Interview with Donyaye Eqtesad Newspaper August 29, 2026 -
The original text is in Persian and the following translation was done by Ai.
Saideh Sadat Fahri: Following the recent visits of senior officials from Pakistan, Oman, and Qatar to Tehran, speculation has increased about the possibility of activating diplomatic channels to resolve the dispute over the Strait of Hormuz; however, Sasan Karimi, deputy director of the Payab think tank and professor at the University of Tehran, said in an interview with the "Donyaye Eqtesad" newspaper: "We cannot yet talk about the negotiations entering the stage of an executive agreement." According to him, the recent mediations have served to prevent the escalation of military tension rather than leading to progress in the negotiations. Referring to the deep difference in positions between Tehran and Washington, the university professor emphasizes that the closure of Hormuz alone cannot force the United States to accept Iran's conditions, and this lever must be translated into national interests at the appropriate time. At the same time, he considers it still possible to return to the Islamabad understanding and design executive and phased agreements, and emphasizes the need for diplomatic initiative, internal cohesion, and taking advantage of the gaps in US policy.
After the visits of Asim Munir, Omani Foreign Minister, and Qatari Foreign Minister to Tehran, can it be said that the negotiations on the Strait of Hormuz have moved from the political mediation stage to the executive agreement stage? If so, what will be the first practical sign of this in the coming days: the creation of a limited shipping corridor, the reduction of passage restrictions, or the announcement of a joint mechanism between Iran and Oman?
I find it unlikely that at the current stage and with the volume of differences between the positions of the two sides, it can be said that the matter has progressed. I think that mediation has been used at most to prevent an increase in military tension. Progress in the negotiations requires a rapprochement of positions or the production of a new innovative solution. This is also unlikely to happen through mediation and message transmission. The transmission of the message in itself evokes a kind of confrontation, indifference to the issue and inflexibility for everyone, especially the parties. Perhaps at the beginning and at the height of the tension; it may be useful to create a ceasefire, prevent the escalation of tension and a kind of "political firefighting", but it is very unlikely to be useful to achieve a result, and a sustainable and decisive result. Both main parties to this conflict and conflict have chosen as their narrative the statement of the absence of any agreement, rigid positions, the desire to impose their opinion on the outcome of the negotiations and the declaration of victory, which itself will fundamentally prevent the achievement of a sustainable result. In addition, external pressures, especially from the Israeli regime and its supporters within the US society and government, should not be underestimated. Of course, there are other internal and external pressures that must be added to the negotiating and executive positions of the parties on the sidelines. Especially if the initiative and flexibility to achieve a result on either side is considered to be against security and national interests, the task will certainly become very difficult.
If Iran is willing to adjust the situation in Hormuz in exchange for specific guarantees, will the United States be willing to return to the same Islamabad agreement or will Washington, having experienced the effectiveness of naval pressure, demand new and tougher conditions?
The fact is that the Americans must answer this question. For the United States, the current situation is not unbearable. Although putting pressure on the global economy and oil prices was initially of considerable use, its coefficient has now been reduced and this pressure does not necessarily fall on the United States. In addition, the Trump administration’s discourse regarding the traditional allies of the United States is not about respecting and supporting them, but rather its approach, especially towards Europe, is from a high position and with considerable demands. As a result, there is basically little possibility of exerting political pressure on the Trump administration from allies. Counterparts such as China are also subject to other equations. On the one hand, this issue is not a priority for China, and secondly, the Middle East remaining a priority for the United States, and therefore the delay in implementing the pivot to Asia strategy by the United States, is a fundamental strategic benefit for Beijing, which certainly makes the economic costs bearable for this country. Meanwhile, by managing its demand for energy, China practically does not allow the energy market to increase and stabilize the increased prices. In the final analysis, it should be said that the United States is gradually recovering from the shock caused by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and is designing and implementing its measures for maximum resilience in the current situation, as well as political and military issues in the medium term. We should not expect that the closure of the Strait of Hormuz will force the United States to accept our conditions. The Strait of Hormuz is a negotiating lever that must be translated into national interests at the appropriate time. Delaying this will turn the issue into its opposite. In addition, the desirability of reaching an understanding by the US government today is much lower than the day the memorandum was signed.
If limited and controlled traffic is established in Hormuz in the coming days, could this be a test of goodwill for the US to return to Islamabad, or will Washington first demand greater concessions in the nuclear field, regional security, and complete freedom of navigation in order to return to the agreement?
The United States will certainly try to get the maximum concessions at each stage; everyone should do so. But ultimately, returning to the Islamabad understanding is not unrelated to various areas; because the understanding on the lifting of sanctions may necessitate the need for dialogue on appropriate matters. The opening of the Strait of Hormuz in a managed and gradual manner, provided that it provides the means to reach reasonable arrangements, is in the national interest. I generally do not agree with words like “test”. In order to be able to reach a conclusion that provides an opening, you must have a constructive approach. Of course, the approach of the other side is also skeptical, different, and unconstructive. Of course, as a country, we cannot wait for America to become rational, punished, and polite. Securing national interests cannot stop at these issues, which are at least “suspended for the foreseeable future.” Identifying the different political tendencies in the Trump administration and addressing them can be a solution to the current impasse. In particular, the competition between Vance and Rubio has so far destroyed Islamabad’s understanding, but designing and arranging arrangements that can take advantage of this goodwill gap is not obvious, nor is it the job of every diplomat. For this type of work, we will need continuous, coherent, and high-level planning and implementation, especially in close cooperation with the main missions of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the world, especially in international organizations. Unfortunately, in the past two years, we have not witnessed such activism from the main missions, especially the ones in New York, Vienna, and Geneva, which we hope will be corrected.
Given that the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding effectively collapsed due to the dispute over Hormuz, would it make more sense for Tehran and Washington to move towards Islamabad II, rather than reviving the same text; that is, a phased agreement that first links Hormuz, then the cessation of economic pressure/sanctions, and finally nuclear and security negotiations?
I think that the same agreement should be acted upon and smaller, more operational arrangements agreed upon. The main bottleneck, of course, is political will, not executive issues. Internal coherence, political will, and creative and bold proposals, regardless of undue pressure, are what we need in the body and at the top of our diplomatic apparatus. We cannot change the other side, but it is not the case that relations between actors remain unchanged. Our activism can influence many things. Therefore, courageous executive agreements under the consistent support of the government and the people can steer the situation as much as possible towards our national interests and security. I think the current situation is very favorable to convince both ourselves and the region that our interests depend on the interests of the region and vice versa. This more than ever intertwining following the Mecca understanding shows the concern of the major actors about the security vacuum in the region and the unreliability of the American presence. Therefore, using this new setting and spirit, which may be the prelude to new regional security arrangements, is a situation worth investing in. Therefore, by enlisting the help of regional actors, exploiting the will of mediators, activating the faults within the United States, and especially trying to isolate Israel, all can be the prelude to operational agreements branching off from the Islamabad understanding. The matter must be placed on the path of advancing analyses based on real perception, and this is far from a slogan.
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