Essay on Shargh Newspaper - July 25, 2019 -
The original text is in Persian and the following translation was done by Ai.
More than a year has passed since the United States withdrew from the JCPOA, while Trump was clearly inclined to do so since the beginning of the current president's presidency. It is clear that the context of this effort to leave the JCPOA by Trump must be followed in competition with the former president and his team, and on this occasion, the Joint Action Community program was not the only case in the international environment that faced the withdrawal of the current US government.
However, there have always been those who have had a significant impact on his actions: just as when the likes of Tillerson and Mattis were in the new government, the president's norm-breaking desires faced obstacles to implementation, after the change of the foreign policy and national security team, the new appointees were able to translate their goals into the language of Trump's desires and sell them to him, and the oil embargo and the policy of reducing Iranian oil sales to zero have currently been the last big piece of the desired string, i.e. maximum pressure.
From the standpoint of an economic activist or domestic workforce, the easiest thing to do is to count the problems that have been imposed on the economy, livelihoods, and business operations in the past year and a half based on American efforts, but at the same time, in order to gain an analytical understanding of society, one must go the other way and look at the issue from the opposite perspective: The reality is that maximum pressure on Iran had goals that were much more immediate and beyond what happened, so that sometimes, in the guise of official statements and sometimes even openly in lower ranks than the president, a complete picture of what was in mind was presented; a picture that can be easily debunked and clearly observed by referring to Iranian circles close to the current American administration. What the other side expected from leaving the JCPOA was economic chaos, but both many times what happened and in such a way that its increasing and destructive process would increase its scope without stopping.
But this did not happen. Although it is difficult for the Iranian audience of this note to accept that, despite all the damage it has done to their businesses and livelihoods, Trump's maximum pressure on Iran has so far been unsuccessful, it must be admitted that this success or failure should be measured not in comparison to the impact it has had on people's lives, but only in comparison to the goals mentioned: "The exchange rate reaching a few tens of thousands of tomans by the end of last spring and a hundred thousand tomans by the middle of the year" were among the images that, along with "Iran becoming Venezuelan" and "one month's salary for a block of cheese," were presented to the shocked Iranian audience by the subversive and sometimes war-mongering lobby close to Trump, and it is perhaps possible to believe that this image was first sold to Trump himself. But with all of Iran's economic problems and sanctions today, it must be acknowledged that the government has largely managed to master its own issues and overcome the confusion that arose last year. Because, considering the policy of zeroing oil exports from May 8th of this year, the government should have become so poor and bankrupt that it would not only not be able to take a step forward but also not be able to pay its employees' salaries. But certainly, with all the problems and lack of resources for development and construction, Iran did not fall into the days that the ill-wishers wished for, and it even moved forward with its development plans at a lower rate.
This performance, despite all the sanctions and even natural problems such as the widespread flooding at the beginning of this year, made the US government rush to think of other solutions. So that it began with the threat of war and led to childish measures such as restricting the movement of Iranian diplomats in New York. An action that revealed to everyone the low and ridiculous level of the US State Department's attitude.
In the meantime, with Iran's decisive positions, the shadow of war was largely removed from the region. Because Iran was almost certain that Trump would not be able to turn a low level of conflict into a war until the elections. Because this will weaken his position during the 2020 election. Of course, it should be kept in mind that if the level of humiliation exceeds a certain level, the trend will reverse and the axing of inaction towards the threat to US national security will be Trump's greatest motivation for starting a conflict and, incidentally, pursuing the election through the path of crisis.
Iran is also seeking to "score points" for itself in the heat of these competitions. Whatever happens in the future - from military confrontation to diplomatic negotiations - both sides will need levers to put pressure on the other side. The reduction in the level of JCPOA commitments and also the response to not-so-major movements and violations in the Persian Gulf can be analyzed in this direction. With these kinds of strictures, Iran is showing, especially to the European surroundings of the JCPOA, that the US withdrawal from this agreement and the threat of Iran are not free for anyone, and Iran's behavior without the JCPOA will be different from Iran's behavior without the JCPOA.
The analysis of these actions is that nothing positive will happen with unilateral tolerance, and it will simply change the boundary of Western imposition and our tolerance in favor of the other side, and this is of course not appropriate. The fundamental point that shows the psychology of Iran in its decision-making was clearly traceable in Zarif’s interviews in New York, and that is that accepting harassment encourages the hostile party to harass it further. This means that Iran’s behavior in the remaining two years of the Rouhani government, like the past six years, will mirror the behavior of the opposing parties, especially the United States; if it really intends to negotiate, the United States government can expect that by lifting the sanctions imposed in the past two years, Iran will consider offering other concessions in return for receiving more concessions and guarantees. The proposal quoted by Zarif regarding the early ratification of the additional protocol in return for the lifting of sanctions is, of course, still within the framework of the nuclear issue and the JCPOA negotiations, and it is usually after returning to this point that the interest in talking about the sunset of the JCPOA or even other negotiable issues will require the presentation of other proposals such as the lifting of sanctions beyond the JCPOA – for example, the initial sanctions.
Although the Europeans' inaction is due to their multifaceted hope that Trump will be defeated in next year's elections, considering all aspects, no calculation on such a possibility on our part is justified and permissible. As reflected in the Secretary of State's forward-looking, fluid, and vibrant policy this year, all efforts and efforts should be directed towards taking the initiative, putting pressure on the Europeans to invest in keeping Iran in the JCPOA, and also making various concessions that may pave the way for the country's powerful bargaining in the future. It is certainly possible to use Trump's threat due to his electoral need and his extroverted and assertive spirit in the current US administration for the benefit of interests beyond the Iran JCPOA - both in terms of the quantity of concessions and the quality and guarantee of obtaining them - by designing and implementing a kind of dual control policy between the two US parties. The condition for this strategy, of course, is that the country's top officials publicly support the diplomatic apparatus in official forums and emphasize the full authority of its custodian - which means guaranteeing the country's reputation in international forums - and that this apparatus be protected from attacks that may be directed at it for domestic political reasons.
Shargh Daily link
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