Essay on Etemad Newspaper, April 3, 2022 -
The original text is in Persian and the translation below was done by Ai.
The year 1400 began with a thousand fears and more hopes regarding the nuclear negotiations and ended with the same fears and fewer hopes. In the last days of Esfand, although the nuclear negotiations were constantly getting cold and hot, eventually, due to what was considered to be Russia's obstacle to the conclusion of the negotiations, the negotiations and the deployment of the teams of the various parties in Vienna were stopped and without any tangible result - victory or defeat - everyone returned home. Although it was later said that in any case Moscow had passed its position and was no longer an obstacle to the negotiations, in any case, the shock from the initial news poured the tension of the Ukrainian war into the container of the nuclear negotiations, and now, although all parties have repeatedly said that a result is within reach, the focus of attention on each of the remaining issues and the stretching of the issue that was expected to be finalized last June somehow brings to mind a decrease in motivation and coldness.
The reality is that politics – whether domestic or foreign – is a fluid affair. Whether in domestic politics, where events such as a coup, a death, a major event in the public sphere, the sudden interest of the masses in an issue or the opposite surprise politicians and upset the equations, or in international politics, and especially in areas that follow the equations of multilateral diplomacy, the fluid nature of politics is decisive. Therefore, time is a factor that must be strategically considered during a negotiation. The negotiator must pay attention to the fact that sometimes in a short period of time the level of motivation and interests of the different negotiating parties can change, and therefore a negotiation that has progressed halfway or close to a conclusion may undergo changes due to a change in the political will of one or more parties or the entry of a new element from the outside. Of course, this change may not always be negative, and depending on the issue and the professionalism of the negotiator, more concessions can be sought and obtained based on the changes that have occurred.
But at the same time, this same meaning may also be reversed: with changing circumstances, one or more parties may feel that they are ahead and demand new concessions, but the other parties, at least in the negotiations in question, do not see it that way, and therefore what has entered the negotiation system from the outside may act as an obstacle to the conclusion of the negotiations. The reality is that every negotiation is carried out to achieve specific benefits at a specific time. Therefore, it is necessary to calculate how much this delay in the possible conclusion of the negotiation is of real benefit, considering the new concessions, and to what extent the negotiator has become strict.
In the nuclear negotiations, which were initially affected by the war in Ukraine, the reality is that after the war, and especially with the increase in global prices of energy carriers and the resulting increase in demand, the equations that influence the negotiations changed:
Russia is naturally not inclined to supply more oil and gas (i.e. Iran's share) to the market legally. Regardless of whether it has taken any action in this regard or not, the fact is that in a situation where the war has become somewhat eroded and the only lever that is pressuring the West, and especially Europe, is gas and oil prices, Moscow's motivation to reach a conclusion in the short term has decreased.
Iran, too, is likely to be able to supply its oil to the market in volumes and at prices that were perhaps difficult to imagine before the war, given the increase in global market demand and the increase in prices, and taking into account the existing discounts. Therefore, Iran is not holding its hands under a rock and, with the breathing space that has been created, is increasing its strictness to change the remaining issues to its desired course. It is as if oil and its sale are one of the most important tools of the United States to be strict with Iran and one of the most important motivations of the Islamic Republic to negotiate and reach an agreement to revive the JCPOA.
China, as the largest energy importer, is also currently suffering from rising prices, and therefore, it is likely to conclude, in a rough calculation, that although the lifting of sanctions on Iranian companies and banks will facilitate exchanges and especially investments in the medium term and a strategic presence in the Persian Gulf region in the long term, taking advantage of Iran's and Russia's discounts on oil prices in the current situation is a short-term escape. Therefore, although it has not broken its policy of moderation and silence in the nuclear negotiations, it is not showing any significant effort to resolve differences and bring the Vienna negotiations to a conclusion.
Even the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf, centered on Saudi Arabia, which are major oil and gas exporters, are making the most of the prevailing conditions in the energy market, which are mostly affected by the war in Ukraine and Iran's exclusion from the official oil sales market. Therefore, although they are not sabotaging the negotiations and expressing a negative position as they did during the 2015 negotiations, they cannot be expected to take any initiative to de-escalate tensions between Iran and the West. If the negotiations between Iran and Saudi Arabia continue, of course, they have a significant parallel with the nuclear negotiations. The only consideration Saudi Arabia has regarding Iran is the security fear that has arisen in the minds of its leaders for whatever reason, real or otherwise, and they are trying to respond to it in two ways: negotiating with Iran and resolving tensions and approaching an Arab security coalition in the Persian Gulf and the GCC countries. Riyadh, of course, has not yet shown any inclination to approach Israel in the latter, and has maintained its Arab-Islamic stance to some extent compared to Bahrain and the UAE.
However, the United States, as the main party to Iran in the nuclear negotiations and dispute - especially after the JCPOA - has a decreasing motivation: domestic pressure from Republicans and the right wing of the Democratic Party has put pressure on the Biden administration, and especially the midterm elections in November of this year, the further we go, the more limited and closed Biden's hand is to offer real concessions to Iran in the negotiations to revive the JCPOA.
On the other hand, with the slowdown in the war in Ukraine and the relative consent of Moscow and Kiev to negotiate in Turkey, which may reduce the fire of war, the Biden administration can rely on the media to advertise a success in foreign policy for itself, and if this happens, the attractiveness of reviving the JCPOA as a foreign policy achievement in the current US administration will be greatly reduced.
The United States is not an energy importer, and therefore, rising global energy prices will not be to the country’s detriment overall: the more people in the United States pay for floating energy prices, the more profits and turnover American oil and energy companies will make, and therefore overall, this will have a positive effect on US economic growth. On the other hand, the potential continuation of tensions in the Middle East, especially between Iran and the countries in the region, will not dampen the US arms market.
This does not mean that the Biden administration is not seeking to revive the JCPOA or that it is opposed to it. Rather, what is necessarily a corollary of these equations is that the Biden administration will have both less incentive and less opportunity to facilitate this revival by offering concessions in the remaining areas.
But Europe is the real loser in the war and the price of energy: the strategic equations governing Europe in the security, economic, and energy spheres have suffered long-term damage. In particular, the main source of gas supply, Russia, apart from the annual games over prices, is now basically shaky and has hostile relations with Europe and its eyes on its eastern territory. Therefore, Europe has the necessary motivation to revive the JCPOA in terms of oil and gas prices, both in terms of Europe's traditional norm-setting and protection of negotiations and agreements in the international arena, and a strategic view of supplying gas from other sources. In addition, the Iranian market, whose relations with Europe have now been minimized, can be a good buyer for European products, especially industrial ones, if not a safe investment location. But what is clear is that Europe's efforts have little weight and have never been able to be more than a mediator. This is why Borrell and Mora continue to move in the face of both Iran and the United States.
Overall, what can be seen from observing the current situation is that completion is a characteristic that the foreign policy apparatus should have: negotiation is one thing, and completion and reaching a conclusion are two things in the end. If many parties feel that the conclusion of the war in Ukraine is not in their interest today, perhaps a short-term view and political-diplomatic greed have somehow dominated the atmosphere. We must be careful of the situation in which the war in Ukraine ends without tangible results through negotiations, and the internal pressures of the United States and the sense of success in the foreign policy of the Biden administration increase. In that situation, with the decline in oil prices, Iranian oil will again fall from the priority list and will no longer be of current benefit to the country, and then we will be the only party that needs to revive the JCPOA and stick to it. The agreement is not for interests, it is to increase stability. We must have a strategic view and finish the job at the peak, otherwise it will be another scene: perhaps this peak was the beginning of Russia's attack on Ukraine and the maximum amount of anxiety on the international stage.
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