Essay on Online News Agency July 20, 2024-
The original text was in Persian and the following translation was done by Ai.
The elections are over, and now various issues have replaced all that excitement and anxiety.
The reality is that the 14th presidential election was neither the kind of election that led to reforms, nor moderation, nor even anything like the elections three years ago.
Since it is said that everything (especially in politics) happens only once, it must be admitted that the events of the past two months were of a completely different kind.
The first point is that due to the loss of the 13th president in a catastrophic plane crash, it was somewhat embarrassing; criticism of the established government did not go beyond a certain point, unity between the currents supporting the government and also within the 13th cabinet itself was not very possible due to the lack of its leader. Furthermore, due to the disappearance of a kind of political confrontation between the fundamentalist movements, we witnessed the most intense division and internal destruction within this movement, so that at least in the first round of the election, most of the energy of each of the two main candidates of the fundamentalist movement was directed towards this internal competition.
Ultimately, however, as the gap deepened and the distance between the views of the two remaining candidates increased in the second round of the election, participation increased and the opposing candidate, who was supported by the Reform Front and the moderate movement of Iranian politics and who had been campaigned for by the most prominent people, won. However, analysis of the votes compared to the votes of the 1400 elections shows that at least five million votes were reduced from the fundamentalist vote pool, and probably, given that participation is a duty in the eyes of many of this layer of voters, this amount was added to Masoud Peshkian's vote pool.
The victorious mass origin of the 14th election, his simplicity and unpretentiousness in speaking, and most importantly, his numerous references to the Word of God, Nahj al-Balagha, and narrations, were effective in attracting the attention of the traditional but unorganized religious layer of society, which was traditionally categorized and analyzed in the voting basket of the fundamentalists. Also, the professional and organized campaign and campaign of the reformists on the one hand, and most importantly, the most qualified activism on the part of the most prominent diplomat of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mohammad Javad Zarif, led to the breaking of what was called the "election boycott" in recent years, despite the full efforts of the subversives and the persuasions of domestic extremists.
At the same time, the fact that Mohammad Baqer Qalibiyaf and Saeed Jalili did not step aside in favor of each other in the first round of the election and Saeed Jalili’s majority of votes and his passage to the second round meant that the vote of the Speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, who was called a developmentist-principlist in terms of political classifications, was not fully added to Saeed Jalili’s basket. In an initial analysis, it can be said that perhaps Saeed Jalili’s step aside in favor of Qalibaf would have had a greater impact on the victory of what was called the Revolutionary Front than vice versa. This is because Saeed Jalili’s votes were more coherent, imitative, and ideological, and if their candidate supported Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, it was conceivable that this decision would be accompanied by the support of his vote.
However, since the analysis shows that the body of Qalibaf's vote was less involved in ideological aspects in their choice and more in search of the other existence of this candidate, namely the image of being hardworking and supported in various institutions that saw him as their desired candidate, and therefore, they did not necessarily vote for the conservative candidate in the Pezizkian-Jalili bipolarity; which seems not to be so untrue, if the second round of the election did not heavily favor the reformist candidate, at least it would not have been considered a point for Saeed Jalili.
However, what should be analyzed from a theoretical perspective on politics and flow analysis is Mr. Qalibaf's low voter turnout in this election. The vote of Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, with a history in the imposed war, the Revolutionary Guards, the police, the Tehran municipality, and the chairmanship of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, should not be limited to three million people at first glance. This number surprised almost everyone, and most of all, himself. However, if we look more closely at the origin of his vote, this issue will not be so far-fetched. Qalibaf has been competing in the presidential election since 2005. But what has prevented him from succeeding is the numerous changes in his character and image in the country's political scene.
In his first appearance in the election, due to the atmosphere created during the reform era, he introduced himself as a modern technocrat with an appearance that targeted most of the reform vote, but with the injection of military authority. However, this calculated structure in that atmosphere and with the diversity of high-profile reformist and conservative candidates, failed to attract the majority of the public, and Ahmadinejad's success surprised almost everyone. However, instead of remaining in the image that he had once achieved by changing his appearance and political character, Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf tried again to adapt himself to the new dominant atmosphere, namely Ahmadinejad.
He then experienced his revolutionary political origins and then his moderate fundamentalist ones again, and all these changes led to his defeat again in the 2013 elections, when society was thirsty for modern technocracy, and after that, his electoral role was reduced to stepping down in favor of a more revolutionary candidate or waiting for him. In fact, it must be said that these changes in Qalibaf's character, instead of attracting a part of both main vote baskets of society, have driven away the votes of both from him.
A voter who seeks to develop and normalize relations with the world always prefers moderate or reformist candidates to him. Likewise, a revolutionary voter, between him and Shahid Raisi in 2017 or Jalili in 2014, is definitely more inclined to other options because his vote is often ideological and not development-oriented. Therefore, in electoral competitions, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf is always expected to step aside in favor of a more revolutionary and classic candidate: something that greatly displeases him. With a more realistic look, the arguments of Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf's rivals seem more audible in this scene, and therefore it is possible to understand why his appeal to the general audience has fallen significantly: he is neither a complete efficient technocrat nor a complete ideological revolutionary.
Qalibaf may never have the political luck or fortune to run for president again, and given the repetition of these defeats, it is no longer in his best interest to pursue this long-held dream. However, maintaining a long-term discourse is what he demonstrated as a prerequisite for politicians to fully win the people's votes. The inhomogeneity of his desires, appearances, personal life, and performance over time, despite the success he has always enjoyed in confirming his qualifications, ultimately did not lead to a significant portion of the people turning to him. This is something that deserves attention and a lesson to be learned in the teachings related to elections in political science. The anger of his supporters and the re-presentation of the image of a modern technocrat that we are witnessing in the days after the election are a kind of repetition of his mistake and indicate that he and his followers have never understood and do not believe in the fundamental reason for the lack of success he received in the presidential election.
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