Essay on Hamdeli Newspaper - July 26, 2019 -
The original text is in Persian and the following translation was done by Ai.
With the rise in tensions between Iran on the one hand and the United States and recently Britain on the other, all in the Persian Gulf, and with the approaching Hajj season, we are clearly witnessing a change in the public policy of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates towards Iran. Also, perhaps due to the reservations that Saudi Arabia, in particular, has regarding the passage of its oil tankers or Iran's direct confrontation with the United States in publicly shooting down an American drone and accepting responsibility for it, Saudi Arabia no longer has the courage to entertain the desire to show a thumbs-up to Iran by relying on its high-quality military equipment or its mostly hired and sometimes low-quality fighters.
In any case, today, with the silence we are witnessing from the bloc of Arab countries in the southern Persian Gulf led by Saudi Arabia, as well as isolated incidents such as sending an Iranian ship off the coast of Saudi Arabia after a few months and withdrawing UAE military forces from the scene of the Yemeni war, it seems that this Arab bloc is not contributing much to fanning the flames of conflict and tension. This shift, of course, must also be attributed to the tendency of half of the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf - namely Oman, Qatar, Kuwait and Iraq - towards Iran. The fact is that the main issue, whether in times of interactions such as the JCPOA or tensions such as those currently raging between Iran and the United States, is that the Europeans, who sometimes side with the United States out of tradition and sometimes out of self-interest and sometimes out of competition with their global ally or out of European independence, strengthen Iran's position, are not the main players. Russia, due to its interests on both sides, is playing a middleman, weakening Iran's economic power, especially its oil power, on the one hand, and not losing this major regional player on the other. China, which has both consumer markets on both sides and constant trade and economic competition with the United States, does not see much interest in weakening or strengthening one side excessively.
Someone like Trump, who even considers the presence in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz to be futile with a realistic and somewhat non-strategic calculation, cannot be expected to be very steadfast in a costly conflict with Iran, unless he sees either tangible and short-term benefits in it or an unprecedented and high-pressure provocation behind the issue. Therefore, and with the movements that are first seen in Japan and now in France, it may be possible to conclude that, as predicted, Trump will be forced to make a decision about Iran as the election race approaches: If Iran were to take a passive stance and take no action in response to Trump's sanctions, then pursuing a policy of maximum pressure and daily harassment would certainly be one of the best options.
But now that Iran is pushing successive deadlines from one side to the other and has somewhat gained control over its economy compared to last year, the president facing the election of America is forced to disrupt this game in whatever way he sees closer to his interests: either he can take a tough and military move that will easily overcome any weak voice that may arise from the Democrats by pressuring American society and arousing patriotic feelings, and taking advantage of the crisis situation, or he can engage in talks with Tehran with the mediation of others and bring himself closer to some kind of conclusion on the Iran issue. The more we imagine Trump’s self-interested spirit, the more we come to the conclusion that he will increase the pressure as much as possible, but ultimately, due to the lack of priority for Iran and the lack of real relevance of the issues he has in mind to criticize, the best option for him is an interaction that, although meaningless and meaningless, still has his name under the signature on the last page, and this is of course his best tool in foreign policy to win the election. It should be remembered that he has even concluded the maximum number of his arms deals with the Arabs, and he will not gain any tangible benefit from Iranophobia. The most important critic and obstacle to such an agreement is, of course, the ruling right-wing government in Israel. What Israel is pursuing, of course, cannot be completely traced in the mirror of its official positions: Netanyahu naturally strongly avoids three things: a strong and powerful Iran and weak Arabs, strong and powerful Arabs and a very weak Iran, and most of all, a strong alliance between Iran and the Arabs. Because, regardless of any formal and apparent connection, Israel's main problem with Palestine is with both Iran and the Arabs, and in any case, the collective Arab spirit, like the dominant ideology in Iran, is not ready to compromise or agree with what has happened to Palestine. Therefore, the best and perhaps only suitable option, in line with the interests of Israel and especially Netanyahu's right-wing government, is the highest level of tension between Iran and the Arabs, as well as sanctions and restrictions on Iran, so that neither the Arabs can achieve unity and real military power, nor does Iran have the opportunity to play a greater role in the regional coalition and integration while strengthening its economic strength.
If what is being heard about the rumors of Trump's disagreement with Bolton for the umpteenth time is true, nothing can be understood from it except Trump's anxious desire to interact with Iran. If we accept this, perhaps we can take a few steps forward from all these tensions instead of taking a step back and demanding more in return.
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