What is clear is that the negotiations to revive the JCPOA, which were stopped at the end of the previous government on the verge of a conclusion and began with five months of effect in the 13th government, have been unintentionally affected by the war in Ukraine since March last year. It is as if Russia was aware of this meaning and had, as a rule, coordinated the management of the negotiations in accordance with its national interests in time with the start of the attack on Ukraine, but as a rule, the other parties, including Iran, were unaware of this meaning.
After the war began and with the increase in energy prices, the desirability of reaching an agreement for Iran decreased: both the United States’ renunciation of Iranian oil sales, especially to China, increased, and the same amount of oil sales, given the price of more than $100 per barrel, brought Iran significant income and freed the government from the predicament it was in. At the same time, prudent policymaking requires that the current situation be used to reach a good agreement and that “a small success is not the beginning of a big failure.”
Because international equations are fluid, as are the equations of domestic politics in countries. As the US congressional elections approach, the Biden administration will become more conservative about an agreement with Iran, and if the war in Ukraine leads to any result that oil prices gradually adjust, then these same concessions will be lost and the US oil sanctions will inevitably be implemented more strictly.
Another effect that the Ukrainian war has had on the equations of reviving the JCPOA is the elimination of the deadlines assumed by the West, especially the United States: both due to the global energy price and the motivation of Iran’s lack of closer ties to Russia, the West has preferred suspension in the current situation to more pressure on Iran through the International Atomic Energy Agency and the mechanism for the return of UN Security Council sanctions. It seems that from a legal perspective, the return of these sanctions does not require re-approval by China and Russia. However, from a political perspective, the West currently prefers not to create a new crisis for itself.
At the same time, it is necessary to pay attention to the differences in the current situation with the lifting of US sanctions: the sale of at least 1.2 million barrels of more oil and condensate without discounts, easy and cheap transfer of foreign exchange, the booming of businesses, especially manufacturing, the possibility of attracting investment and exports, and most importantly, the improvement of the psychological atmosphere of society.
But what we need to do is to use the current situation to convert the momentary situation of limited oil sales into the lifting of all current nuclear sanctions imposed by the United States, which will lead to the stability and stability of the psychological and real situation: stability that is the first and least condition for the beginning of the country's development. If we consider the comprehensive development of the country as the fundamental task of the sovereignty of any country, the lifting of the unilateral sanctions of the United States is the first condition for this development, and it is clear that the conditions for bargaining about these sanctions will never be better than the current conditions. Therefore, regardless of the amount of damage caused, at least since last year, due to US sanctions, it will be beneficial to prevent this loss from happening wherever we can.
The connection between the Ukrainian war, nuclear negotiations, and global order goes back to our understanding of the conditions of international management at the highest levels of decision-making: Despite Russia's war with Ukraine and the West's confrontation with Putin, if we look at the behavior of China, India, Turkey, etc., we see that most countries that have strategic and political similarities with us have refused to imagine the current international environment as a re-polarized order and to fall into the trap of definitive support for one side. The right policy in the current situation for the Islamic Republic of Iran is to refrain from taking sides while pursuing national interests in the field of foreign policy, which, above all, at the current stage is to revive the JCPOA and consolidate its position in the international system.
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