Essay on PAIAB website written by Sasan Karimi, dated January 27, 2026 -
The original text is in Persian and the following translation was done by Ai.
Preliminary explanation:
This report is based on informal study, observation, and reflections following discussions with Chinese non-governmental parties (including think tanks, universities, companies, etc.) and does not have any governmental or sovereign aspect from any party. The main objective is to examine the issue of “whether the political and strategic developments of the past two years have changed China’s attitude towards the Middle East and Iran?” Since China is a country that strategically chooses its foreign policy positions and may change them later slowly, the answer to this question can shed light on opportunities for cooperation.
Part One: The Strategic Importance of the Region for China and Iran’s Challenges
The Middle East and Energy Security: The Middle East and the Persian Gulf are of high strategic importance to China. This region has become a point of convergence and confrontation of various stakeholders, going beyond issues such as Palestine, Lebanon, etc. and has taken on a long-term aspect. The Persian Gulf is China’s source of energy security, as a major part of its energy imports come from this route. Therefore, the stability of this region is vital for China’s economic engine.
Iran-West Tension: The tension between Iran and the United States has a direct negative and deterrent effect on Iran-China economic relations, which have the most beneficial economic interaction with the United States. The Chinese also express confusion over the vagueness and lack of clarity of Iran’s overall strategy for improving Iran-West relations (especially the United States). This issue is sometimes compounded by the differences in the positions of the government and various sectors of the government.
Iran’s Internal Problems and Tensions: Chinese economic activists have significant concerns about the possibility of internal tensions in Iran and their dimensions, because in any case, such tensions could adversely affect their economic activities. In addition, Chinese activists have specific concerns about the current and future status of resistance-oriented activists.
Also, in his opinion, Iran's internal issues such as the possibility of socio-economic tensions, devaluation of the national currency, and poor management have made it difficult to attract investors. Apart from the main restrictions resulting from sanctions, Chinese companies based in Iran have prepared a written pathology and a specific introduction of the bottlenecks of their activities in the country in the form of a federation. In this list, many of the issues that have hindered the work of Chinese companies are written in a precise and objective (not general) manner, which can be presented to the responsible government and governance institutions for removal of obstacles. However, at the same time, no authority has been identified for these companies to follow up and remove obstacles in the government or other relevant institutions. It is noteworthy that the aforementioned companies are among those that have continued to operate despite all the restrictions and risks of sanctions and fines of being present in the Iranian market. Therefore, negotiation, continuous contact, and efforts to resolve the issues and obstacles facing them are valuable.
Part Two: A Clear Picture of Reciprocity
Iranian political and business parties’ view of China: Political support in the United Nations Security Council, ignoring sanctions, military aid, and the role of a full strategic partner are among the most important main perspectives in Iran’s political space towards China, which do not correspond to the reality of the scene in the post-polar world environment. Therefore, Chinese activists complain that existing Iranian narratives do not recognize China and have a simple understanding of this country, and also, there is a kind of anti-China or anti-China sentiment in layers of Iranian society.
China and the United States: China has a huge trade surplus with the United States, which creates a large investment capacity between them. China has also made significant progress in technological fields, so much so that even the United States and Europeans consider this country to be of technological importance, and with the changes that have occurred in the technological arrangements of the world, at least Europe does not hesitate to use China’s capacities for its own development.
China’s Economy and Development and President Xi’s Macro Approaches: China’s economy is transforming from production for export to production for consumption by a domestic middle class (approximately 450 million people) that has more modern demands than ever before. In general, and given China’s emerging position in world affairs, understanding China, as well as President Xi Jinping’s personal psychology, is essential for any serious actor – including governments, academics, companies and other non-state actors – in the global environment. For China, Mr. President Xi is a leader on the level of Mao and Deng Xiaoping: to borrow Max Weber’s classic idea, it can be said that for China, Mao brought power, Deng Xiaoping wealth, and Xi global prestige. China’s previous approach was isolationist, but Xi is seeking a global community led by China.
In the overall approach, President Xi has put forward four global initiatives:
Global Development Initiative
Global Security Initiative
Global Civilization Initiative
Global AI Governance Initiative
The core theme of China’s approach is based on “development” as the main model of the current and future world, accompanied by security, and civilizational dialogue as its maintaining nervous system; within this framework, unity and equality among countries constitute Beijing’s policymaking model. As mentioned, President Xi Jinping’s leadership focuses on restoring China’s global status, so that the country can abandon its past passive stance and avoid reactive action and shape global trends through infrastructure construction.
This approach could provide valuable opportunities for Iran, as Xi’s strategic projects would be challenged and the Central Asian, West Asian, and North African regions would be negatively affected if the United States were to gain greater influence in the region. However, at the same time, Chinese parties express that they face considerable uncertainty on many of the primary issues, even identifying suitable partners in Iran.
In the dual analysis of the Chinese political system – between “those close to the power core” on the one hand and “economic actors” on the other – the first group, i.e. those close to power, believe that greater support for Iran is necessary to prevent a change in the regional situation to the detriment of China’s interests; in addition, the challenges associated with the sale of Iranian oil, including domestic competition and price declines, add to the complexity of the relationship. The final impression is that “establishing contacts with key individuals in China can create a positive will to cooperate”; of course, it is clear that Beijing’s priorities in the global environment are different from Tehran’s and the desire for multilateral cooperation in partnership with other countries prevails over anything else, including welcoming tension and possibly resisting the impositions of the international system. In order to be realistic in the analysis, this Chinese prioritization must be taken into account. Accepting this real prioritization in the Chinese governance system can be useful in adjusting Iran’s outlook, approaches, and expectations (both at the level of governance and at the level of economic cooperation, etc.).
On the other hand, and on the Chinese side, the false image of the Islamic Republic of Iran as an unstable system, due to external pressures, the imposition of military operations, and possibly internal protests, has a negative impact on China's accurate understanding of the internal and international situation of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as the real possibilities of cooperation and through governmental and non-governmental relations. The sovereignty in the Islamic Republic of Iran, with its various voluntary and imposed aspects, is inherently far from what is in the Chinese mentality; just as it does not correspond to Western models. As a result, the strength and stability of the governance system must be considered by taking into account territorial and historical equations, as well as the special political situation - regardless of the reason for their creation. This point, like the aforementioned opposite, will also affect the accuracy and reality of the image of politicians and economic activists in their practical calculations in dealing with the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Part Three: Reasons for the Failure of Iran-China Relations
Four main reasons for the slow progress of Iran-China relations can be identified:
China’s Foreign Policy Strategies: China’s foreign policy strategies are based on the country’s status as a developing economy focused on meeting the needs of its 1.5 billion people, and as a result, it follows a conservative and pragmatic economic approach; Beijing has a good position in the international system and prefers gradual internal reforms rather than fundamental structural changes, and Chinese officials prefer to enter the field after the conflicts have ended.
China’s Foreign Policy Priorities: The two main issues in China’s macro priorities are (1) territorial integrity and a one-China policy, and (2) the United States (China has grown largely with American capital and believes that Sino-American relations will shape the future of the world). Of course, in recent years, the policies of the United States have somewhat disrupted this game, and especially since the Obama era, the policy of interaction between the two countries can be interpreted as a "policy of managed confrontation." Ultimately, it can be said that the neighbors, the Korean Peninsula, and Russia are the next priorities of China's foreign policy.
The shadow of other issues on relations: The Iran-US relationship has always affected Iran-China relations. With the conclusion of the JCPOA nuclear agreement, China's reluctance to develop relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran decreased, but the sanctions resulting from the withdrawal of the United States have once again fueled China's caution. China's relations with the Arabs and Israel also affect the nature and extent of its relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran. China sees the Arab world as a comprehensive and holistic phenomenon, and President Xi's visit to Iran in 2015 was accompanied by visits to Saudi Arabia and Egypt, at the insistence of the Chinese side. China-Israeli cooperation is also basically extensive, and this development of relations has sometimes even provoked American protests against Israel, and on the other hand, has made China cautious about actively supporting the Islamic Republic of Iran in situations such as the Twelve-Day War.
Level of Iranian expectations: Iran's expectations from China typically remain unmet because the strategy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in its foreign policy has limited its choices in the global environment and, as a result, by being immersed in a "bipolar view and the Cold War", it has unconsciously created the expectation that China and Russia will neutralize the problems resulting from Western sanctions in Iran's favor or share the problems and costs of this confrontation. While this is not within the means or priority of these two countries. Therefore, sometimes the party with expectations - such as Iran - may become disappointed with the level of its relations with the opposing parties (here China and Russia). However, this readiness does not exist not only on the Chinese (and Russian) side, but even considering the aforementioned cases, Iran, due to the restrictions built into its foreign policy, has largely become a "cheap partner" of these country(ies) in its relations with China (and also Russia), and as a result, it sees limited bargaining power for itself on various issues.
China's main complaint: Iran's emergency approach towards China: As an obstacle, some Chinese political, policy and business activists believe that "Iran is too concerned with the West and then Russia and wants an extensive relationship with China only for its own emergency period". A 25-year agreement was proposed between them to correct this approach, but by including some unnecessary and unrealistic items in the text that were ultimately opposed by the Chinese side, this mentality was rebuilt and even strengthened on the Chinese side, and the psychological aspect of the agreement to correct this image did not have an effect on the political mentality of the Chinese parties.
Part Four: Suggestions
Using Chinese engineering and management consulting companies: One of the key suggestions is to utilize the expertise and cooperation of the Chinese in various sectors of the country, especially in the field of "airports and air transit". This project could be initiated as a pilot project, in which Chinese companies would help upgrade Iran’s air transport infrastructure by transferring technical knowledge, investing, and implementing efficient management models. With the Chinese side’s participation in the management of the country’s air infrastructure and transit, the security of Iran’s skies would also be strengthened. Meanwhile, the securitization of this space would also be neutralized by the active and visible presence of the Chinese parties.
A Chinese-inspired foreign policy: The second suggestion is to introduce elements of Chinese foreign policy into Iran’s diplomatic approach, which could mean integrating or drawing inspiration from Beijing’s conservative, pragmatic, and development-oriented principles. This would include focusing on domestic priorities such as territorial integrity and economic growth, while avoiding unnecessary confrontations. Inspired by the Chinese model, Iran can base its foreign policy on gradual internal reforms and multilateral cooperation, to strengthen its position in the international system and manage the challenges of relations with great powers. An inspiring point in Chinese prioritization is the realism of the concept of priority, so that firstly, there are very few priority issues and secondly, issues that are not at the top of the policy priority list are easily placed on the margins of priority issues and the overall approach adopted.
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