Essay on Hamdeli Newspaper - August 15, 2018 -
The original text is in Persian and the following translation was done by Ai.
In Iranian popular culture, we have heard that "beware of the black and brown people". Regardless of the old and somewhat "race-oriented" appearance of this quote, its underlying layer is worthy of attention as an issue in unofficial history. If we analyze it from grandmothers who may have been in Azerbaijan and the northern regions of Iran, we will probably come to the conclusion that the meaning and reference in this sentence is to the Russians, whose attack and occupation have left a residue of arrows in the minds of Iranians.
Today, due to the historical sensitivity of the people regarding territorial and water treaties with Russia, public opinion is focused on the Convention on the Legal Regime of the Caspian Sea. From those who consider Iran's share to be 50% based on the quotes to others who, for the sake of fairness and lasting peace with their northern neighbors, are all aware of the aforementioned issue.
If we ignore the rhetoric of this convention as an example, we will find two questions as strategic questions before us.
One is: To what extent has our proximity to Russia been a matter of choice due to the positions declared and adopted against the West, and especially the United States? Has there been or is there another choice for us to form a "strategic alliance" among the superpowers or major powers of the world?
It is clear that according to the constitution and the independence-seeking nature of the political system, there is no official and declared strategic alliance between Iran and world powers. However, in the field of practice, every observer confirms that in recent years (and mainly after 1384), Iran has established close strategic relations with Russia that cannot be hidden.
Of course, theoretically, from the author's perspective, a strategic alliance, even if it is declared and official, does not necessarily mean dependence and violation of national sovereignty, and countries all over the world can (and do) enter into such alliances based on their national interests without reducing their independence.
But it remains to be seen whether, due to the lack of diplomatic relations with Russia's primary rival, the United States of America, as well as the volatile relations with Europe and Britain, it remains to be seen whether this alliance, its origin and the timing of its occurrence, and its continuation have been able to and can we take sufficient steps with confidence in securing our national interests?
The question is whether, due to the fact that Russia sees Iran's hand empty in approaching the West in its relationship with Iran, it does not prioritize its other interests or relations at appropriate times, or is it potentially unable to do so?
Let's look at Turkey: Whether we like it or not, Turkey is a strategic ally of the West and a member of NATO, it has extensive commercial and industrial arms relations with the United States and especially Europe, and the United States even has a military base in Turkey. At the same time, Turkey does not make any concessions to them in this alliance with the West, and as soon as it feels pressure from the United States or even a country like Germany, it turns to the other side of the world, namely Russia (and primarily Iran). While using this shadow as an implicit threat to contain and moderate its partners, it has even succeeded in purchasing weapons due to this constant competition between the superpowers, and despite being a member of NATO, it quickly purchased and received S-400 missiles from Russia. Because both Russia is willing to give Turkey concessions in order to separate it from its strategic partners as much as possible, and in return, the West, and especially the United States, under the influence of this strategic competition, will yield to it as much as possible in the medium term. As a result, by placing itself among the great powers, Turkey both establishes a balance and equilibrium among them and implicitly makes itself the strategic objective of all those around this competition. In this way, both the national interests of the country are secured and, incidentally, the independence of the country is maintained to the desired extent due to the balance that is established between the superpowers. In fact, the guarantee of this lack of foreign interference is another foreigner and a competitive environment in which it seems that everyone is watching out for each other.
Our second question about the strategic alliance or closeness between Iran and its northern neighbor is that, fundamentally, is Russia naturally the best choice among the dominant powers of the world for establishing close relations?
The first factor that seems to be the extent of the natural interdependence of the two countries in assessing the appropriateness of a strategic relationship is the degree of natural interdependence between the two countries. For example, when a country has a distance dimension to our region, it is likely that the need to influence this sensitive region could be one of the motivations for approaching regional powers. As the United States constantly tries to be present in this region, whether through military bases or approaching the southern border states of the Persian Gulf.
As a second factor, another motivation for major countries to approach regional powers and countries such as Iran could be the guarantee of energy supply. With a brief look at the scene, we can see that Russia, whether geographically and due to its proximity to our country and region and the possibility of immediate presence in this part of the world, or due to the fact that it itself has energy resources and exports them (especially to Europe), cannot have great motivations in a strategic relationship with Iran.
It is even because of this strategic relationship that Iran's gas exports to Europe - especially Germany, which is always worried about its imported energy resources, especially from Russia - have never been taken seriously, because in the field of oil and gas exports, Iran and Russia not only do not have common interests, but naturally have conflicts and conflicts of interest, and basically in every scene one must step aside in favor of the other. Because both have the largest energy resources and can make their western regions, i.e. Europe, dependent on their energy exports in this way and also gain great material benefits from it.
Perhaps if Europe saw Iran’s hand in gas exports politically open, it would not only develop its relations with our country in many areas but would also be willing to make significant investments in the construction of pipelines and gas (and oil) extraction. And this dependence on capital and energy would itself be the best guarantee for political contracts: imagine for a moment that if the energy of Germany, Austria, France or Scandinavia was dependent on Iran (and that too in the form of gas pipelines and not oil, which can be replaced), who could even talk about sanctioning us?
The third factor in assessing the appropriateness of a strategic alliance is the scientific and technological power of the larger country: with all the will to import from its northern neighbor, the fact is that most of the equipment and technologies used in Iran are Western and not Russian: this is evident both in the infrastructure and upstream industries, and in the daily lives of the people.
It is clear that our intention is more towards production than import. But today, production has at least four inputs: human resources, raw materials, technical knowledge, and equipment, in which Europe and the West in general certainly have a definite and far-reaching comparative advantage over Russia in the last two elements. It is as if the meaning of economic independence in the current century is not "self-sufficiency" but "mutual dependence." If the world or at least the allies can be made dependent on "what we have" in return for the influx of "what we don't have," the balance is established and stable.
Now, if Iran has become Russia's "guaranteed partner," it is not surprising that this country is not willing to pay a high price for this partnership: to join the UN sanctions against Iran (which it did) or to compromise Iran's regional positions through a deal, and even to sell advanced weapons to regional rivals ahead of Iran.
If Russia had an unreasonable delay and procrastination in delivering the S-300 missiles and building the Bushehr power plant, it should not be blamed, because this relationship is worth it to it as long as it is low-cost and profitable. The first benefit is, of course, curbing the only potential competitor for gas exports to Europe.
If we add to these three points the point that was mentioned in the article - namely the historical pessimism of the Iranian people towards Russia - it seems that Russia is not the best, but our only possibility for political rapprochement with a major global power, and due to this point, which Russia is also aware of, you do not see a reason to pay the price of this alliance. This imbalance has constantly made its burden heavier to our detriment, and the half-hearted political support for us in international forums (which is a minimum expectation of a strategic relationship but has never been fully fulfilled) has been and will be at the cost of isolation and giving up competition in a part of the gas and energy market (such as Europe).
The question now is: Now that the US president's short-sightedness has led to a policy rift and a conflict in Europe's short- and medium-term interests with this country, hasn't the time come and the ground been prepared for Russia to create a serious competitor in its partnership with Iran? A competitor that, on the one hand, would make Russia's treatment of Iran fairer and the atmosphere healthier, and on the other hand, would increasingly modify US policies toward Iran due to its own interests - and not in defense of right and truth?
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