Essay on PAIAB website dated January 29, 2026 -
The original text is in Persian and the following translation was done by Ai.
Policy Issue Formulation
The US National Security Strategy 2025 should be seen not simply as a policy text, but as a sign of the redefinition of America’s role in the international system. The document reflects “America’s strategic fatigue” from trying to play a costly global leadership role and moving towards a model in which US national security, based on the Monroe Doctrine, is defined above all by geography, borders, domestic economy, and a focus on the Western Hemisphere.
For the Islamic Republic of Iran, the main issue is not whether the document apparently contains hostile language against Iran; rather, the more precise issue is what position Iran has found in this redefinition and what consequences this position has for US behavior and Iranian foreign policy choices. Superficial readings of the 2025 document - whether those who interpret it as a return to maximum pressure or those who consider it insignificant - can lead to decisions whose costs cannot be recovered for the country in the medium and long term.
The policy question of this policy paper is formulated as follows: Given the published text of the US National Security Strategy document, and the visible changes in it, how should Iran's foreign policy be adjusted to ensure its security and national interests?
Analytical framework: From global security to Monroe security
The 2025 document must be analyzed along a historical trend. After the Cold War, the United States considered itself committed to maintaining and managing the global order, which, of course, had different practical aspects during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars and afterwards. However, the costs of long wars, increasing competition, especially with China, and internal crises have eroded this perception. The implicit return to the logic of the Monroe Doctrine - that is, prioritizing vital geographic areas and avoiding unnecessary global commitments - can be understood in this context.
In this logic:
• Threats are ranked based on geographical proximity and direct impact on domestic security;
• American ideology and values give way to cost-benefit calculations;
• Actors opposed to the United States outside the Western Hemisphere are not necessarily considered existential enemies and the way to deal with them must be designed.
It should be noted that in this strategy, relying on the military and especially technological capabilities of the United States, the priority of risk aversion and operational activism has changed from classic wars and large-scale military operations to sudden, rapid, severe and effective strikes, examples of which can be seen in the attack on Iranian nuclear facilities, including during the Twelve Day War and the operation to kidnap the Venezuelan president. This approach can be likened to a "sledgehammer blow."
Europe in the US National Security Strategy (2025):
In the US National Security Strategy 2025, Washington’s approach to European partners is not hostile or openly contemptuous; but at the same time, it is clearly unromantic, instrumental, and conditional. This change in tone and position, although not accompanied by harsh or insulting language, in practice means a decline in the strategic position of European partners in American calculations and, therefore, is considered “derogatory” by many European elites.
In previous documents, especially the 2022 Strategic Document, European partners were still considered part of the US strategic “we.” But in the 2025 Document, this notion has been effectively abandoned. Europe is not seen as an equal partner to the United States, but as a costly security area that must either take responsibility for its own security or deviate from Washington’s priorities. In this context, the United States defines its commitment not in terms of historical or value ties, but in terms of cost and benefit.
The NATO security pact is not rejected in this document, but it is reduced from an “alliance based on political and value solidarity” to a “conditional security contract.” In Trump’s view, European security should not be considered a “free commodity” and each member must pay its share of the costs of this collective security. For Europe, which has been accustomed to the guaranteed security umbrella of the United States for decades, this change of perspective is tantamount to a demotion of Europe’s dignity, priority, and place in the United States’ strategic calculations and prioritization.
In the hierarchy of threats and priorities of the 2025 document, the Western Hemisphere is at the top of the list, China is defined as a structural competitor, and Europe is reduced to a manageable issue, which is a rational and prioritization-based view from Washington's perspective.
China in the US National Security Strategy, 2025:
In the 2025 document, China is introduced as the "only competitor" that has the ability to create a long-term and structural challenge, and not just a regional or sectional threat, to American power and order. In other words, the United States sees China as a competitor that can be challenging not only in the security sector, but also in economic, industrial competition, and the structure of the global order. This approach shows that Washington continues to see the competition with Beijing as a "systemic challenge", although, unlike previous documents, it does not express it in a purely confrontational-ideological manner.
In similar documents from previous years, the competition with China was often described in terms of values (democracy versus authoritarianism) and the long-term threat to the liberal global order. In the 2025 version, the value emphasis has been somewhat diluted, and the focus has shifted to the operational and economic dimensions of the competition:
• Economic competition and supply chains;
• Efforts to bring strategic industries back to the US;
• Concerns about China’s position in global trade.
In the 2025 document, the US has declared that its main priority is security in the Western Hemisphere and its domestic borders, and therefore some extra-regional threats – including China and Russia – are not considered “top-priority issues”. This does not mean that China has been removed from the list of threats to the US, but that the US attitude towards the competition with China has changed, so that the US has moved away from a desire for direct confrontation or full-scale military confrontation with China, but economic containment, preventing China from dominating sensitive production chains, and maintaining technological superiority remain on the agenda.
Russia in the US National Security Strategy, 2025:
In the US National Security Strategy 2025, Russia’s position has been conceptually degraded but functionally stabilized. The document does not define Russia as a structural rival on par with China, nor as an immediate existential threat to US national security; rather, it portrays it as a disruptive, costly, and somewhat contained actor that must be contained, not “defeated.”
In previous documents - especially the 2022 document - Russia was at the center of the US national security strategy. The war in Ukraine, a direct threat to the European order and a clear challenge to the liberal order, had made Russia an "urgent threat". But in the 2025 document, this position has clearly changed. The war in Ukraine remains important, but it is not the center of the definition of US national security; thus, Russia has been reduced from a central threat to a regional issue with manageable consequences.
This change does not mean normalizing behavior towards Russia, but rather results from a "cold strategic assessment":
The US sees Russia as a power that has the potential to destroy, but not the capacity to build an alternative order. Unlike China, Russia is neither the economic engine of the future order, nor a technological competitor, nor an attractive model for others. Hence, Washington sees it more as a “pervasive security problem” than a civilizational or structural rival.
In the 2025 document, the US policy towards Russia is based on three axes: first, gradual containment and erosion without entering into direct military confrontation; second, transferring the main burden of confrontation - especially in Ukraine - to Europe; and third, preventing a deeper strategic alliance between Russia and China that could upset the balance of the larger competition.
The important point is that in this document, Russia has become a variable in the US-China competition, rather than an independent issue in US foreign policy. Washington’s main concern is not Russia itself, but how Moscow can help strengthen or weaken China’s position. For this reason, containing Russia is the goal, but defeating it is not the issue.
In terms of tone, the 2025 document’s approach towards Russia is cold, pessimistic and devoid of any conciliatory language, but at the same time it lacks the confrontational fervor of previous documents. Russia is neither a potential partner nor an adversary worth investing heavily in defeating. This view relegates Russia to what might be called a chronic secondary threat: one that must be contained, but not at the cost of diverting America’s focus from more critical priorities.
In sum, the National Security Strategy 2025 demotes Russia from center stage, but does not eliminate it from the equation. Russia is no longer central to the definition of American security, but part of the European security backdrop and a nuisance in Washington’s larger competition with Beijing. This demotion is not a sign of trust, but a calculated deprioritization: a deprioritization that has important implications for Europe, the Eurasian security order, and even Iran’s calculations.
The Middle East and Israel’s Security: In the Middle East, the document makes it clear that the region is no longer at the top of America’s strategic priorities, as the United States is now a major energy exporter and its dependence on the region’s oil has diminished. However, Israel’s security remains a “red line” and a core US national interest, and Washington insists that it must support this strategic partner against regional threats.
It should also be noted that Iran has not been relegated to a lower priority in this document, along with the Middle East. In other words, the two issues of “Israeli security” and “the Iranian threat” should be considered separate from other Middle East issues in the document.
Waterways and Maritime Security: The document states that maintaining freedom of navigation in strategic passages, including the Strait of Hormuz, the Bab al-Mandab, and the sea lanes in the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, is essential to US interests and global energy stability. This approach is part of an effort to ensure the flow of energy and goods in global trade, although the method of directly addressing threats has changed from the past, emphasizing multilateral security commitments and cooperation with regional and international partners rather than a large and costly military presence in the region.
Although the official text of the US National Security Strategy focuses most on the Indo-Pacific region and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea as part of the strategic competition with China, analysis of the document shows that the United States continues to insist on maintaining open and secure maritime shipping lanes around the world, including the Red Sea, the Sea of Oman, the Persian Gulf, and the Strait of Hormuz, because these passages are fundamental to global trade and energy security. This view, although less focused on a direct military presence in the Middle East, reflects the strategic importance of these regions, above all in the economic and military security of the United States.
Overall, the US National Security Strategy document attempts to establish a combination of strategic superiority over vital sea lanes, maintaining the security of Israel, and reducing permanent military commitments in the Middle East, without neglecting the US role in ensuring freedom of navigation and preventing disruption to global energy and trade routes.
Iran in the US National Security Strategy 2025
In the text of the document, Iran is still presented as a regional destabilizing factor; But more importantly, the document does not mention any specific military action plan (as a long-term strategic imperative for the United States), a broad diplomatic initiative, or a costly political investment in Iran. This absence is self-evident: Iran is a threat, but not an immediate or strategic one. This new position shifts US policy in its strategic direction towards three features:
1. Indirect containment rather than direct confrontation;
2. Delegating the responsibility for containment to regional allies;
3. Adopting a “strike operation” approach rather than costly and time-consuming attrition for direct confrontation if necessary.
The current state of affairs may be able to continue for years, so that there is essentially no need for a direct and decisive military confrontation in the form of a large-scale, all-out, and protracted war as the starting point. At the same time, the erosion resulting from the continuation of this situation seems unnecessary.
Practical Implications for Iranian Foreign Policy
This new situation has several practical implications:
• Possible direct US military action against Iran will be sudden, while the risk of indirect, disruptive, or accidental conflict remains strong;
• In the event of any unrest, or any other plausible pretext, effective and repellent military intervention is not far-fetched;
• Sanctions pressure will continue; there is no reason to reduce it, and at the same time, the costless weakening of the Islamic Republic of Iran will lead to unilateral erosion and pave the way for any subsequent initiative by the United States and possibly the Israeli regime to advance anti-Iranian regional initiatives as well as military action against the Islamic Republic of Iran;
• Any action that ties Iran to the US-China competition will seriously increase Washington's sensitivity;
• Iran's regional behavior will be evaluated more than before from the perspective of "costing America," rather than an existential threat.
In such circumstances, Iran's behavior can change its position in this threat hierarchy to the country's advantage or disadvantage.
Policy scenarios facing Iran
Scenario One: Escalation of threat and tension and increased confrontation to regain priority
In this scenario, Iran tries to turn itself into an unavoidable threat again by increasing regional or nuclear pressure.
Motivations and hopes:
• Increasing Iran's weight in US calculations;
• Creating short-term psychological leverage.
Costs:
• The possibility of returning to the escalation-punishment cycle;
• Justifying a tougher containment policy;
• Increasing economic and security costs.
Assessment:
This scenario is likely to transform Iran from a secondary threat to a more costly problem without ensuring a sustainable gain.
Scenario Two: Strategic Passivity
In this scenario, Iran considers the mere reduction of its priority in the hierarchy and list of strategic threats against the US as a success and avoids active action.
Motivations:
• Short-term reduction of friction;
• Waiting for the threat to pass and the blockage to be opened;
• Avoiding immediate risk.
Costs:
• Loss of initiative;
• Loss of prospects;
• The opposing parties do not remain in the current situation;
• Strengthening Iran's reactive and passive approach to the actions of the opposing parties;
• Increasing the role of rival actors in shaping the surrounding environment;
• Stabilizing the state of economic erosion.
Assessment:
This scenario postpones military action in the absence of other factors such as pressure from the Israeli regime, but at the same time, the opposing parties, especially the Zionist regime, will take the initiative and in fact, the opposing parties will not necessarily agree with the decision to maintain the status quo, and this will put the position of the Islamic Republic of Iran at the point of response.
Scenario Three: Active foreign policy adjustment based on reducing priority and managing differences
In this scenario, Iran accepts that it is a secondary threat and uses it as an opportunity to manage differences with the United States in a comprehensive and phased intelligent initiative.
Key components:
• Avoiding costly actions;
• Using regional capacities to reduce tension and manage disputes;
• Carefully managing sensitive files;
• Exploiting Iran's position in the China-US competition, without entering the strategic market without a deal;
• Increasing diplomatic mobility at the regional and trans-regional levels.
Advantages:
• Reduced likelihood of direct confrontation;
• Increased power of economic and political maneuver;
• Possibility of gradual management of pressures.
Risks:
• Domestic misunderstanding of the concept of de-escalation;
• Need for complex institutional coordination;
• Sensitivity to miscalculations of aligned actors.
Policy Recommendation
Within the framework of the US National Security Strategy 2025, in which the Islamic Republic of Iran is considered a threat in any case, the most desirable path for the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is to design a comprehensive, phased, and symbolic political initiative, rather than escalating tensions or settling for strategic passivity. The logic of this initiative should be based on the assumption that the main problem in Iran-US engagement is not the lack of a technical or legal solution, but the asynchrony of the political needs of the two sides: Washington seeks a quick, low-cost, and domestically deliverable achievement, and Iran needs to break the erosive situation of sanctions and security uncertainty without crossing fundamental red lines.
In this context, it is recommended that Iran, instead of entering into a process of erosion or increasing costly actions, pursue a symbolic political agreement with gradual implementation proposed through acceptable intermediaries, which is limited to a formal reduction in the level of hostility and a mutual withdrawal from the “active enemy” literature. Such an agreement does not mean normalization or an attempt at naive confidence-building; rather, it is a tool for the calculated exploitation of the logic of America’s “Monroe security” and the transformation of Iran from a potential security issue into a political and managerial issue.
The advantage of this approach is that it takes advantage of the opportunity created by the logic governing the US 2025 document: the US is strategically seeking to reduce costly trans-regional commitments and is not inclined to engage in erosive conflict or invest heavily in the Iranian issue, although sudden and effective strikes are still within the reach and the US government’s choice system. On the other hand, Trump has not achieved anything in the field of foreign and domestic policy so far and, given the upcoming mid-term elections, is hungry for a symbolic victory. A symbolic and minimal agreement would allow Trump to declare “achieving peace with an old enemy” and at the same time create for Iran the necessary legal and political basis to reduce sanctions pressure and contain risks. The condition for the success of this path is the conscious design of the agreement at the political level, entrusting the technical details to multilateral and timely mechanisms, and managing the domestic narrative based on “actively regulating relations to secure national interests,” rather than ideologically redefining relations.
Final Conclusion
In sum, the US National Security Strategy 2025 signals a redefinition of the global role of the United States and its transition to a “Monroe security” logic, in which priorities are set based on geography, cost-benefit, and direct threats to US domestic security. At the same time, the Islamic Republic of Iran continues to be seen as a regional destabilizing factor and is subject to a pattern of indirect containment, attrition, and, if necessary, limited, sudden, and effective military action.
The continuation of this situation, without a classic war, could lead to the gradual erosion of the country’s economic, security, and political capacities and the loss of windows of opportunity. Therefore, neither escalation of tension nor strategic passivity are appropriate responses to the new circumstances; Rather, the rational approach is to actively regulate foreign policy by designing limited, symbolic, and phased policy initiatives that also benefit from the logic of the US 2025 document, allowing for the management of security risks, the reduction of erosive pressures, and the preservation of national interests without crossing fundamental red lines.
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