Essay on Shargh Newspaper - June 25, 2019 -
The original text is in Persian and the following translation was done by Ai.
Shinzo Abe's trip to Tehran has its own characteristics and specifics that have been repeatedly discussed in Persian-language media. However, what seems to be the case in the field of mediation by Japan and others such as Switzerland, Germany, Oman, etc. is that mediation is essentially a two-sided matter: As much as the principle of mediation by an influential and important country like Japan has been able to create hope - and the impact of this hope can also be seen in the Iranian market last week - it should be noted that this issue can also become a threat at the same time:
It cannot be ignored that these mediator(s) do not have similar interests in relation to Iran and the United States: they look down on the United States, and this country even has the ability to determine for them the consequences of not implementing the JCPOA, Resolution 2231, and buying oil. However, what ultimately makes Iran's relationship with a country like Japan is, first, the commercial history, especially the oil history of the two countries, which is currently somewhat out of the scope of profit, and second, the security of energy and the Strait of Hormuz, in which it seems unlikely that Iran's threats in this regard will be taken seriously.
Consequently, if the mediation process is to play a role beyond simply "conveying a message" - which it is - the mediator's treatment of both sides of this dispute will not be the same. This will make Iran's positions harder and will push the mediator to a greater extent towards the other side, the United States.
It should be noted that in the issue between Iran and the United States, Iran's goal in negotiating is to remove the pressure, mainly sanctions, and the United States' goal is merely to start negotiations with Iran for electoral purposes. In this calculation, despite all the pressures on Iran's economy and trade relations, it seems that up to a certain point it is the US government and Trump himself who are in a time crunch, and Iran can propose its intentions for negotiations as a precondition for starting them, which it seems to have done to some extent. After that, Trump is of course looking for any kind of agreement that he can sell in the election campaign, and this should rationally facilitate negotiations with Trump.
Another issue that is crucial to pay attention to is that one should not expect much from the media-covered negotiations, contrary to popular belief. Because their internal costs impose a huge burden on the negotiations and their people. Of course, it goes without saying that secret negotiations with a personality like Trump are not very possible. Because he basically needs "news of negotiations" rather than "the goal of negotiations."
Another point is that the failure of mediation, especially when it was initiated by the United States, could remove Iran from its current relatively legitimate and just position and make it appear as a tension-seeking and non-negotiable figure. In this case, international pressure on Iran will collapse, and Trump's physical pressure will also have the support of public opinion and the global atmosphere. To avoid such an event, Iran should have held effective and substantive talks with the mediator at lower levels in advance, and also decided to accept the minimum of the proposed items. Otherwise, the acceptance of mediation and its media coverage should not be accepted. Because in order to start negotiations (which is actually to get Trump to his goal), Iran needs to receive tangible concessions both domestically and in terms of negotiations, and advice, threats, sending messages, and announcing positions of the kind that the German Foreign Minister did in Tehran with a frown last week will not unlock the door to negotiations.
Shargh Daily link
File
