After the hopes that had been raised before the Doha talks were disappointed, the negotiating team of the 13th government is once again heading to Vienna; negotiations that seem to be following a renewed attempt by the European Union coordinator to bring the positions of the two main parties closer together. Iran's positions and demands, of course, seem clear. What is important, regardless of the details of the negotiations, is that the desirability of reviving the JCPOA for various parties to this issue, other than Europe, has sharply decreased.
Motives: Russia due to the war in Ukraine and energy supplies, especially on the eve of the European winter, China due to the significant discounts it receives on oil and energy from various sellers, especially Russia, and the United States due to the fact that the energy crisis is putting Europe under the control of the United States more than ever before. The United States is not an energy importer in general and is therefore not much affected by changes in oil and gas prices. In addition, the shadow of the domestic politics of the United States and the mid-term elections of the country's parliament has fallen on its negotiating team.
Tehran: Although the official will and position in Tehran is on the desire to revive the JCPOA and lift sanctions, a penetrating analysis is that the upcoming winter, given the energy crisis, especially in Europe, is a golden opportunity to use the Green Continent card to increase pressure on the United States and obtain double concessions. According to this analysis, given the energy crisis and the war between Russia and Ukraine, there is no political or operational possibility for the Europeans to activate the mechanism for returning the UN sanctions, and at the same time, Europe and the world cannot tolerate another military conflict in the worst-case scenario. Therefore, these two threats are not currently affecting us, and we can put pressure on the other side with some degree of certainty. At the same time, if we do not receive some kind of "guarantee", the United States will withdraw from the revived agreement again, which will reduce our gains from this revival to a short period of time, and given the history of the US withdrawal, any foreign investment will be seriously questioned in advance.
Europe: From this, it seems that the motivations for the revival of the JCPOA are mainly in Europe, and outside this union, no one is making much effort for this project, or at least is not willing to easily offer any concessions for the progress and conclusion of the JCPOA. However, Europe, as a mediator, is making the most of its efforts to reach a middle ground regarding the demands of the parties, and in particular, to propose sanctions on Iranian military institutions and some kind of guarantee.
Change of tone: Looking at Biden’s literature since taking power, we realize that at some point, the use of the verbal threat of the “military option” has been explicitly or implicitly removed from his and his foreign policy team’s agenda. Biden’s trip to Israel changed this literature, and he also mentioned this option during his Middle East trip - at least to satisfy his regional partners. It seems that the statements of Iranian non-governmental officials regarding the possession of “knowledge of building nuclear weapons” were a response to this type of statement and Biden’s change of discourse, which of course was not new information or position.
Incoherent beats: But following these statements, we are now witnessing repeated positions of media activists on “deterrence capacity”, “ensuring security through the nuclear program” and “building nuclear weapons” or “reaching the threshold of building nuclear weapons”, which seem to be intended to implicitly imply that the weapons are going to be built suddenly or that they are on the threshold. This is while the official political and jurisprudential directive is the standard in governance based on the political prohibition and religious sanctity of building, storing and using nuclear weapons. In a situation where the country officially and practically observes such restrictions and announces them from time to time, such statements by those who are sometimes considered close to the government, although they have the honor of "slandering and creating psychological pressure due to ambiguity on the other side," could potentially become a lever in the hands of the other side if the equations and the will of the other side change to increase pressure on Iran and use pointless references to them. Therefore, if the official position of the country is to be in accordance with the standards of political and jurisprudential declarations, which it is, it is better to avoid an unwanted increase in political costs that would make these positions unbelievably credible and give the hands of extremists full control in the internal debates of the other sides.
Development: In any case, the special task of the government is to lay the groundwork for the comprehensive development of the country, from security to culture, economy, industry, etc., and since the nuclear industry is a military commodity for us, it is a development commodity and should not be turned into its opposite and hinder development. It seems that this is Iran's main motivation and approach, previously for the negotiations leading to the JCPOA and now for taking action to lift sanctions and revive and implement the JCPOA. In fact, the JCPOA and now its revival pursue various goals, the most simple of which is "removing obstacles" from the country's path. Security, economic, etc. aspects are considered under this meaning.
The decision in Tehran: The principle of national sovereignty indicates that we, like all other governments, have all national powers in our hands without any restrictions, and this is not limited to the nuclear right, but includes: the right to sell the full quota of oil and energy at current prices, the right to attract foreign investment, the right to have trouble-free international banking relations, the right to purchase conventional weapons, the right to normal trade, the right to purchase medicine and medical equipment, the right to import up-to-date technologies, the right to unrestricted scientific and academic relations, the right to build power plants with other renewable energies that also have a high degree of local compatibility, such as solar power plants, etc. However, it is clear that the unfairness of the international system and the unilateral approach of the United States prevent the exercise of all these rights at the current stage, and therefore political acumen requires that we optimize the use of all these rights at the current stage by maintaining sovereignty and national pride, and this is the reason for the country's will to lift sanctions as a result of the revival of the JCPOA. Of course, no one but us as a nation and national sovereignty can interfere in the decision-making process for this optimization. Whether by urging us to take a side or by putting one right on the agenda and neglecting other rights.
Transparency: For this purpose and in order to prevent trends that begin with good intentions but can later become costly, it is better for the nuclear negotiating team and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to continue to clarify the process of negotiations and sideline measures of the JCPOA in accordance with the law: According to Note 2 of the Law on Obliging the Government to Preserve the Nuclear Achievements and Rights of the Iranian Nation, approved by the Islamic Consultative Assembly on 2/4/1394, "The Minister of Foreign Affairs is obliged to report the implementation of the agreement to the Islamic Consultative Assembly every six months. The National Security and Foreign Policy Commission of the Assembly presents a report on the progress of the implementation of the agreement to the representatives of the Islamic Consultative Assembly every six months." This clarification, which now also includes a detailed report on the ongoing negotiations and, according to the law, must be heard by the nation from the podium of the open session of the Islamic Consultative Assembly every six months, will bring about convergence and contribute to national cohesion, and will prevent possible unwanted costs in the future.
A point that should be mentioned below is that: One of the greatest achievements of the JCPOA is the existence of nuclear sunsets, which permanently free Iran from various regulatory or enforcement restrictions at different stages. During decision-making and negotiations, which are typically based on security and economic elements, it must be strategically considered that this privilege is not lost and that due to the setbacks of the US withdrawal from the JCPOA and Iran's compensatory measures, these times should be reaffirmed in any possible agreement to revive these times so that they do not become the subject of future disagreements. In the event that the JCPOA is not revived and any path that will emerge as a result of it, it is up to the decision-making experts to design the path in such a way that these sunsets remain in force from a legal perspective.
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