Essay on Etemad Online Calendar April 1, 2023 -
The original text is in Persian and the following translation was done by Ai.
In the last few years, what has been heard in the non-professional space regarding foreign policy is a Cold War view of the international environment. Naturally, from such a perspective, the main question will be whether we should go towards the "West" or the "East"? A question that fundamentally shows the incompetence of the questioner and the possible answerer, and, apart from everything else, shows that both of them mistakenly see today's world as a world with two camps or two poles, and at the end of the day, the world order, every event, and every international actor must be analyzed in the conflict between these two.
Such a Cold War view will inevitably evaluate foreign relations mainly in the duality of "conflict and alliance" and therefore see itself as committed to supporting whatever its "strategic allies" do and, inevitably, in the hope of their support, will share in the cost of their possible actions. Such analysts, of course, are surprised after hearing positions like what the Chinese President stated in the Middle East and feel that he and his hope have been betrayed.
However, it is possible and today it is evident that the other side of this relationship sees the world as having a different kind of order and therefore the meaning it understands of partnership, cooperation and political closeness is different from our perception in Tehran. So that perhaps it can be said that today's world is not a world of permanent alliances but a world of thematic coalitions. Therefore, policy-making in the sense of its words in foreign policy should be done in each case separately and of course in a general spirit.
Basically, one should ask such questioners and respondents what is this East and the second pole that is the largest trading partner of the West and the first pole? So what pole and what camp, perhaps it can be concluded that it is we who look at the current international environment with old and scratched glasses and otherwise at least there is no betrayal on the part of China; Beijing does not see itself obliged to comprehensive defense and strengthening regional and global polarization in the international environment; Whether between Iran and Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council countries or in the Ukraine war, this is one of the points that should be learned from China.
After a year since the beginning of Russia's attack on Ukraine, we see that China, instead of entering the hot scene of conflict, supporting Russia and aligning itself against Europe and the United States, and in general becoming part of the problem, has introduced itself as part of the solution and has not allowed Russia to share its costs and abuse this country, nor has the United States used this excuse to put China under its desired pressures.
Another point that should be learned from China is the issue of priority in policymaking: It is obvious that all countries want to maximize different aspects of their national interests, but in this way, sometimes conflicts occur between different aspects of policymaking and the actor is required to make a choice. This is where the role of policymaking as a specialty becomes clear: prioritization is meaningful when it is really clear in advance which aspect of the country's strategies has priority and is preferred in the scene of each conflict. Because if we are faced with a multitude of priorities in the usual way, we have merely described the desired (and not possible) picture, and this is no longer strategy and policy-making, and it is also a very simple task. Even if we were to specify priorities case by case and without having a systematic and referable roadmap, we would inevitably end up neutralizing the outcome of many of our actions in foreign policy. In learning from China’s foreign policy and activism in the international environment, we should pay attention to this country’s vigilance in recognizing the United States’ security traps: The United States, through its superiority in military components, is trying to trap China in pre-designed traps. Especially with actions such as Ms. Nancy Pelosi’s trip to Taiwan and the accompanying American fighter jets, as well as numerous violations of China’s territorial waters, the United States is trying to force Beijing to react in a way that shows that it has fallen into this security trap. The Chinese certainly have the wisdom, ability and patriotism to deal with such tough situations: including many suggestions and predictions to bomb the landings in Taiwan, etc. But this is the same goal that the United States was pursuing with Mrs. Pelosi's visit. It is also the case of the encroachment of American vessels into Chinese territorial waters, which China has again limited itself to taking a stand, warning and expelling. Therefore, the Chinese do not fall for the scenarios that the United States has designed and indirectly provokes and even encourages Beijing to do.
Even in the recent case when the United States tried to shoot down a Chinese balloon with a fighter jet over its territory, China downplayed the issue and announced that the balloon was a research balloon and that it had landed on American soil due to a technical error, and therefore, despite the wishes of the United States, did not allow the issue to escalate and become bigger.
On the other hand, we witnessed that following the dispute with Germany over the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, Russia fell into the trap designed by Ukraine, with the provocations of the United States and its investment in Mr. Putin's analyses and personality profiles, and after a year, what is certain is that Russia cannot be called the winner of this war.
Today, Russia is certainly not safer than in the past, its military dominance in international public opinion has collapsed, it has been sanctioned and under economic and sanctions pressure, its development potential has reached zero, and ultimately its legitimacy in the international environment and public opinion is on the brink. But the United States has benefited from this war: whether in confronting Russia and trapping this country in a quagmire called Ukraine and introducing it as an aggressor, or by consolidating its position in NATO and its dominance over Europe, which was being depreciated, or by curbing China's growth due to rising energy costs.
By comparing these two cases, China and Russia, firstly, we can see two types of reactions to rival provocations to trap a country and secure it. Secondly, there is basically no pole called the East that includes China and Russia, and this is evident both from China’s lack of support for Russia in the war and from the fundamental difference in the type of reactions of these two countries to the United States. Therefore, basically, a maximal declarative response is the easiest, most costly, and least useful thing to do: while preserving national interests and declared limits, one must pay attention to both its priority and its cost and benefit before any action or reaction. If we look at the history after the Islamic Revolution, it becomes clear that from the very beginning, many traps have been designed to secure us and increase our costs. Especially with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the disappearance of the bipolar order, whether in the 1990s when the United States was in the illusion of unipolarity or after the world is in a transitioning order, the shape of these traps has changed.
It is now clear that at least the United States, Saudi Arabia and its satellites, and especially Israel, are the main actors that benefit from Iran's securitization: both material benefits such as oil sales and attracting more investments in the manner of Saudi Arabia and some southern Persian Gulf countries, as well as political and security interests.
It can be easily shown that, especially since the Madrid Conference in 1991, Israel, in addition to all the ideological issues that existed since the beginning of the Islamic Revolution, has tried to introduce Iran as a serious security threat to itself and to benefit from it in the international environment: receiving financial and military aid from the United States and Europe, trying to legitimize itself, curbing the Arab-Islamic unity and will against itself, and ultimately diverting international and regional public opinion from the issue of Palestine and the Palestinians, are among the most important interests that this regime pursues in securitizing Iran. Therefore, while maintaining all national and value-based positions in the face of this, we must be aware of these scenarios that Tel Aviv favors, namely presenting a dangerous image and ultimately securitizing Iran, and therefore we must adjust our actions and reactions in a way that leads to the isolation of Israel and the creation of legitimacy for Iran. Sometimes, in foreign policy, as mentioned, vinegar really adds bile.
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