Essay on Etemad Newspaper July 3, 2022 -
The original text is in Persian and the following translation was done by Ai.
In this case, it is also unclear how long this small increase in negotiating leverage on the nuclear issue should continue? Where is the line that, if we reach it, will the other side be forced not only to give in to our concerns about ensuring the sustainability of the agreement, but also to comply with our demands on the margins of the JCPOA? And basically, what is the need for tension management against such an opposing side that has fallen to its knees like this?
Another point that comes to mind in this regard is that: the development of nuclear weapons is not always free of cost. At the same time as our nuclear power increases, the pressures from the other side also increase and improve. According to the history that has been going on for at least the past twelve years, and considering all the strengths and weaknesses of the country and the management system, etc., these pressures cast a shadow on the scientific, industrial, agricultural, medical, pharmaceutical, and above all economic and welfare systems. These pressures, which typically result in dissatisfaction and sometimes social tensions, themselves become a lever in the hands of the other side that it uses against our newly created nuclear weapon.
The criticism that was made in the previous point is also audible in this case.
The third group are those who live more in the “here and now” of the international environment than others and understand politics not as a science of wants but as a science of capabilities and possibilities and believe that, considering all these issues regarding the unfairness of the international system, the country’s inalienable rights, etc., it is necessary for us to create a balance in the possible exploitation of our various rights: If our nuclear rights are certain, then the right to sell our oil quota is also certain, the right to sell gas is also certain, the right to attract investment, normal trade, import medicine, etc.: all these rights are certain, and in the current situation where nuclear excuses have caused the violation of various rights of ours, it is necessary to take the excuse from the other side and, by preserving and consolidating nuclear rights, a balance should be provided for the possibility of using other rights.
Now that there are glimmers of openness again in the negotiations to revive the JCPOA, it is an opportune time to pay attention to the solutions to face the current situation and the pros and cons of each. While we have only put the nuclear issue on the negotiating table in the current situation and are willing to discuss it, it is also assumed that the nuclear issue is only a handful of examples of the many issues between Iran and the United States: this can be observed both in the words of Iranian politicians, who consider the nuclear issue in itself a kind of excuse by the West, especially the United States, and in the positions of the United States and its allies, who take every opportunity to refer to other issues of dispute with Iran.
But in any case, the current situation requires that the issue be addressed from a policy-making perspective: policy-making has an important substantive difference from position-making and policy-making, and that is that in policy-making, which is essentially advisory in nature - even sectoral advice such as legal, financial, technical advice, etc. - presenting only one solution is never desirable and professional. In other words, a policy-maker is someone who places several versions of different solutions on the table of decision-makers, mentioning the advantages and disadvantages of each, for them to choose. Even decision-makers should not allow themselves to choose only one version.
What we mention in this note is not policy-making that is presented specifically from an advisory position and can be the subject of decision-making, but rather those general versions that are raised in the mind and opinion when facing our central issue in foreign policy: the issue of Iran and the West (America) in general and the nuclear issue in particular; even if one or more of them are fundamentally irrelevant from any political position. In addition, under each of these versions, policy can be made and, as explained, solutions can be mentioned in the aforementioned format, i.e., a policy paper, which contains appropriate strengths and weaknesses.
Considering what exists today in our historical record, namely, the conclusion of a partial (nuclear) contract and its relatively successful implementation in a partial manner and then the fragility that prevailed over it, there are five main ways to overcome the challenge that has challenged Iran's foreign policy today, in general and mentally:
1. There is a school of thought that believes that since the international order is firstly oppressive and secondly in transition, this historical record has left no choice but for Iran not to negotiate effectively (i.e., lead to an agreement and manage tension), but to buy time by going back and forth and presenting diplomatic initiatives until the season of "Russia and China's rise" arrives and at the same time increase its nuclear weapons (which in one direction can be the threshold of deterrence and in another direction even the construction of nuclear weapons). In this case, and with the reduction of the United States' influence in the international environment, Iran, which is now an ally of the East, neither needs the United States nor does it see a difficult path ahead of it to do so.
But the point is that, first, it is impossible to calculate how long it will take for the East to rise to the point where it will be able to prevent America from incurring costs for Iran and, second, to see such a priority for itself. Even if we accept that the rise of the East is in a style that will result in a hegemonic power, we must see whether all the countries that are close allies of the "East" at that time have paid such an exorbitant price in this transitional period? Can't the short and medium term be spent at a lower cost and reach that "destination"?
Furthermore, is it fundamentally possible to think about increasing deterrence or getting closer to weapons under the current monitoring conditions and Iran's membership in the NPT, etc.? Has any country with nuclear military capabilities been able to build its own nuclear weapons under such supervision?
2. The second thought also believes in negotiating in the short term to buy time and without reaching a conclusion; so that in the meantime, by increasing nuclear power (which could again be deterrence power or nuclear weapons), stronger negotiating leverage is built for the future and Iran comes to the substantive and effective negotiating table when it can achieve easy negotiations and a desirable and sustainable result with effective leverage.
Those who hold this view are also not satisfied with the current state of the international environment, but at the same time they believe that it is not possible to make the country and the nation costly and possibly even threaten it in the hope of the East rising today. Also, the possibility of developing the nuclear program and reaching the threshold of deterrence or more, with regard to safeguards monitoring, will not be without harm and threat from a certain point onwards.
Furthermore, the guarantee for any legal or political contract in the current circumstances is purely legal or political and not beyond. Therefore, the only way to sustain a contract like the JCPOA is to manage tension, attract capital, and normalize their repetition and continuation.
What can be mentioned as a criticism of this solution is its lack of objective guarantees.
The fourth view regarding resolving the issues between Iran and the United States is to solve the problem in a non-partisan and comprehensive manner. This, of course, does not mean negotiating all the issues between them and resolving them. Similarly, there are few two countries that do not have differences of opinion on the issues between them. The issue of Iran and the US is certainly more than a few differences of opinion: it is clear that both Iran and the US have issues that they are not willing to discuss. What those who advocate the fourth view intend is to set aside these two categories of issues and address issues that are negotiable from the perspective of both sides.
The benefit of this approach is that, first, the resolved areas act as a buffer and prevent other adversaries, such as Israel, from trying to address non-negotiable issues and radicalize the situation.
Second, by resolving several issues of tension in peripheral areas, double pressure is not placed on each area that has been resolved as a single issue (such as the nuclear issue) and the fragility of the solutions is not contributed to.
Third, this becomes a precedent that reduces the activism of domestic extremists on both sides and intensifies the atmosphere between them.
But the most important criticism of this approach is, first, the lack of trust between them, which always makes the work difficult, and second, its unreality in the current circumstances. The bad record of the United States in violating the results achieved and, above all, the JCPOA, also reduces the popularity of this solution.
The fifth view is in the mind of a fundamental change in foreign policy, especially in relation to the United States: that basically everything that the United States wants should be accepted by Iran due to its being a superpower, and that the people and the government in Iran should not be so concerned about independence in decision and action. Accepting the will of the United States will remove obstacles and will lead to openness in various fields. This view not only accepts the hegemony of the United States, but also believes that in principle, giving in to it and "coming under the umbrella of American support" is a matter of national interest, and therefore, for greater prosperity, it is better to give up not only nuclear power, but also everything that displeases the West, the United States, and ill-wishers such as Israel, so that their minds are not upset and the issue is resolved all at once and suddenly and we are in the Western bloc.
This view, of course, does not respond to its costs, including damage to national morale, the country's independence, the principle of national sovereignty, the failure to criticize Iran's demands, and the increase in the demands of the other side. In addition, the most important damage that a country like Iran would suffer in a region like the Middle East would be the severe security threats that would be imposed on it due to its weakness in independence, decision-making, and various strategic capabilities. There is also no guarantee that this interest is mutual and that the United States would have the same level of interest in uniting with Iran and supporting it; especially despite Iran's inherent competition with America's regional allies.
Whatever the case, what is relevant is that we believe that even in the most realistic views of international relations, one of the eight sources of power is national morale and another is the quality of diplomacy. It should be noted that national morale may not necessarily be maintained as a result of extremist policies, and as a result, national power may decrease.
The quality of diplomacy, which means using the most efficient cadre and strategy in diplomacy, is one of the most important elements of national power: this power is possible only with planning and without relying on coincidences and exceptions. The rule must be set correctly and the country must be updated for such issues, especially in terms of analytical power and information. The quality of diplomacy means the power to criticize levers that have already been prepared technically and do not necessarily have the same value in the international political market. The best policymakers and advisors are those who provide the country with the most up-to-date information and analysis in several degrees of desirability for use in various situations, and the best negotiators are those who can best use the levers created, and this is an expensive specialization that requires both relevant education and direct experience.
Finally, a fair look at these five options requires that the middle options from the point of view of one side of the spectrum are not considered minor from the other side of the spectrum, in which case one side creates a paper tiger and easily hunts it. The details of each view should be heard from its guardians, rather than each side expressing its own opinion on behalf of the other side.
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