Essay on Website "Khabar Online" August 14, 2025 -
The original text is in Persian and the following translation was done by Ai.
What Mr. Larijani may do in playing a role on fundamental issues of security and foreign policy should not, due to his significant activity, take the Ministry of Foreign Affairs out of the scope of use and even marginalize it.
The appointment of Ali Larijani to the position of Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, although accompanied by a one-year delay in the change of government, has occurred at an important juncture: at the same time as the end of the imposed twelve-day war and the constant threats of the United States and the Zionist regime, when changes, especially in the dimensions of security and macro-politics, are not easy and initially desirable, this change indicates a significant requirement on the one hand and a fundamental expectation of his performance on the other. His two-year experience in the General Secretariat, security and management records at the highest levels of governance, have fueled the creation of expectations of significant performance and even correction of what we know about the Secretariat's records and even his personal management past.
The reality is that the previous era of the Secretariat, taking into account all the merits and individual characteristics, was not considered a bright period in the history of this Secretariat, and the prevailing approach was seen as a period without external poetry. This style, which is naturally different from Dr. Larijani's management style, had both strengths and significant weaknesses: although the type of handling of affairs without poetry and respectful external statements, as the Secretariat experienced in the previous two years, has relatively less friction with institutions such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it cannot play the role of the driving force of foreign policy. At the same time, the Secretariat's less visible activity may result in some of the powers and initiatives of the Supreme National Security Council being removed from this institution.
The Secretariat of the Supreme Council has traditionally been the place where the country’s general security and political policies are concluded in a multifaceted manner. Despite the fact that the description of duties provided for this council in the explicit text of Article ... of the Constitution is not explicit regarding foreign policy, traditionally, the role of the Supreme National Security Council, and especially the Secretariat and its Secretary, in foreign policy decision-making and in the multifaceted advancement of the work has been unrivaled. For a long time (1382-1392), the nuclear file, which was the most important major issue of the country’s foreign policy, was not pursued in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but in the Secretariat, and at least since the final year of the twelfth government, the Secretariat has once again found a significant role in this file. Although classically, it should have been a priority for foreign policy professionals to maintain foreign policy issues in the relevant ministry (and this is also the case for the author), the opposite rule may be true at times due to exigencies, powers, and personal characteristics. The present article does not claim to be based on transferring the file of negotiations with the West (both the negotiation paths with the United States and the negotiations with the three European countries) to the Secretariat, but stating that the Foreign Ministry is merely following the mechanical process of negotiations is not at all constructive for the negotiating position.
What Mr. Larijani may do in playing a role on fundamental issues of security and foreign policy should not, due to his significant activity, take the Foreign Ministry out of the field of profit and even marginalize it. It is true that the path-breaking activity, and especially the initiative in foreign policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in planning and policy-making in the past year, has been significantly different from what was expected, but the non-slogan synergy of these two institutions is essential for effective movement in foreign policy. However, this issue is perhaps an easy one to avoid and one of the topics that everyone agrees on, but its actual design is by no means obvious.
Who the policymaker is and what real share the executor has in this policymaking so that his dignity and negotiating position are not questioned is a serious question. On the other hand, by changing the aforementioned and taking into account the conditions that have arisen in the country, the necessity of introducing a new plan in foreign policy, especially the upcoming nuclear and security issue, becomes apparent. In other words, first of all, negotiation is not so important as the negotiation plan. Negotiation without a plan, vision, and authority may be reduced to a kind of formality and arrangement, and only serve to pass the time. Since time is not in Iran’s favor in any way, Iran will not be a suitable strategy to choose. The negotiation plan and the solution to get out of the current situation in a way that is both possible and desirable to the greatest extent possible is the most difficult part of the job. Because creating a decision and consensus within and at different layers of the country’s structure (so that at least there is no active, effective, and legitimate opposition) will pave the way for the negotiator to a solution that is as possible, desirable, and progressive as possible.
The second point is: Even if the negotiations remain in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it is not necessary for the negotiating team to consist of the Council of Deputies and Directors General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Negotiators in the executive position should be selected from among the most prominent in the country. The country is currently not in a situation where traditional systems of selecting and appointing individuals and exercising plurality in order to create consensus are responsive to the appropriate quality of negotiations. The fundamental courage today lies in selecting and proposing individuals who may not necessarily be optimal options in normal political conditions and observers of the balancing dynamics in domestic politics, and who may not necessarily represent a group, ideology, or even a prominent person, but who have the necessary efficiency to advance what has been designed.
Likewise, with regard to the team of deputies and advisors of the Secretariat, as well as the decision-making sub-meetings and councils, it is necessary to avoid adopting repetitive and traditional approaches, and to create the necessary agility and creativity that are exciting and create first-hand trust in young people and new, expert and qualitative figures. On the other hand, it is appropriate for the new secretary of the council, relying on his considerable background in macro management, to avoid creating repetitive, slow, outdated combinations, especially those that reproduce repetitive official narratives that can marginalize the results of each meeting and make it extremely ineffective.
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