Four Signals Transmitted from Oman

Essay on Etemad Newspaper April 15, 2025 - 

 

 

The original text is in Persian and the following translation was done by Ai.

 

 

In politics, including foreign policy, creating a situation is a fundamental topic. The fact is that negotiating with Trump was not an obvious decision; the requirements of national interests required decision-makers to try to present alternative versions in different forms to enlighten the minds of politicians and decision-makers, and they made timely choices among these options. In principle, what is happening today has been in the orbit of decision-makers and decision-makers' calculations since before the US presidential election. However, creating a situation, which was sometimes seen as a lost cause during this time, was not an obvious and simple matter. However, thanks to expert work and due diligence, the country was able to manage its situation in the region and the world and hit the arrows of ill-wishers.

 

 

What has been going on for some time now is that the implementation and advancement of the created situation is being placed in the hands of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the first round of negotiations of which we witnessed in Muscat. The reality is that although the efficiency and speed of direct negotiations are incomparable to those with intermediaries, due to the history between them, especially after the United States withdrew from the JCPOA and other issues, a decision has been made for the time being on indirect negotiations, which can still be effective to some extent.

 

 

What happened in the negotiations last Saturday was the exchange of four mutual messages, which, naturally, were due to the initial nature of the discussions, to ensure the generality: that the parties came to Muscat with mutual respect and an acceptable tone, that the political will to move in the right direction exists on both sides, that they are talking about the same issue, namely Iran's peaceful nuclear program, and that in the final picture, unrealistic perceptions of each other such as the collection of the nuclear program or disarmament and similar issues do not prevail on the other side. Of course, all of these are very small but important steps; so that if it were otherwise, there would be no hope of continuing the negotiations.

 

 

But the fact is that we are still in the first and very political step of the negotiations. So that no part of the technical nuclear, legal, financial and sanctions matters have yet been discussed. The fact that both sides were present in Muscat and that each side had taken their previous positions into account would have brought to mind the outcome of last week, namely the white smoke rising from Muscat, but this is a very preliminary result. In fact, in the first meeting with the aforementioned specifications, there was not much room for the parties to adopt maximum positions.
What is being discussed is how Iran can move from its current technical position to something close to the technical specifications of the JCPOA on the one hand, and the effective lifting of all nuclear sanctions on the other. This picture, of course, is considered an initial all-round return to implementing their JCPOA commitments, which is not what Donald Trump initially intended, according to his statements. Commitments or acceptance of further restrictions by Iran cannot, of course, be among the possible solutions. Therefore, what seems to be the case is that the possible upcoming agreements, which will naturally be negotiations on technical and sanctions issues, will bring their own challenges.
The topics of discussion in the coming weeks will naturally be on the nuclear dimension from the Americans, namely the volume and level of uranium enrichment, the issue of uranium metal, the number of centrifuges, etc., and from the Islamic Republic of Iran, to be able to effectively and reliably benefit from the complete and one-time lifting of sanctions.
What is necessary is that, at the outset, the burden on the negotiating team should not be increased by widespread public expectation and media pressure. Increasing the level of public belief in the positive outcome of the negotiations, i.e. confusing the principle of the negotiations with its outcome, will double the difficulty of the work on the negotiating team.
At the same time, it should be noted that the world's media are typically in the hands of our opposing parties. Therefore, getting ahead in the media game, or more correctly, narrative creation, is something that must be addressed alongside the negotiations and at a high level; it should be remembered that the "second narrative" is never seen and heard with dignity.
Trump's sabotage in the middle of the road is also one of the things that may happen depending on his mood and should be considered a possibility: Trump does not have much patience and determination to navigate the maze of predicaments and may make a sudden maneuver that should be prepared for in advance.
It seems that what lies ahead is not a smooth path with a gentle slope, but a path with ups and downs, but not too long. We must try to prevent Americans from having the false illusion of Iran's weakness in the midst of the discussion, nor to instill such a falsehood in others. As soon as the false illusion of Iran's weakness is formed, what will result will be defeat and the other side's excessive ambition. In addition, in the region, Europe and the United States itself, there are many ill-wishers lurking to strike Iran, peace and diplomacy at the right moment. We must not fall into their trap, or more precisely, the "Iranian security framework".

 

 

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