Essay on Shargh Newspaper - October 6, 2019 -
The original text is in Persian and the following translation was done by Ai.
The past weeks have been full of important events and moments in Iranian diplomacy: from the telephone talks between the presidents of Iran and France, which showed the seriousness of the parties in advancing the talks towards a common outcome, to the climax with the inflammatory images and reports coming from New York. Iran's positions on three levels, including the lifting of all JCPOA sanctions by the US for Iran to return to full implementation of its JCPOA commitments, the return of the US to the JCPOA to talk to this country, and finally what was raised in the president's speech at the UN General Assembly: more for more.
What we heard and saw briefly was Macron's attempt to approximate the positions of the parties and possibly a meeting or contact at the highest level, which, of course, despite the relative agreement of all around with his four-point plan, ultimately did not reach the desired result in New York. But one of the questions that arose for the domestic audience as a result of these positions was that if Iran is willing to negotiate with the lifting of sanctions and the return of the US to the JCPOA, why was such an answer not given at the beginning of Trump's rise to power and before his withdrawal from the JCPOA in May of last year, when he repeatedly insisted on further negotiations? In other words, isn't this the point he was trying to get Iran to a year and a half ago, and is it now, after all this time and the burden of the annoying sanctions, that Iran is giving in to such a thing? In order to provide a more accurate analysis of the issues at hand, it is necessary to pay attention to points such as the following:
What existed in the minds and, to some extent, the views of the US ruling body from the beginning was a self-confident and confident view of its own will. A position that had given the more radical tendency in the White House hope for a change in the political system in Iran, and the tendency close to Trump to impose whatever it wanted on Iran's behavior and possibly tie its hands and feet under a deal.
When the Trump administration came to power and even until May of this year, Iran was fully committed to its JCPOA commitments. Therefore, whatever was desired by the United States or beyond it, mediators such as Europe regarding commitments beyond the JCPOA and even beyond the nuclear deal on the part of Iran, which had to be made in return for part or possibly all of the JCPOA commitments of the other party. In other words, all or part of what had been achieved in the JCPOA was now to be offered to Iran again and at a higher cost. With Trump’s announcement in 1996 that he would withdraw from the JCPOA within a few months, the Iranian economy began to fluctuate. Changes in the exchange rate, JCPOA cooperation and contracts with European and Asian companies, and components that indicated pressure on the Iranian economy and society, created the impression in the United States and, in a sense, the international space that America’s hands were full and that there were numerous levers to pressure Iran. This situation, of course, made it more difficult for Iran to enter negotiations. Because the prevailing impression was that weakness and pressure had caused this surrender. An issue that now, with the stability of the exchange rate, relative economic calm and repeated US sanctions, seems to be coming to an end.
At that time, Trump's foreign policy projects were in the beginning of their opening: North Korea, the beginning of trade tensions with China, the issue of Afghanistan, which the new US president was trying to use as his trump card, Venezuela, which he was thinking of taking over, and other smaller issues that, although none of them had yet been completed, seemed to have enough time to address them.
Today, however, Trump's position in his foreign policy is different and his hands are empty: with the dismissal of a figure like Bolton, disappointment with the extreme right and his war-mongering is evident, and according to research, all of Sadr al-Ashara's cases have met with definite or relative failure.
Another change in the situation is issues related to the region. Regardless of the accusations that Iran, the Arabs, Israel, and the United States make against each other, there are two realities on the ground: one is that today the region is in a more fragile state of stability and security than it was a year and a half ago, and the other is that Iran clearly has a military and strategic advantage - at least due to the greater audacity that has been seen from it - whether through actions such as seizing the British tanker and, more importantly, downing the American drone, or through the upper hand that forces aligned with it, such as the Houthis, have gained in the region and in confronting the defenders of the Saudi line.
It is due to these strategic successes, as well as issues such as the weakening of the political power of the far right in Israel and the lack of firm support from the United States for the Saudi-UAE axis against Iran, that today, after the UAE's silent turn in foreign policy - at least close to a position of neutrality - Saudi Arabia itself is taking steps back and forward to end its tensions with Iran from a defensive position: tensions that it once began with the hope of Trump's support.
The last and perhaps most important change that the scene has today compared to the first half of Trump's leadership is Trump's own situation due to failures in foreign policy cases, issues such as impeachment in domestic politics and, most importantly, the arrival of election campaigns in the United States. An issue that makes the coming year more tense for Trump and the path for him more difficult every day: something that makes him more and more in need of a demonstration of success in relations with Iran.
What was initially considered a comprehensive agreement in the minds of several Western actors, and which Trump withdrew from the JCPOA under the pretext of wanting to achieve, includes, in addition to the nuclear issue, other issues of disagreement with Iran, including regional issues, the missile issue, human rights, the issue of supporting regional groups known as terrorism, etc., which are essentially red lines for Iran in several components and the firm position is based on non-negotiation on them. However, even in cases where Iran may think of a balanced agreement with the West in the distant future, the basic requirement is to prove that Iran benefits from the agreements and that the other parties adhere to whatever is achieved. Therefore, returning to the JCPOA and lifting sanctions can be considered a kind of rebuilding of trust with this argument. The "more for more" plan by the president can be understood in two meanings: one is balanced changes in the schedules within the JCPOA and the other - which may be seen in a more distant and fainter horizon - other negotiable issues from Iran in exchange for concessions beyond the JCPOA, such as initial sanctions. In this regard, it should be noted that Emmanuel Macron's four-point plan was not intended to fundamentally resolve the issues, but rather a proposal to urgently resolve tensions; a plan that, due to its distrust of the United States, forced the Iranian side to request guarantees for its implementation. Perhaps, after making a verbal agreement and entering the 5+1 summit with Iran in New York, Trump would have refused to implement it immediately and, having received his electoral and propaganda points, would have left the Iranian side empty-handed.
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