Published on IAI website (Italian version)
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Israel–US Attack: A Suspended Equilibrium
In the aftermath of the United States re-imposing the six United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions and entering a post-war era, the situation in Iran can be characterized as a precarious suspension, which the Supreme Leader described as a profoundly adverse circumstance for the nation. Iranian analysts maintain that control over Western policies lies entirely beyond European influence, with the European Union (EU) and its members compelled to align with United States directives now shaped by President Donald Trump.
This President, known for his distinctive psychological profile, appears convinced that Iran's nuclear program was comprehensively dismantled through American strikes at the conclusion of the 12-day war. From Trump's perspective, this development arguably eliminates the need or justification for further military engagements with Iran. Yet, from Israel's standpoint, the strikes represent an incomplete objective. Consequently, Israeli leaders may seek to persuade other actors to launch additional incursions into Iranian territory. The ultimate aims of Israel remain ambiguous: some observers suggest a pursuit of regime change in Iran, while others contend that Israel's assessment views Iran as an insurmountable power hindering its regional hegemonic aspirations in the Middle East.
A further interpretation posits that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's regional conflicts, including the war with Iran, serve as a mechanism to 'escape forward'—sustaining momentum to avert domestic collapse. In periods of relative calm, the disintegration of his coalition government becomes probable, particularly following the Gaza deal, which could intensify internal pressures on Netanyahu from more radical right-wing factions, potentially prompting coalition withdrawals.
Thus, a new strike remains feasible, though not overwhelmingly likely. Regional analyses from other stakeholders—including most Arab Middle Eastern states, Turkey, and Pakistan—now perceive Israel as the paramount threat to peace and security, especially after its aggression against Qatar.
This perspective positions Iran as a pivotal counterweight to an entity harboring ambitions of a 'Greater Israel'. Complementing this, the United States now recognizes that the collapse of the Islamic Republic of Iran is neither feasible nor desirable. Any ensuing regional chaos from the Iranian state's failure would prolong instability, compelling sustained American involvement—an outcome misaligned with Washington's priorities amid intensifying rivalries with China.
Hence, a 'weak Iran' emerges as the optimal configuration for American interests. The 12-day war has grounded all parties in greater realism, rendering Iranian calculations more pragmatic and earthly than previously.
This tempered outlook permeates domestic discourse, where optimism tempers caution, fostering debates on long-term viability rather than immediate retaliation.
The Snapback Mechanism: Legality and Resistance
Iran's stance on the so-called snapback mechanism—which effectively constitutes a dispute resolution mechanism (DRM)—asserts its illegality, grounded in multiple arguments presented to the United Nations Secretary-General.
Russia now endorses this position unequivocally, with China offering qualified support, albeit less explicitly. In practice, however, few can credibly deny that the resolutions have been mechanically reinstated. This invocation occurs against a backdrop of transformed global dynamics since the resolutions' original adoption. The heightened competition between the United States and China, the profound rift between the Russian Federation and European countries (including the EU), and the reconfiguration of regional and international relations render the measures outdated.
Consequently, segments of Iranian opinion hold that, despite these resolutions and accompanying sanctions, the nation can endure and resist effectively. Iran's over two decades of experience with stringent sanctions equips it to mitigate economic repercussions, drawing on adaptive mechanisms honed through prolonged adversity.
Sanctions: Resilience Amid Overreach
The global equations diverge starkly from the era when these resolutions were enacted: United States–China antagonism has escalated dramatically, the Russian Federation–European Union confrontation exerts substantial influence, and worldwide relations bear little resemblance to prior configurations. This contextual shift underpins Iranian convictions that survival remains attainable even under renewed sanctions. One must account for Iran's extensive history—spanning more than two decades—of navigating heavy sanctions, which has cultivated strategies to attenuate their economic toll.
Excessive sanctioning, paradoxically, may diminish their efficacy, as overreach fosters circumvention and resilience. The Islamic Republic of Iran, as a polity, has been forged in turbulence, adept at managing crises and emerging intact. For over four decades, this system has withstood manifold pressures, from geopolitical isolation to economic strangulation. Yet, the essence of the current conjuncture transcends mere endurance; it hinges on dignity. Dignity constitutes the pivotal keyword in engagements with the Islamic Republic. Western states must recognize that no form of humiliation or coercion will prevail against it. In such a framework, cost–benefit analyses falter, as principled resistance overrides pragmatic concessions. This ethos resonates deeply in domestic opinion, where polls and commentaries reveal widespread aversion to perceived capitulation, framing sanctions not as existential threats but as tests of sovereignty.
Rethinking National Security: From Defensive Posture to Offensive Horizons
The confluence of reinstated E3 sanctions—comprising France, Germany, and the United Kingdom—and the fragile ceasefire in the Iran–Israel conflict has ignited a vigorous debate within Iran's political landscape and among domestic constituencies.
Central to this discourse are questions about recalibrating the national security strategy, traditionally anchored in a defensive posture under the current administration, to address a potential resurgence of offensive elements. Proponents of continuity emphasize the merits of 'forward defense'—an evolution from pure deterrence to proactive projection—yet tempered by the 12-day war's sobering lessons. This approach, articulated in elite circles, seeks to neutralize threats preemptively without overextension, leveraging proxies and asymmetric capabilities to maintain regional influence. Critics, however, advocate a bolder offensive pivot, arguing that defensive restraint has invited escalation, as evidenced by Israeli incursions and snapback activations. They contend that restoring offensive momentum—through enhanced missile deterrence and alliances with Russia and China—could deter future aggressions and reclaim strategic initiative.
Domestic opinion, gauged through social media and public forums, mirrors this polarization: urban intellectuals favor diplomatic resilience intertwined with measured offensives, while rural and conservative bases prioritize unyielding defense rooted in revolutionary ideology.
The Supreme Leader's rhetoric, decrying the post-UNGA 'suspension' as untenable, subtly signals openness to adaptation, provided it upholds dignity. Ultimately, this rethinking transcends tactics; it embodies a broader existential reflection on Iran's role as a balancer against Israeli hegemony, informed by Arab and Turkish apprehensions of regional destabilization. As sanctions bite anew, the debate crystallizes around a hybrid strategy: defensive fortitude yielding to selective offensives, ensuring survival without surrender.
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