, considering the departure of Bolton and Netanyahu, the weakness of Saudi Arabia's position, being under pressure from Trump, and the support of other countries, is a suitable moment to seize the initiative and impose the maximum possible demands on our part; a season that may not last very long. Perhaps the best introduction would be to actively de-escalate tensions with Saudi Arabia and align it with a front that believes in international cooperation on the Iran issue. We have paid a lot of money to reach this strategic point and enter the issue from a position of power, and now it is time to use the privileges and tools we have built up; how much better if this is to use the right tactics at the right time, from a position of power.
Shargh Daily link
File
