Essay on IRNA News Agency, September 10, 2025 -
The original text is in Persian and the following translation was done by Ai.
The recent agreement between the Iranian Foreign Minister and the Secretary General of the International Atomic Energy Agency was a necessary step in managing Iran's foreign political relations in the current critical situation. At a time when three European countries have implemented the JCPOA dispute resolution mechanism in an act without good faith and without considering the various dimensions of the action they are taking, one of the important priorities in foreign policy is to get excuses from the other parties. Europe, which now has little left in the international arena, is trying to show itself as a still effective player in the equations by bringing up the snapback issue. But the reality is that implementing the snapback brings their role in the equations of nuclear diplomacy closer to its end. In addition, if the Islamic Republic of Iran reacts in a way that questions the non-proliferation regime, (regardless of what happens next for Iran), Europe's international credibility will be doubly damaged. At the same time, it should be noted that Europe has become so weak and powerless that it is even looking to the United States for the use of snapback or not, and cannot design its own independent line.
In the meantime, redesigning Iran's cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency will have a decisive effect. Of course, the Islamic Republic of Iran has never had the will to not cooperate with the Agency, nor is there a rational reason for it. It is as if for many years, with a maximum of 3% of the world's nuclear activities, Iran hosted more than 20% of all Agency inspections, so much so that at one point this international body complained about the costs associated with inspections from Iran and requested more funding. The meaning of these two numbers is that Iran has been subject to Agency inspections seven times the global average. The continuation of this level of inspections over many years and the failure to find a single piece of evidence of the deviation of the nuclear program from the peaceful path at least makes clear Iran's intention regarding the peaceful nature and remaining peaceful of its nuclear program. Technically, there is no conceivable ambiguity, either before the war or after the aggressive attacks on nuclear facilities. And therefore, the excuse must be removed.
What has and can confront the country with significant costs without any deviation is the irresponsible statements made by individuals inside the country regarding the need to equip the country with nuclear weapons, which are contrary to and contradict the country's real standards, both legally, officially, and practically. Another is the impatient expectation of the country's enemies to continue and intensify the security of Iran and its nuclear program. The Zionist regime in particular is anxious to find a single particle of ambiguity as evidence of deviation and to use it as the basis for any blackmail and wrongdoing. Furthermore, the European parties and the United States also welcome having more excuses to double the pressure on Iran. Unfortunately, the first case, that is, irresponsible statements, unintentionally pave the way for these enemies to abuse it.
In such circumstances, the Islamic Republic of Iran should, more than ever, take advantage of its real superiority in transparency and deprive the aforementioned parties of any excuse they might want to use. The fact is that during the time of Director General Rafael Grossi, the approach of the Agency, and especially the Director General, has been clearly political and non-technical. In many cases, unnecessary ambiguity in the tone of the Director General's reports has served as a basis for the Board of Governors to put pressure on Iran. For example, when the Director General has not observed evidence of deviation, he can, based on the principle of innocence, explicitly state that there is no cause for deviation. But Grossi, when politically necessary, presents the other side of this sentence as a pretext to the waiting parties and states that the Agency cannot confirm that no deviation has occurred anywhere in Iran. Logically, it is proof that requires evidence, not non-existence. In a territory as vast as Iran, no matter how much inspection, it is impossible to present a report on the entire territory. But any inspector must, of course, speak on the basis of his own observations, not what he may have seen.
All of the above suggests that denying the agency an inspection, when we have no motive or intention to conceal it, only serves to fill the hands of the other side and provide them with more excuses to justify their illegal actions.
At the same time, Iran has never responded negatively to the Agency's inspection request, and only two things have been considered in the Islamic Republic of Iran's approach:
First, that Iran's interests and information should not be endangered, which is a prerequisite for any kind of professional cooperation, and second, that the Agency basically had no basis or protocol for inspecting bombed facilities. In other words, since this act has not had much precedent in the international environment, an institution like the Agency (which, according to its statute, is responsible for protecting facilities containing fissile materials) basically did not foresee such a thing in a structural way. The written agreement between Iran and the Agency that is the basis for inspections and cooperation also lacked such a prediction. Therefore, any inspection of the facilities that were hit required the design of a basis that, in addition to being able to be carried out by the Agency, also recognized and respected the national security and governance considerations of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Now, with the agreement reached between the Agency and Iran, such a technical-legal basis has been designed and is available. Politically, this is firstly an excuse, and secondly, in the conflict over the implementation of the snapback, it makes the actions of the European parties more unjustified than before. As if being unjustified does not have much practical relevance in the international environment, but in any case, just as Grossi's personal weaknesses and ambitions were used to back down from his position, it is possible to take advantage of Europe's current isolation in the world equations, and the groundlessness of their excuses due to this agreement with the Agency, and come close to a conclusion regarding Resolution 2231 that takes into account Iran's positions and interests to some extent.
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