If Iran and the IAEA continue to take a confrontational approach, the resolutions will increase/The threat of withdrawing from the NPT will only increase the pressure

 

Interview with ILNA News Agency June 15, 2023 - 
 

 

 

The interview was in Persian and the translation below was done by Ai.
 

 

 

Sasan Karimi, an international affairs analyst, in an interview with an ILNA reporter, in response to the question of what behavior Iran should adopt in order to prevent other resolutions from being issued against Iran, given the issuance of the Board of Governors resolution against Iran and the Leader's insistence that these issues should be resolved peacefully, said: It seems that to some extent, the opportunity has been lost in terms of putting the Iranian nuclear file on track. We should have continued our action in March and brought the work to a conclusion. Given the war in Ukraine and the increase in the price of energy carriers and demand for them globally, Mr. Raisi's government has preferred short-term interests over the country's long-term interests. Mr. Raisi's government thinks that if it sells oil at a high price, it will be enough and shows no motivation to continue negotiations. I have called this a “small victory before a big defeat.”

 

 

Karimi added: It is true that we can resist by selling more oil, and of course we should have used this as a lever in the negotiations and we should have, but the progress of the Vienna talks should not have been stopped. These talks should have continued and reached a conclusion. On the other hand, it does not seem that Russia, given its need to sell energy carriers and the differences it has with the West, is particularly supportive of the resumption and advancement of the talks, and I think it is unlikely that Russia will fundamentally support us on the nuclear issue. In response to the question, “What should Iran do?” Iran is now taking a stand against the IAEA. I see no way out of this. Unless they change direction and change the negotiating team. This was not the right thing to do at first, but now there is no other choice.
He clarified: "If we want to change the scene, the Secretary of the National Security Council should be changed and the file should be sent to the Council Secretariat anew. It would be better to elect a moderate figure like Mr. Araghchi as Secretary of the National Security Council and take over the negotiations. This is a way that Iran can change its course while maintaining the face of negotiations." Regarding what technical measures Iran can take, Karimi said: "As I said, the space between Iran and the Agency has become a space of confrontation. From our perspective, the Agency has a unilateral political approach, but in the international space, the Agency is considered a technical and professional institution. So most of the Agency's words will be reliable; therefore, dismantling the Agency's cameras has made the conditions for negotiations more difficult. Certainly, the other side will not enter negotiations from a position of weakness and will not fall into a trap. We are the same way; therefore, negotiations will not take place. I do not think that taking the initiative approach to making a technical decision is possible in order to both maintain our face and change the Agency's approach." He added: The reality is that Iran can be held accountable for the pollution. Many of these pollutions can have a subversive aspect. It can justify the pollutions and give more precise answers. In a way that the Agency cannot respond in kind. If we are to take the approach of confronting the Agency, the resolutions will certainly continue. The reality is that when we reach an agreement, the Agency will take its foot off our tail; therefore, the main way is to continue the negotiations, which I think is unlikely to come from the Foreign Ministry of Mr. Amir Abdollahian.
In response to the question that in the past periods we isolated the United States by issuing resolutions against us, in a period when no one issued resolutions against us. What behavior should we have today to maintain this position, he said: That behavior is not a one-day or two-day behavior. I call it international space-building. Over the years, we had created international space-building against the United States. Ultimately, Mr. Trump withdrew from the JCPOA. But the professionalism of Iran's foreign policy had caused us to consolidate the atmosphere against America. Relations with Europe, Russia, and China and relations with other countries were so good, and the negotiations had given technical answers from Iran to the Agency that ultimately caused the Agency to approve us 14 times; therefore, the international community will not reach a consensus with someone who has been approved by the Agency fourteen times. He clarified: "But when the Agency issues a resolution against us in this way, later in the Security Council, international institutions, and the General Assembly, the approach of various countries will be against us. Consensus building will be formed against us. While we should have had a little more active diplomacy so that we could maintain the consensus against America and the conditions for condemnation would not be reversed. The body of the Foreign Ministry, which is stable, needs more professional approaches at the top. Mr. Amir Abdollahian's approach is passive and Mr. Bagheri's approach is passive aggressive. Mr. Bagheri has not had the slightest media presence, even in government media, even after the negotiations ended in March. With this approach, it is not possible to attract the attention of different countries and create an international atmosphere.

Karimi also responded to the question of what the consequences would be if a resolution was issued against Iran again, whether there was a possibility of reactivating the snapback, saying: Of course, there are two paths: one is the so-called snapback path, which is within the JCPOA. The other is the path from the Agency to the Security Council; that is, the Agency condemns and the Board of Governors issues a file to refer Iran to the Security Council. It seems that the second path has now begun, not the snapback within the JCPOA. In any case, each of these will take between three and nine months, and the main issue is referring Iran's file back to the Security Council. Now, whether they can enter the snapback with the right of veto and without a vote is a legal question. The snapback mechanism is such that it is within the JCPOA, and now any of the Europeans can start it, and of course, they will ultimately vote against the return of Iran's resolutions. In this path, Russia and China cannot veto.

He clarified: But to refer Iran back to the Security Council, a vote must be taken again. Russia and China may veto there. If Iran is not reconciled. I am not aware of whether they can connect the second path to the first path. In principle, referring Iran to the Security Council is not good news at all. The return of UN sanctions will greatly delegitimize Iran. The issue will be different from the current issue of unilateral US sanctions.

Also, in response to the question of whether not accepting some voluntary measures for greater transparency by Iran will make it possible for Russia and China to no longer be on our side or to issue a negative vote against us, Karimi said: In the case of China, it is very possible. China does not have the basis for confrontation with the international community, especially the West; but Russia is now far from the West and will only vote against us when it puts us in a compromise agreement; But in the current situation, it is unlikely that it will vote against us. Unless it uses the snapback mechanism, which is to not vote to return sanctions.

In response to the question of what methods are there for Iran to maintain its relations with the Agency, if there is no way to maintain relations, may Israel use this to its advantage? He said: Yes, Israel, although it is not a member of the NPT, has gained a lot of influence in the Agency. As much as we can reduce our distance from the Agency and improve our cooperation in the short term, we will basically reduce Israel's influence on the Agency. There is no reason to want to reduce the Agency's monitoring, and using this lever will be to our disadvantage in the long term.

Also, in response to the question that some have raised Iran's withdrawal from the MPT, given that this process is not correct and will not be in the interest of national interests, what is your analysis in this regard, Karimi said: I do not agree with this issue. If Iran does not have a nuclear weapons approach, this approach will only increase the pressure. Unless it does, which it does not seem to have. If Iran uses this leverage today, it will have no leverage to use when it is to be condemned in the Security Council. This is a hasty and premature move. It can threaten, but it is premature to do so.

 

 

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