Essay on PAIAB website April 25, 2026 -
The original text is in Persian and the following translation was done by Ai.
Problem Definition
Assumptions:
• Within the Trump administration, the view of Iran is not unified but consists of several competing logics;
• The confusion of these logics in analysis and messaging causes them to converge against Iran.
Policy Problem: How can these gaps be preserved and turned into opportunities? Who is the right negotiating party?
The correct formulation of the problem determines the type of response; in the issue between Iran and the United States, if the issue is seen as a general confrontation, strategies will inevitably be general, confrontational, and poorly differentiated. But if the issue is defined as a competition between different tendencies in Washington about Iran, policymaking can move away from a reactive mode and actively design work on the gaps. The purpose of this policy report is to provide such a framework for differentiation.
The experiences of the Twelve Days War and the Ramadan War, in addition to previous precedents, indicate the existence of an institutionalized and stable framework in American foreign policy, especially in difficult junctures. However, in addition to the relative unity of approach in junctures such as the period of military confrontation and the overcoming of more extreme tendencies in these junctures, factors such as the psychological characteristics of individuals, the different origins of politicians and political movements, the limitations of political interests and, as a result, the inherent competition therein, are influential and necessary to recognize.
Patriotic resistance and defense in the two aforementioned wars with its various aspects, in addition to operational experience, can also lead to strengthening theoretical knowledge regarding better understanding of the opposing sides and influence policymaking on this issue.
Analytical framework:
Although foreign policy in the United States has a final and relatively stable framework, personalities, media, think tanks and financial-political networks are trying hard to influence it, which has intensified during the Trump era due to his personality traits. Therefore, it is important to understand the motivations and decision-making logic of key actors. In addition, each tendency understands “Iran” differently: an existential threat, an unnecessary cost, or a trading opportunity. This perceptual difference is the source of behavioral differences and can be the basis for designing a differentiated policy in the medium term. Therefore, the following analytical framework has been considered for the present policy report:
• Actor action analysis (focusing on influential individuals and networks);
• Perceptual-discursive analysis (how to construct the “Iranian threat”);
• Strategic division logic (preventing the competitor from becoming coherent).
Typology of Tendencies in America about Iran
1. The “Israel-First” Tendency
This tendency sees the Iranian issue as structural and identity-based, not merely behavioral. In their view, a temporary change in behavior is not enough and Iran’s strategic capabilities must be limited. Therefore, they are skeptical of limited agreements and always emphasize strict deterrence and increasing sanctions. Iran’s policy towards this spectrum should focus on increasing the cost of military action and strengthening deterrence, not normative persuasion. The following are some of the characteristics of this tendency:
• Figures: Marco Rubio, Tom Cotton, Ted Cruz, and Lindsey Graham;
• Intellectual and institutional ties with institutions such as FDD, UANI, ISIS, etc.;
• This tendency considers Iran an existential threat to the Israeli regime;
• The basic preference of this trend is for maximum pressure and military preparedness against Iran.
It is worth noting that this trend is both vocal and maximally aligned with the Israeli regime and Benjamin Netanyahu, and at the same time has the power to influence the entire government, the president, and other trends.
2. Isolationist “America First” Trend
• Figures: Vance, Tucker Carlson, and Rand Paul;
• Focus on avoiding endless wars;
• Sensitive to the financial and human costs of foreign intervention.
For this spectrum, Iran is not a top priority; what is important is preventing the United States from entering a new conflict in the Middle East. They consider competition with China and domestic issues more important. Therefore, highlighting the costs of war, the risk of regional conflict, and the financial burden on American taxpayers can strengthen the narrative of this trend. This spectrum could potentially be an obstacle to the militarist consensus, but it is currently in a lower position in the trends surrounding the Trump administration. The significant differences between Vance and others in the first circle regarding negotiations and war with Iran support this meaning.
3. The Self-centered Dealmaker's Tendency
• Figures: Donald Trump, Jared Kushner, and Steve Whittaker;
• The three main characteristics of this tendency are self-righteousness, self-interested bargaining, and opportunism.
This tendency sees foreign policy as a stage for prestige and political or economic gain rather than a normative project. The self-righteousness component makes it sensitive to personal humiliation or threat. Self-interested bargaining seeks tangible and declarable gains. Opportunism also means being prepared to pivot quickly if a "quick win" or a "show deal" is seen. Currently, this tendency is more than ever the target of the whispers of the first tendency, the Israeli regime and Netanyahu himself, and as a result, this tendency is pursuing the chance to secure its interests in what was described as quick-fire war-making and show-off through immediate victories. Given the failure to advance these goals through two aggressive wars in nine months and the unparalleled resistance of the people and armed forces, designing proposals to motivate a shift from quick-fire war-making to a quick-fire show-off agreement may be a way to secure Iran's interests. This requires careful and pragmatic planning with a long-term view, in which isolating the Israeli regime, its competitors, and also its political ill-wishers in Iran is a priority.
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Possible strategic error
In war conditions, with bragging against the Israel-centric trend (first category) in the first category and personal bragging against the bargaining actors (third category), the possibility of convergence of these two groups increases. While in normal conditions, there is competition and even distrust between these trends. Imprecise policy closes these gaps and provides the basis for the unity of the two groups; while in post-war conditions, precise policy keeps them active and even deepens them. Therefore, the most important axes of possible error in this regard (especially in non-war conditions) can be listed as follows:
• Equating the three trends;
• Using the same threat literature for all trends and at all times;
• Stimulating the egotistical component in the bargaining trend.
Policy Implications
An effective strategy for Iran to confront the aforementioned tendencies in the United States could be multi-layered: deterrence against Israel-centrics, cost-cutting against isolationists, and offering the possibility of a show of victory for dealmakers. This distinction is not a contradiction but a sign of strategic maturity. A single message for different audiences reduces the effectiveness of the policy.
Iran’s behavior in a moment of crisis can change the weight of each narrative; actions interpreted as “direct humiliation” strengthen the hand of the Israel-centric stream, while controlled and manageable behavior leaves more room for maneuver for the civilian narrative. Therefore, the following general points should be considered:
• Try to design messages that appropriately affect each group according to their characteristics;
• Combine hard deterrence with transactional flexibility;
• Highlight the cost of war to strengthen the isolationist narrative.
Short-term implementation recommendations
Deterrence should be focused on behavior and policy, not personality; as in the case of Donald Trump, given his specific psychological characteristics, it has become inevitable to consider personality. In principle, flexible channels and phased agreements can be compatible with the opportunistic logic of the dealmaker's tendency and help diplomacy move forward or create obstacles in its path, without weakening Iran's overall frameworks. Care in official literature and media signal management, including the monopoly of foreign policy spokespersons by a very few individuals, is particularly important at this stage. Therefore, the following can be mentioned:
• Avoid personalizing the threat;
• Designing marketable but low-cost offers in the US domestic space;
• Maintaining deterrence without derogatory language.
Strategic Conclusion
A successful strategy for the Islamic Republic depends on avoiding reducing complexity to a simple “Iran-US” binary and making the internal competition of US power-building, especially the growing tendency against Israel first, an active variable in its calculations. Managing these gaps not only allows for cost reductions, but can also expand the space for diplomatic maneuver.
• US policy on Iran is the result of the competition of three different logics in addition to structural strategies;
• The convergence of these logics against Iran is not inevitable, but rather depends on the behavior and messaging of the parties;
• Smart politics deepens the gaps and emotional politics unites them.
In the Twelve Day War and the Winter War of 1404, the third tendency was more than anything influenced by the Israel First tendency, and of course Israel itself and Netanyahu himself, and evaluated its cost-benefit calculations regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran in line with their interests, and Iran's resistance to these attacks ultimately exposed the error of these calculations to the politicians of the interest-oriented tendency.
At the same time, and in view of the need for a precise picture for future policymaking in the Islamic Republic of Iran, it should be said that diplomatic messages should not be designed in a way that unites the radical pro-Israel group with the third group. Mistakes in recognizing the groupings and their characteristics, or considering these tendencies as one, and possibly inaccurately designing messages in different diplomatic and political situations can become their opposite.
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