Essay on Shargh Newspaper - May 12, 2019 -
The original text was in Persian and the following translation was done by Ai.
Last week, on the anniversary of the US withdrawal from the JCPOA, we witnessed an aggressive step taken by Iran in the form of Articles 26 and 36 of the JCPOA. So that with the US embargo on the exchange of Iranian nuclear materials, Iran announced the continuation of production and the suspension of their exchange, instead of stopping their production in order not to exceed the JCPOA material stockpile ceilings. Meanwhile, by setting a sixty-day deadline and determining subsequent steps, it tried to throw the ball at the JCPOA's European partners without falling into the trap of reacting to the US action and get them out of their one-year and largely sloppy passivity and force them to act.
Legitimacy
One of the general issues in any international negotiation, and especially in the JCPOA, is the parties' efforts to establish and promote their legitimacy on the international stage. A legitimacy that the US government, with the exception of Iran, seems not to be concerned about. However, in the case of Iran, two legitimizing issues can be considered as opportunities: one is the one-year strategic patience that, while giving other JCPOA partners time to advance their desired solutions, removed any excuses of "urgency" and rashness from the country and presented a well-prepared show.
The other is that the government that has now put the suspension of parts of the JCPOA on the agenda is the same government and negotiating team and political investor in the JCPOA, and this plan of playing a psychological game and attributing Iran's reaction to changes in the domestic political scene takes it out of the hands of the JCPOA partners, especially the Europeans.
In addition, Iran has placed both options in Europe's path: guaranteeing and implementing a mechanism that will completely solve the problem of Iran's oil and banking, and as a result, restore the JCPOA to its previous state, and considering Iran's threat as insignificant, which will lead to the next steps being taken (lifting the enrichment ceiling and building the Arak reactor). As mentioned in the President's speech, a threat to Iran to refer to the Security Council was also mentioned, which, despite not being mentioned, can be assumed to be something like withdrawing from the NPT and expelling inspectors or something along those lines.
European reaction
In response to Iran's announcement, Europeans showed utmost sensitivity to refrain from any extremism. This shows that not only in public opinion but also among European elites and governments, Iran's position has been recognized as right. Of course, Europe will not accept a small country as a party to the ultimatum, and Europe also followed the same procedure in the first place.
A point that is worth noting, given the maximum efforts of the United States - and especially the Pompeo-Bolton team - to militarize the atmosphere and their constant threats against Iran, is that Iran's response was extremely "designed" and professional, regardless of any opposition or agreement. In other words, Iran neither showed its initiative in a military format nor left it to chance. Rather, both the planning and execution were entirely carried out by the same diplomatic and calculating team at the level of the State Department and the President, and this is in fact a refusal to accept the amateur game of the US State Department.
This type of approach requires a highly professional team that, despite all the unfair propaganda of its opponents regarding compromise, shows that it is as proficient in other types of rational approaches as it is in negotiation. Hence, with the step-by-step approach that we have witnessed, Iran is in a way seeking "concessions" that will protect it from being forced to make new concessions in any new negotiation. Otherwise, if any behavior is repeated continuously and in any situation, it will be as primitive as "reading a statement" and will not require diplomats and decision-makers with complex minds.
Iran's duality versus America's duality
In contrast to the American duality of war-deal that Pompeo and Trump represent these days, Iran has also taken the latest step to put its duality, that is, securing its interests in exchange for tightening its conditions, on the table for its audience, which is mainly Europe. To implement it, it is using various levers at its disposal, which mainly target domestic politics in European countries (such as the immigration issue), because domestic politics, and especially elections, create real and rapid movement in the governments of liberal democratic countries more than anything else. The fact is that both sides (Iran and America) have been successful in creating these dualities to some extent, but it remains to be seen whether Iran, as America's audience, will increasingly respond or whether it will itself succeed in forcing its audience, namely Europe, to move effectively.
Domestic Politics of the United States
Just as European domestic politics can be used as a tool to force their respective governments to try to keep Iran in the JCPOA, domestic politics of the United States is not separate from this issue, and a recent sign of this was Trump's mentioning of John Kerry's name as an obstacle to the Iranian government's contact and "deal" with him.
This type of comment from Trump, of course, shows the simplicity of his mind in political calculations. He is a dealmaker, not a negotiator, and that is why his meeting with the North Korean leader was blunt, short, and unsuccessful. Because he has nothing else in mind except expressing a firm and unyielding position and acceptance by the other side; he only knows how to deal from a superior position, and this is of course far from any reality in the diplomatic arena. That is why we are witnessing to a large extent that the fat and expert US State Department is seen as a small group, both in decisions and statements, and some of the most skilled forces have basically separated from their respective groups with the coming to power of the Trump administration.
But perhaps Trump, by mentioning the former Secretary of State's name at this time, is more seeking a kind of early attack and preventing him from running for the presidential election next year; something that, by the way, would not be useless to advise and pressure if there are contacts between Iran and US Democrats.
Whether from the Democrats or from the Trump team, one of the main pillars of Iran's scoring points from the US side must undoubtedly be pursued in the specific electoral environment of this country. Of course, with diplomatic professionalism in a way that is not considered interference in the internal affairs of another country from a legal perspective.
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