Interview with ILNA News Agency, September 7, 1402 -
He added: "We remember that the government had closed the negotiations for several months without giving a specific reason, and after the new team returned to the negotiations, they dreamily demanded that all six rounds of negotiations conducted by Araqchi be abandoned, which even Russia and China objected to. Then they constantly made amendments to the positions and even the negotiating team. All this delaying caused the world situation to change. In the meantime, whenever we came very close to an agreement, we did not have the finality without providing a real reason. I do not know how much intention and fault Russia, and especially Ulyanov himself, had in this prolongation of the negotiations. But in any case, warnings had been given, which unfortunately were ignored by senior officials of the Foreign Ministry.
This international affairs analyst emphasized: With the beginning of the war in Ukraine, the analysis was again that we would be in a better position. But perhaps today we see that such a calculation was fundamentally wrong. What we should have pursued was to separate our fate from Russia and any other country and normalize relations with Iran, especially in the sale of oil and petrochemicals, and more importantly, banking issues. I must say that the best thing for an agreement to be implemented and normal conditions around a country are the duration of its implementation, which unfortunately, due to Trump coming to power, the JCPOA did not benefit from this duration. But if normal trade and banking relations with Iran had been implemented for three years from 1400 to next year, the Biden administration would have taken advantage of the opportunity, and returning Iran to the security conditions that had been established would not have been easy. The 13th administration faced this issue with a political perspective.
In response to the question of what the Iran-US agreement looks like today after the release of dual-citizen prisoners and the frozen money, Bloomberg recently claimed that Iran would increase its oil sales in exchange for reducing uranium enrichment. To what extent is this true, Karimi said: Again, I must say that we do not have the necessary information regarding Bloomberg’s claim. But if Iran has cooperated with the Agency, the Agency should also respond positively to this cooperation. We know that Iran's cooperation with the Agency is in three layers; safeguards, Additional Protocol, and the JCPOA, of which only the first should be officially implemented for now. The second and third levels have been voluntary, firstly, and secondly, in the form of the JCPOA. As a result, with the conditions of not implementing the JCPOA in full and according to Articles 26 and 36 of that document, Iran is not required to comply with any extra-safeguards.
He added: Now, if there is an interaction where Iran carries out some of its non-commitment affairs, then in return, some relief should be provided for some of its bottlenecks, such as oil sales or banking affairs. But I would like to remind you again that non-public, temporary, and partial agreements do not generally meet our main interests; because, more than anything, we must change the security environment that has been created against us in the world. With such measures, the government may be more open in some areas, but investment and cooperation with Iran will not become normal; a Swedish, Emirati or Malaysian capitalist or company or bank has nothing to ease their worries about sanctions by working with Iran. Therefore, they continue to give this cooperation to their opponents and go to more secure countries.
In response to the question of how the scenario ahead of the Iran-US agreement is predicted to be, whether the September agreement will lead to an agreement on paper, Karimi said: At least I do not have such an analysis. All these efforts, if they are real and not news therapy for the market, are to revive the JCPOA. Attempts to introduce a new term such as “lifting sanctions” or “September text” are not mature and insightful, and as we can see, they have not been useful to the economy, the Foreign Ministry and the government in the medium term. At the same time, the revival of the JCPOA, in whatever form it is expressed, is a blessed thing that does not seem to me to be a really close issue. The agreements made so far seem to be a matter of fact; the exchange of prisoners, the opening of the transfer of national currency, etc., which, as mentioned, have short-term and especially everyday value for the country, and not strategic value. The main issue before us is to emerge from the cocoon of public sanctions, normalize our relations with the world, and especially eliminate the real psycho-political atmosphere against the country, which cannot be achieved by making statements, secret negotiations, and unclear texts.
In response to the question, in your opinion, is reducing uranium enrichment not a kind of interference in the law of strategic action to lift sanctions? Will the parliament not confront this issue? Karimi said: I think that in this regard, if we think about it, different parts of the country are with the current government and the government does not feel constrained in this regard. Basically, I see it as close to impossible for the parliament to confront any matter in the nuclear and foreign policy areas by the government in the current circumstances. The function of this law was for the parliament in a special situation and it was done. Today, not only does no one talk about such matters, but there is no objection from the parliament to non-public negotiations and non-public texts, etc. While we remember that when there was a clear and public text, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was constantly accused of negotiating and having a secret text, which we know today were false. Therefore, fortunately, the current government is not subject to such pressures for any reason.
In response to the question of what behavior do you think the US's actions in establishing contact with Iran for negotiations were the result of? Did the US seek to reduce tensions with Iran by dismissing Robert Malley? Karimi said: No. Robert Malley's own position was in line with de-escalation. What is true is that the Biden administration is currently seeking to ensure that the situation in the region does not escalate. Stability of the situation surrounding Iran and its nuclear file is the best baggage that Biden can bring to the elections. Therefore, the current priority of the US is not to increase tensions on the one hand and not to revive the JCPOA on the other, so that it can reap the most benefits for its elections at the lowest cost.
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