Essay on Hem Mihan Newspaper July 19, 2023 -
The original text is in Persian and the following translation was done by Ai.
Both what happened during the Chinese President's visit last year and the surrounding events, and Russia's recent action in officially supporting the Gulf Cooperation Council's statement on the three Iranian islands, caused confusion and bewilderment in many foreign policy officials, which of course showed the importance and surprise of trying to prevent it from happening.
During a visit to Riyadh in December last year, the Chinese President first considered Saudi Arabia as one of the indispensable powers in the modern international environment, and secondly, by supporting the Gulf Cooperation Council's statement, especially in its aggressive stances towards Iran, he shocked Tehran. It seems that the reestablishment of relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia was subsequently mediated by Beijing, but it cannot be hidden that China's support for Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries in the Persian Gulf has inevitably weakened Iran's hand in these negotiations.
In a similar matter, we recently witnessed Russia's support for the Gulf Cooperation Council's position. Especially since both of these contained the sensitive issue of the three Iranian islands, and this time even Russia did not remove its support for the subsequent pursuit of Arab countries in this regard from its position.
Of course, our question in this note is not about the repeated and marginal news surrounding these news, but about the cause of these events and especially the cause of these surprises and criticisms.
It seems to the author that what has surprised different tendencies in foreign policy the most is a type of perceptual problem: the perception of concepts in foreign policy, like other areas, is the background for the construction of many subsequent concrete realities. What we understand from a single word potentially causes many subsequent problems.
Perception in the field of foreign policy, like other aspects of life, does not occur with an empty mind and without background, but an analyst, statesman, decision-maker and decision-maker always has a theory in the face of each issue, or rather, mental backgrounds that affect the perception of the issue. These tendencies, of course, have different origins:
The selection of data entering the mind of a decision-maker and politician can be due to the unconscious motivation of not violating beliefs. Someone who wants to sell his belief as reality cannot allow any data from the outside environment to enter his mind and understanding system.
Secondly, data can be accepted that is more consistent with the statements made and established in the past and in the public and social environment. Therefore, the communities in which the decision-maker's mind lives are important. Because the collective projection and acceptance of information or its marginalization is a function of how ready this community is to accept this data and also to what extent this new data and information is consistent with the pre-established statements in those communities.
The third factor that can affect the understanding and acceptance of information is the interpretation of ambiguous cases, which, incidentally, are not uncommon in politics, especially foreign policy. Ambiguous cases are always interpreted in favor of the pre-proposed theory.
But the most important thing that can influence the understanding of a politician or a policy-making group is the functional aspects resulting from this understanding:
The first function is in evaluating the understanding of a new data in proportion to the calculation of costs and benefits. The fact is that consciously or unconsciously, the mind of the policymaker is not neutral in relation to the data in proportion to different interests. Therefore, it tries to consider data as meaningful that is more consistent with its calculation.
Another function is to receive confirmation as a need of every mental entity, which is also affected by the policymaker and politician in the first way. The person considers that data important and highlights that which causes him to confirm and not vice versa.
Another function in the perceptual system is to justify decisions that have been made before any study. This meaning, of course, sometimes occurs unconsciously, and sometimes as a result of the establishment of institutions that, instead of studying, find suitable foundations for justifying decisions, and this is basically mutual confirmation and reinforcement. On the other hand, consultative and study arms that play an unsound and opposing instrument will inevitably be condemned to isolation, and this is of course a natural, pervasive and harmful thing that requires decision and thought to prevent.
Finally, it is necessary to mention the conscious and unconscious influence of interests on perception. In any case, individual, current, etc. interests affect our perception of the environment around us. This also applies to policymakers and decision-makers in the first place, and as a result, it may result in any form of filtering and selective treatment of external data.
However, regarding the example mentioned at the beginning of the article, it should be said that the perception of betrayal and incompetence by Russia and China in the matter of their association with the Arabs occurs because we, with any political orientation, typically do not have a realistic and up-to-date understanding of relations between countries in the international environment. Both the orientalists who think that a new bloc in the East centered on China, Russia, and even Iran is emerging against the West, and those who see the West as a unified entity with an essential unity and also the dominant pole in the international environment and who denounce and despise the first group, both suffer from similar problems in their perception of the international environment.
For someone to think that we are a strategic ally of China or Russia or any other country and therefore enjoy their unwavering support is as delusional as for someone to think that by uniting with the West, and especially the United States, we can place ourselves under the umbrella of security and prosperity. Both of them, with all their differences, share their ignorance (in the words of logicians: there is no table for execution). This ignorance is about living mentally in an environment that has been over for years, and that is the thinking of the Cold War and the bipolar order, and basically the polar order in the international environment. Both the first surprise at the aforementioned actions of China and Russia are due to this illusion, and the second arrogance: both the damaging Orientalism and anti-Westernism of the first group and the dangerous Westernism and anti-Orientalism of the second group.
Today's international environment is not fundamentally a context for permanent and comprehensive alliances (which constitute our idea of a strategic relationship), but rather these thematic coalitions that have meaning, and therefore at any given time and on any issue, a number of actors based on their common interests come together and engage in simultaneous action, and therefore the partners of each actor on different issues are different, and this is not at all surprising. In this network environment, no one is an unconditional, permanent, and predestined friend or enemy of another actor, but may accompany or oppose them depending on the issue.
In the specific case of China and Russia and their association with the position of the Arab countries, it should also be noted that what has caused surprise is not their performance, but our idea of the relationship with these two countries and its requirements. Inevitably, given the financial strength and power of Arab countries in the fields of energy, investment, and arms purchases, major players will not be able to ignore their good deeds. The Arabs, due to their long-standing and close relationship with the United States, do not consider themselves indebted or trapped in these relationships and deprived of the promotion of other relationships that may not be desirable to the United States. Rather, they both benefit from their networked and diverse relationships to create balance and, regardless of balance, benefit from the content of these relationships.
However, due to the lack of relations with the United States and the damaged and minimal relations with European countries, Iran has become a cheap partner for China and Russia, which, due to the aforementioned imbalance, do not see the need to satisfy or respect Iran in their actions. At the same time, a tendency in Iranian politics, due to this imbalance, is trying to define its goals and interests with the existing situation and evade receiving invalid data. The depth of this problem comes to mind when we recall that development requires a correct understanding of the current meanings in foreign policy.
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