Zelensky's Lessons

Essay on Donyay-e-Eqtesad Newspaper, March 5, 2025 - 

 

 

The original text was in Persian and the following translation was done by Ai.

 

 

Donald Trump and his team's behavior with Volodymyr Zelensky, President of Ukraine, revealed a new level of diplomatic impudence; whether in terms of language, personalization of issues, humiliation and content of the negotiation, or even the form and openness of everything that could be done to a president, the president of a country that is supposedly united.

 

 

This confrontation initially indicates a deepening of the rift between the two sides of the Atlantic, which will inevitably lead to pressure from global public opinion, especially European, on the governments of the Green Continent to somehow and in the long term strive to restore their independence, dignity and security.

 

 

The first blow to Europe came from their misperceptions, at least in two cases, of Trump and the new world order. After the collapse of the Cold War in the early 1990s, Europe was blind to the real changes in the world order, and then, since the beginning of the new millennium, it has been oblivious to the order that has been transformed from the previous bipolar to the emerging post-polar order. The insistence on maintaining an alliance like NATO, which is undoubtedly one of the most classic examples of the Cold War era, was a reactionary and opportunistic attempt by Europeans to somehow surrender their security through low-cost participation. Surrendering security usually backfires in the long run and forces them to cede more fundamental interests by losing their bargaining power. The post-polar era is not an era of permanent alliances, and thematic coalitions are meaningful in it. Therefore, different countries have the same or different opinions on various issues and stand together or against each other. Therefore, in such an order, it is a naive fantasy for Europe to think that it can rely on its security in the long term on joint military-security positions with the United States.

 

 

The various types of power in the post-polar era have transformed the semantic elements of that field in the new world and have somewhat reduced the weight of the military element in interstate relations. However, what was considered a transatlantic alliance has also suffered from the aforementioned instability today. The early alliance between Trump and Putin, after all these years of the Ukrainian war and Russia's isolation, shows the same unreliability of any lasting alliance. Alliances are formed at a specific time between specific members and on a specific issue and are likely to fall apart later. Therefore, Europe should not be satisfied with the stability of a common view with the United States.
Second, Europeans considered Trump an exception in US politics during his first term, which made them more patient than ever to get through this awkward moment in history. But Trump’s re-election, with a majority of the popular vote, electoral votes, a majority of states, a majority of Congress, and a majority of Supreme Court justices, showed that Trumpism should be considered at least one of the serious currents in US politics.
It is safe to say that no foreign policy issue in Washington was as urgent as the repair of relations with Russia, and as a result, the public humiliation and harassment of Zelensky, as an extension of this policy, was carried out with utmost insistence and diligence. It is as if Trump and his vice president, Vance, have no diplomatic qualms about showing off any new kind of rhetoric and norm-breaking.
In the previous Trump era, and especially when Trump withdrew from the JCPOA, countries, especially the powers and the European Union, preferred to comply with the illegitimate and illegal demands of the United States to fulfilling their obligations, citing the constant reason of “protecting the national interests of European countries.” At the same time, Dr. Zarif, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs of our country, repeatedly reminded them that if you do not take action today, not for the sake of Iran, but to preserve the independence, dignity and prestige of Europe, America will pressure you in your relations with other countries, including China, and one day you will find your soil, security and prestige in the hands or under the feet of the United States; today is that time. Today, Europe’s power has been reduced more than ever to the power of norm-setting, and that is changing with Trump’s fundamental changes in domestic and global norms. Therefore, what is left for Europe is nothing but being ignored. A fierce confrontation with this reality may, of course, provide the green continent with a horizon to begin a new attempt to rebuild and recover itself in the long term, which will certainly not be easy. At the same time, Zelensky's own role in this weakening of Ukraine's position, and in the first place Europe's, should not be ignored. Insisting on non-negotiable positions, relying on foreign power or powers, and not resolving the issue based on one's own capabilities and at the appropriate time, which, incidentally, was followed by stronger levers (including the significant support of the Biden administration), has caused what could have been done from a better position to inevitably move towards being done from a lower and weaker position today. It is as if Zelensky was sure that in any case, the United States, after the election, as before, will not withhold its significant financial and especially weapons support from this country. This idea, rooted in the backdrop of the Cold War and the West-East bipolarity, has led to the design of a policy in Kiev that has prevented it from addressing the problem at the appropriate time and place and has made it dependent on Europe, and especially America, a daily occurrence; to the point that in political circles it has been called a "war monger."

 

Now, with the competition with China being given more priority than ever before and also considering Europe irrelevant in Washington, the United States has turned Russia's desire to emerge from its isolation of these years into a tool to advance its cause and has presented new combinations of power and actors. It should be noted that Europe's backwardness is not limited to military and political issues; rather, with the competition between the United States and China in the fields of artificial intelligence and... as well as the large investments of some Arab countries in this field, Europe has generally lagged behind in this area as well and may never be able to make up for it.

 

 

By not playing Ukraine and Europe at the right time and with the main actor - in this case Russia - Ukraine became the subject of negotiations instead of the negotiator, and without the presence of Ukraine and even Europe, talks were held between the United States and Russia on Ukraine as part of Europe. This is not an exception but the rule of the game in international relations:

• Choices are fluid in this environment and one cannot expect stability of the situation by delaying the decision;

• Other actors will not necessarily wait for the selection and role-playing of an actor and will finish the job in his absence;

• There is no authority to assert the right of the absent and declare the illegitimacy of what is agreed upon, and what has been lost will be consolidated.

But in the case of Iran, with all the records of the past few hundred years of Russia and the past few decades of Russia and the United States, what is important for us is that:

• Be careful not to become a victim and a compromise in the rapprochement between Moscow and Washington;

• Even if we can show ourselves as an active actor, part of the solution and a supporter of solving the problem with creative, strategic and practical designs;

• Do not become the minimum consensus between the United States and Europe;

• Let us not fall victim to Europe’s eagerness to assert its existence by implementing the dispute resolution mechanism (known as snapback);

• Let us not get too involved in analyses based on the decline of Western powers, including the United States and even Europe, which leads to neglect and backwardness.

Various ways can be designed for this purpose: multilateral negotiations in the format of 5+1, negotiations in the context of the revival of the JCPOA, separate negotiations with different parties in the world and using each to contain and adjust the position of the other, and even non-negotiation scenarios, each of which, of course, has its own consequences, costs, and impact coefficient.

What is important is not to fall into the two traps of passivity on the one hand and following on the other. The speed of developments in today’s global environment does not allow for postponing such issues, and delaying action to solve the problem for any reason only weakens the position of the activist. Following and being too close to one or more actors will also weaken initiative and independence in taking a position and solving problems. Both of these problems can be observed in Ukraine and Europe over the past few years, and the result is clear.

 

 

 

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