An Opportunity for Old Negotiators

۲۶ فروردین ۱۴۰۴ Essays

Essay on the newspaper Doniyay-e-Eqtesad, April 16, 2025 -

The original text is in Persian and the following translation was done by Ai.

After the first round of nuclear talks between Iran and the United States in Muscat, the two sides called the talks constructive and scheduled the next round for next week. The society and the market also reacted significantly to this first step by creating hope. But the reality is always a little "thinner and more precise" than what is seen in the media and rumors.

What can be considered positive and hopeful at the current stage is limited to the political will of the parties and the small and managed influence of America from adversaries such as the Zionist regime. The reality is that Trump and at least Whittaker have their feet on the ground in confronting Iran: they do not talk about their demands, red lines, different dimensions of the negotiations, etc., they do not try to exploit the negotiations early, and all of this is a sign of their real desire to achieve a result. In any case, Trump, as a not-so-new but narcissistic politician, is looking to leave a legacy of his own. He is in constant mental competition with everyone, including previous US presidents. This gives Iran the psychological upper hand to use Trump’s desired desirability to its advantage. But the risk with this opportunity is that he will definitely introduce himself as the champion and winner of these negotiations and any outcome; something that could lead to exorbitant costs for the negotiators in our domestic politics, as we have already witnessed.

But if we ignore political will and pay more attention to the reality of what was done, it is important to mention that in the four rounds of the Omani mediator, it was not possible to go into details. Therefore, it is likely that what was exchanged, regardless of the political will that was described, was the general issue and position expected by the parties.

At the same time, if the government, the people, and the government want to move towards a real and peaceful outcome, they must take into account that the knots in the work always appear when they enter into the details. Although Trump is seeking to create a legacy from these negotiations for himself and as a result can more easily than anyone else to ignore the details, in any case, the realities on the ground in the past weeks will determine the course of the negotiations more than ever.

If the US government’s position is to ensure that Iran’s nuclear program is peaceful, the best framework for pursuing the same JCPOA is the one that Donald Trump’s entire motivation is to reject. Therefore, what he wants to ensure that Iran’s nuclear program is peaceful beyond the technical clauses of the JCPOA, and at the same time be acceptable to the Islamic Republic of Iran, is not very clear. It is not even easy to guess what technical and nuclear concessions Iran will offer beyond what is mentioned in the JCPOA. If the same clauses are the issue, Trump’s problem in selling it to Iran’s domestic politics, which is of course not our problem, is in place.

The next point is: Iran’s technical and nuclear distance from what was in the JCPOA is much greater today than it was in 2015. As a result, the path that Iran must take to achieve something similar to the JCPOA is technically longer than what the other side must consider to lift sanctions. This meaning, along with the previous point, shows the complexity of the details of the negotiation. In addition: Trump is not ready to “return to the JCPOA” and needs something more or less than it, and it seems that even America itself does not have a clear picture of what it wants: “guaranteeing the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program, but not in the form of the JCPOA.”

What we need to do in this regard, according to the author, is to design such a version on the Iranian side. “Chocolate-wrapping” the JCPOA in a way that is attractive enough for Trump and his political position is an initiative that we can take, and in that case we will be one or more steps ahead of the American side, which seems confused.

The expert power of the US State Department and other institutions of this country should not be underestimated, but Trump's stances and his desire to achieve a result based on a deal rather than going into details could give Iran the upper hand in this regard. In addition, the Iranian team is more familiar with the nuclear issue, the JCPOA, and the negotiations surrounding it. No matter how much the opposing team benefits from expert advice on this issue, they will still have second-hand knowledge at most. Therefore, it must be said that in the event of direct negotiations, the negotiator with Iran has a relative advantage in terms of negotiating power. Because in indirect negotiations, there is more room for that second layer to play a role. Furthermore, we should not be prematurely satisfied with the result: this will increase the pressure on the negotiators to achieve a result and will make them rush. So far, what has been done has been within the limits of the positions and issues desired by the parties, where there has been a common ground of opinion and mutual respect, and nothing else was expected. But going into details may put our negotiating team in a position where it faces unacceptable demands from the American side on the other side and, from behind, excessive enthusiasm, sensitivity, and expectations from the market, the public, and the domestic media.

In addition, up to this point, the ill-wishers of the negotiations have not yet taken action: whether in the media dimension or in political and operational action, we must wait for the intrigues of Israel, hardliners inside the United States, and others: those who have fundamental interests in sanctions, isolation, and threats to Iran will naturally not rest until any agreement is reached.

Doniyay-e-Eqtesad Link