Interview with Ham Mihan Newspaper, August 16, 2023 -
The interview was in Persian and the translation below was done by Ai
Sasan Karimi, a lecturer in world studies at the University of Tehran, said in an interview with Ham Mihan that the transfer of five Iranian-American prisoners out of prison is mostly symbolic and confidence-building and was done to show the political will of the Iranian side. This university professor believes that the Biden administration will negotiate with Iran as much as it thinks is in the interest of its government and country, especially in the elections. Karimi emphasizes that Iran's security project will continue, especially under the pretext of its nuclear program. This foreign policy analyst also believes that the distance to the revival of the JCPOA is very long. Karimi also believes that Iran has wasted the position of the early Biden administration and today the conditions in the United States and the world have changed in such a way that the revival of the JCPOA and our benefit from the lifting of sanctions are far from being realized.
While news sources quoted informed sources as saying that Iran and the US had a disagreement over the implementation of the agreements reached in Oman between Bagheri and McGurk, on Thursday news of the release of Iranian-American prisoners from Evin appeared on the media outlets, and then the issue of releasing Iran’s frozen assets in Korea was raised. Does this new development indicate the implementation of all the provisions of the verbal understanding on which the two sides reached a consensus in Muscat? In agreements between governments, especially when the agreement is likely to be unwritten and informal, one cannot be sure of the implementation of things until everything is done. This is because the international environment is fundamentally characterized by aversion to authority, and therefore even written agreements do not have any specific implementation guarantees other than mutual benefits. In the first place, unwritten and non-public agreements are the same. Therefore, the transfer of the individuals from prison to outside is more symbolic and trust-building and was done to demonstrate the political will of the Iranian side, otherwise the individuals outside the prison are also under protection and there is no substantive difference in their actual situation. The same is true for the transfer of Iranian financial resources from South Korea. It is still not possible to be completely sure about the fate of this understanding, but the interests of the parties apparently require that these two issues probably come to fruition.
The Wall Street Journal reported on Saturday that Iran has significantly reduced the 60 percent enrichment process; given that Iran is negotiating with the International Atomic Energy Agency and, on the other hand, according to what was stated in the media, this issue was also raised in the oral understanding between Iran and the United States, which of the negotiations could such an issue be related to that John Kirby, the White House National Security Council Strategic Communications Coordinator, has refused to confirm?
These matters are typically coordinated between the IAEA and the Atomic Energy Organization as the Iranian side. We do not know whether this is true or false, but my analysis is that Iran has first produced 60% uranium to meet its needs and then to consolidate its position. Therefore, especially on the eve of the IAEA general meeting, there may be informal agreements between them to prevent further pressure in this regard, which, of course, is not far from political wisdom. It is as if the Wall Street Journal’s articles on the Iranian nuclear issue were not coincidental in some cases.
It was clear from the outset that any agreement between Iran and the United States, even at the lowest possible level, would incite American warmongers against the White House. On the other hand, until now, Joe Biden is the only president who has failed to release any American prisoners during his term. How will the US president manage this situation?
The first answer to this question is that the understanding we have been hearing about in recent days was reached for this reason. The Biden administration is preparing itself for the elections. Of course, in relations between countries, it is basically at this juncture that you can reach an understanding. Because, as I said, the main requirement of governments is interests. Of course, any minor concession that the United States government gives to Iran on any issue is excessive and a big loss in the eyes of the opponents, and an unparalleled victory in the eyes of that government itself. The same is true in Iran. In fact, every political actor, including governments, parties, and individuals, has two languages: a domestic language and a foreign language. In domestic equations, it makes no difference what quality you have agreed to. You will be pressured by the opposing faction and accused of compromising and giving too many concessions. The Biden administration is preparing itself for the elections, and for this reason, an understanding of such quality that it will bring pride to American public opinion has been reached. The positions of the warmongers cannot be taken into account because they consider anything less than war and pressure on Iran to be an easy matter, and sometimes they even consider sanctions to be insufficient. Of course, sometimes our friends inside interpret the positions of these warmongers as good when they say that sanctions are ineffective, but the truth is that what they mean by the ineffectiveness of sanctions or the badness of the agreement is to encourage military action against Iran. They are always there, but they should not be used as a criterion. I also think that Mr. Biden is doing his job and is not falling into the trap of those competitors. The Biden administration goes as far as it thinks is in the interest of its government and country, especially in elections, and no further.
If the unconfirmed media reports that the prisoner exchange and the release of Iran’s frozen funds are part of the second of the three clauses agreed upon between Tehran and Washington are true, the third clause of this verbal understanding will be to create the necessary conditions for a return to negotiations to revive the JCPOA. Given the current atmosphere in Iran and the United States, the issue of the JCPOA clauses related to sunsets that will be in October this year and in two years’ time, and the US presidential elections and then Iran’s, is there any time or will left to revive the JCPOA?
I see a very long way to the revival of the JCPOA. At least before the US elections, neither Biden is ready to enter into this issue, nor is Iran certain of its fate. But the sunsets of the JCPOA are more important to us than anything else in this matter. Because especially the sunset of 2025, which will permanently end the six resolutions and eliminate the possibility of their return, is very effective in neutralizing the issue of Iran’s securitization. Therefore, we must proceed with such a crooked and subtle approach that it is not disrupted. This issue is worth paying the price. In fact, today it has become clear that the JCPOA and all its clauses, especially the snapback issue, have been so skillfully designed and crafted that despite all the blows the United States has dealt it and the compensatory measures that Iran has taken, it has still maintained its structure and has practically put European countries under such political pressure to activate the snapback that this has not been possible until now. In addition, the sunsets of the JCPOA that have occurred with all these events to date have been very skillfully designed.
We are far from reviving the JCPOA, and the United States government in particular is not ready to do so. The fact is that we have wasted the early position of the Biden administration, and today the conditions in the United States and the world have changed in such a way that reviving the JCPOA and benefiting from the lifting of sanctions make it impossible. This opportunity cost in the sale of oil, etc. and various commercial, industrial, scientific and investment exchanges that were imposed on us is skyrocketing. We have had many glorious aspects in our resistance, but at the same time we have made very significant and unnecessary mistakes, especially in our perception and calculations, and although this is not unique to the nuclear issue and in relation to the United States, these two are perhaps the most costly. We should not constantly beat ourselves up in our calculations. We should also think about the costs that we could have avoided. Until we read our history and history in a reflective way, we will be condemned to repeat it.
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