The fact is that the new nuclear news does not smell good. Earlier, the Ukrainian war and the shadow that the change in the balance of power among the countries involved in the negotiations to revive the JCPOA was written in this same publication. The fact is that today, past predictions have come true and, according to unofficial reports, the sale of Iranian oil on the gray market has been affected by significant Russian discounts. With the possible withdrawal of OPEC from its alliance with Russia on production levels, it is likely that the price of oil and the shortage of supply, which will probably cause both waivers in the implementation of sanctions against Iran and factors that reduce the desirability of the negotiations to revive the JCPOA for Iran, will be affected. This means that the predictions have come true early: with the initial impression that there was of Russia's military power, it seemed that these two windows of oil prices and the possibility of relatively easy sales would remain open until the end of the war. But with the erosion of the Ukrainian war and the lack of a decisive and rapid victory of the Russian army, which was mainly in the shadow of financial and weapons support from the West, the energy equations have also changed, and now three things have happened or are happening in succession: 1. Russia will try more than ever to kidnap Iranian customers in the gray market and seduce them with its special discounts, 2. Official oil production by OPEC will increase, resulting in a decrease in prices, and 3. The United States will be more open in its pressure to implement oil sanctions, and all this will no longer necessarily wait for the resolution of the Russia-Ukraine war.
On the other hand, with Europe disappointed in the success of the Vienna talks, the approaching parliamentary elections in the United States, and the decreasing desirability of any normalization of Iran in the global market from Russia and China, the matter may not necessarily continue in its current form. These days, there is talk of a draft resolution against Iran that the European Troika and the United States have submitted to the Board of Governors, which mainly concerns the Agency's recent reports on Iran's responses to technical issues. The point is, however, to increase this kind of pressure on Iran to resume negotiations and bring them to fruition. This will not be a big loss for them if they fail.
Despite the US withdrawal, the European Troika is still officially a member of the JCPOA and therefore has the possibility of using the complaint mechanism against Iran. This will be left to the members’ arbitration after going through several stages, each of which will take several weeks, in the event of a lack of understanding on the alleged issues. It should be noted that the US withdrawal from the JCPOA during Trump’s time and the failure to use what is called the snap back were partly due to the fact that at that time the US saw itself deprived of the support of the other members of the JCPOA, the three European countries, despite Russia and China, and therefore assumed that it would be the loser of any arbitration under the JCPOA against Iran: a guess that at least the votes in the Security Council and the UN General Assembly and the decisive defeat of the US at that time were the best evidence for its correctness.
But regardless of who is right and what the reason is, the reality is that we do not have that previous atmosphere today: both due to the more normalization of politics in Washington and the consensus-building role of the Democrats, and perhaps because our level of activism and activity in the world today is of a different kind, now the European Troika and the European Union are not in a position to politically defend us and against the United States regarding the JCPOA. Russia's argument is also different, considering the war in Ukraine and the general confrontation with the West, and its support, if any, is not very effective and does not have significant influence on the front against us. China has also not shown much activism in the past on such sensitive issues, and its policy is more in line with the majority and the prevailing opinion.
Now, observing the scene and especially the draft that has been presented to the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency, it seems that European countries still do not intend to apply pressure through the mechanism for resolving disputes within the JCPOA and are trying to threaten Iran with condemnation by the Board of Governors of the Agency and possibly a re-referral to the UN Security Council. Perhaps this lack of use of the internal mechanism of the JCPOA is due to the assumption that the votes of the members of the JCPOA are equal (Iran, Russia, and China on the one hand, and the European Troika on the other) and the uncertainty of winning it. That is why the United States and Europe have sought a kind of renewed consensus in the international space against Iran.
Of course, imposing new sanctions in the Security Council is not impossible, but it seems unattainable due to the many differences between the West and Russia at the moment. However, in the process of restoring the same previous resolutions, it also requires creating a political and media atmosphere against Iran, preparing international public opinion, and bringing governments together, and this is a task that is currently being seriously pursued.
What is needed is an effort to restore the legitimate face of the JCPOA, which is possible through the mobilization of diplomats from the center and the missions. Political and diplomatic initiatives at various levels of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, especially at its top, can have the greatest benefit for us. The place of the violator of the JCPOA and the one harmed by this violation should not be changed. This issue requires an explanation of Iran's positions and arguments in the global arena, and as a rule, one cannot be satisfied with the rightness of one's position.
In the final analysis, what could be our weakness today in nuclear diplomacy policymaking is excessive optimism and possibly captivity to our own slogans and boasting. While acknowledging that expressing positions in the abyss of negotiations and the media is necessary in foreign policy, we should not think that the work of a diplomat ends here. In other words, our positions are only our positions and not our solutions. If we think that “the Board of Governors, the UN Security Council, the internal dispute resolution mechanism of the JCPOA, etc. are all nothing and will not be able to increase the pressure on us” or if we think that “we are still under sanctions today and it will not make much difference,” we will only convince ourselves. Foreign policy veterans know well the difference between superior and inferior positions, the difference between unilateral US sanctions and comprehensive UN sanctions, and the re-entry under Chapter VII of the Charter. Meanwhile, the hope for the support of others – Russia or China or any other country – can be considered the worst optimism, as history shows. Because these countries, especially in the current situation, may make Iran a factor in their reconciliation with the West on another issue. Because increasing the qualitative and quantitative pressure on Iran does not reduce their real interests, nor does Iran leave itself another option in foreign policy that Russia and China would fear Iran's approach to it and consider themselves free to choose between early and late interests.
Etemad Link
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