Policy Report: Originality and Need in External Links

۱۱ بهمن ۱۴۰۴ Essays

Essay on PAIAB website written by Sasan Karimi, dated January 31, 2026 -

The original text is in Persian and the following translation was done by Ai.

Policy Issue

One of the fundamental challenges of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s foreign policy is the dominance of the “logic of necessity” over the “logic of authenticity” in defining and sustaining foreign ties. In practice, a significant part of Iran’s foreign relations – including relations with neighbors, eastern powers, and even some regional actors – is perceived and narrated not as an authentic and strategic choice, but rather as the result of coercion, obstruction, or the lack of alternative options. This perception is visible not only among public opinion, but also among a part of the elite and even in the practical behavior of policy-making bodies.

Instead of creating bargaining power, a foreign policy based on necessity gradually transmits a “signal of helplessness” to the other side; a signal that results in increasing transaction costs, imposing unequal terms, and reducing the other side’s motivation to invest long-term in the relationship. In such circumstances, even countries that could potentially be Iran’s strategic partners do not consider Iran a reliable partner, but rather an inevitable customer and a cheap partner.

The importance and strategic implications of the issue

The continuation of this pattern traps Iran’s foreign policy in a vicious cycle: the more limited foreign policy options become, the more “need-based” the remaining relations are defined; and the more need-based the relations become, the more the other side imposes costs and Iran’s options become more limited. This cycle not only erodes Iran’s economic interests, but also its political credibility and strategic power, and eliminates the possibility of balancing foreign relations. In this regard, and with a long-term view, the following are the various macro-options:

Policy scenarios

Scenario One: Continuation of a foreign policy based on necessity and reaction

In this scenario, the existing pattern continues; That is, Iran’s foreign relations are largely defined in response to sanctions, pressure, or the blocking of other avenues. Linkages with China, Russia, neighbors, or regional markets are seen not as a strategic choice, but as an “inevitable substitute” for lost relations with the West or rich markets. The natural consequence of this approach is increased asymmetry in relations, the imposition of price concessions, unilateral payment terms, and a decrease in the other party’s willingness to transfer technology, invest, or engage in long-term partnerships. This scenario may meet immediate needs in the short term, but in the medium term it leads to structural foreign policy lock-in and an escalation of unbalanced dependencies.

This scenario seems to be the least costly option in the short term, but it imposes the greatest prestige and strategic costs in the long term. The main motivation for this scenario in the short term is to meet the country’s minimum immediate needs, from selling oil and importing basic goods to circumventing financial and banking restrictions. This approach does not require difficult strategic decisions and has a lower domestic political cost because it does not challenge existing structures. However, the costs of this scenario are much heavier and cumulative. Iran’s foreign relations in this context become unbalanced relations in which the other side, realizing Iran’s helplessness, imposes unilateral conditions on the country, such as high price discounts, unequal payment terms, lack of technology transfer, and refusal of long-term investment. Moreover, this model undermines Iran’s international credibility and reduces the country to a “no-choice actor” and a “cheap partner” in the eyes of its partners, as well as an unreliable and unplanned actor; a situation from which it becomes increasingly difficult and costly to exit.

Scenario Two: A selective and partial turn from East to West (or vice versa)

In this scenario, instead of correcting the fundamental logic, Iran’s foreign policy simply changes its geographical orientation; in the sense that ties with East or West are used as a “pressure tool” against the other. Although this approach appears to be diversification, in practice it reproduces the same logic of necessity, as each side realizes that Iran’s relationship with the other is also lacking in authenticity and is merely instrumental. The result will be chronic distrust, refusal to make long-term commitments, and Iran becoming an unpredictable actor in the eyes of potential partners. This scenario creates neither balance nor credibility.

This scenario has higher reputational costs and instability, effectively neutralizing the benefits of diversity. The apparent benefit of this scenario is increased tactical flexibility and the creation of temporary leverage. Iran can use competition among major players in the short term to gain limited concessions and create the impression that it has multiple options. But the costs of this approach are structural and long-term. Potential partners quickly realize that the link with Iran is not genuine and is simply a means of pressure against a third party. The result is reduced trust, extreme caution in commitments, and a refusal to enter into strategic projects. Instead of a stable balance, this scenario creates chronic instability and turns Iran into an unpredictable actor for which neither side is willing to pay the long-term cost. Ultimately, this approach not only does not increase bargaining power, but erodes it.

Scenario Three: Redefining Foreign Policy Based on “Genuineness in Ties”

This scenario is based on a paradigm shift: defining foreign relations not out of necessity, but as a conscious, sustainable choice independent of sectional pressures. In this framework, ties with China, Russia, neighbors, and even the West are each seen as having an inherent authenticity, not as substitutes for each other. This approach requires that Iran, even in the context of opening up to the West, maintain and deepen its relations with the East and its neighbors, and vice versa. Such a policy sends the message to the other side that Iran is a permanent, programmable, and long-term partner; a message that paves the way for concessions, flexibility, investment, and real participation.

The main benefit of this scenario is the gradual but steady increase in Iran’s bargaining power in foreign relations. By defining ties as a genuine, long-term choice, Iran sends the message to its partners that its relationship with it is programmable, sustainable, and non-instrumental. This approach would reduce asymmetries, improve economic conditions, increase investment willingness, and foster genuine technological and security cooperation. However, the costs of this scenario are largely transitional: the need to change elite mindsets, modify institutional practices, endure some short-term pressures, and avoid emotional reactions to momentary developments. It would also require Iran to adhere to its commitments even under conditions of openness or pressure, which would require high strategic discipline. However, the total costs are limited and temporary, while the benefits are structural and long-term.

This option requires a change in mindset, a modification of practices, and acceptance of the potential costs of changing approaches, but it is the only option that allows for a sustainable balance, increased bargaining power, and an escape from the cycle of helplessness.

Policy Recommendation

The recommended scenario is to reorient Iran’s foreign policy based on the authenticity of its ties and the true diversity of its relationships. This means that Iran should define its relations with China, Russia, its neighbors, and the West not as temporary tools or unwanted alternatives, but as part of a core component of a balanced strategy that must be completed. Such an approach requires consistency in messaging, consistency in commitments, and avoidance of signaling inevitability in official speech and behavior.

Conclusion

Successful foreign policy does not arise from necessity, but from conscious and genuine choice. As long as others feel that Iran is compelled to engage with them, they will exploit this inevitability. But if Iran can redefine itself as a partner that “wants” to engage, not just “has to,” those same actors will be forced to reconsider their behavior. This change requires a change of perspective before it requires tools.

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