Essay on Etemad Newspaper, January 5, 2022 -
The original text is in Persian and the following translation was done by Ai.
During the eighth round of the JCPOA revival talks in Vienna, it still seems difficult to analyze what is going on, given the limited and highly managed information obtained from Iranian sources within the talks. It is as if analyzing the situation “from the outside” is still necessary both to shape public opinion and to expose the negotiating team itself.
The fact is that, except for a few interviews with the head of the negotiating team - Mr. Ali Bagheri - and Mr. Dr. Mohammad Marandi, most of the news about the negotiations is reflected from Ulyanov - Russia's representative to international organizations in Vienna - and China and the Western parties are also less interviewed than usual, in the style of the Iranian team.
But at the same time, Mr. Bagheri’s team, in proportion to its characteristics and the conditions in which it is located, also has threats and opportunities, the recognition of which will bring us closer to the existing reality, the use of opportunities, and the prevention of damage:
The following are among the threats and challenges that the nuclear team potentially faces in the negotiations to revive the JCPOA:
What is clear is that the current nuclear team – as well as Mr. Seyyed Abbas Araqchi’s team in the spring of this year – has entered into the preparation of a new text to revive the JCPOA. This was certainly inevitable, but it should be noted that it is not ideal. Because the production of any new text indirectly questions the JCPOA as the main agreement, to which the position of the Islamic Republic of Iran has always been only adherence by all parties.
In addition, considering the issues that became clear to the opposing parties during the US withdrawal from the JCPOA, and especially after the law passed by the parliament last winter regarding the nuclear issue, it is possible that in the event of any changes to the original text, the US and other partners will not be subject to such a clause for the second time, which was sometimes unknowingly imposed on them the first time. Therefore, whatever the text is, it should not go beyond the level of a program to return to the original text, that is, the JCPOA. Because we will definitely not be the winner of any amendment to the original text.
We all know that the leaders of the current team have traditionally not been among the most supportive political forces with the JCPOA text, and whether they like it or not, their label of opposition to the 2015 agreement is not something that is hidden from the opposing parties. This is generally not a very positive issue, because the unwritten makes it difficult for them to defend a return to the original text.
The current team has left behind slogans for negotiation during the internal political competition, and at the beginning of its term of office, with the motivation of starting from a higher point, it has taken maximalist positions, which is necessary for a professional team to be aware of this issue and not to be captured by its own slogans and the current it belongs to.
In any case, given the complex economic conditions, etc. inside - which the negotiating parties are certainly aware of - the negotiating team is trying to keep the internal psychological atmosphere away from turbulence and for this purpose is being a little generous in expressing satisfaction with what has happened. As if this kind of expression of relative satisfaction when the other party is either completely silent or expresses doubts will cause them to be stubborn in the next round of negotiations.
We know that the negotiating team has so far refused to negotiate face-to-face with the American team, nor to accept them in the multilateral negotiation room, arguing that the United States is not a party to the JCPOA. But at the same time, this team should not turn this issue into an identity-based and irreversible issue, so that if it deems it necessary, at a stage when the work has progressed to an acceptable level, it can either participate in a marginal and bilateral negotiation with the United States or accept this country's team as a non-member present in the negotiation room. Because, apart from political issues, from a technical point of view, indirect negotiation or what is referred to today as written negotiation will cause many technical problems. Including the absence of the Iranian team during the negotiation of others to disrupt anything that could potentially be an alliance against our interests. The other thing is about the accuracy of the issue: in such negotiations, the path will be extremely open for breaking promises and making excuses later. Ultimately, it does not seem that the United States will conclude a negotiation that requires its promise and implementation through an intermediary.
Regardless of any political position or agreement or disagreement with the negotiation tactics of the current nuclear team, it must be admitted that the current team does not have the upper hand in the field of media action and international atmosphere-building. The two psychological and media games are among the most important determining aspects of such negotiations. Having an active position in the media and psychological debate, as well as taking charge of creating an international atmosphere, both distances the opposing sides from each other so as not to bring isolation to Iran, and also helps Iran maintain the upper hand on this specific issue.
It should be noted that gradually and as time goes by, Iran will not return to the position it had before 2013, when it was unfairly placed in the position of the accused. No matter how incorrect and perverse this position is, it will simply reverse the conditions to our disadvantage as soon as they are proposed and concluded. The fact is that this activity does not require a special media team. The main negotiators have the most news coverage, who can use the atmosphere surrounding the negotiations to pressure the opposing parties by adopting appropriate strategies. Because their words and statements, given that they are present in the negotiation room, will be more effective and credible than the stance of any spokesperson. Certainly, not stepping into the media pool and creating an international atmosphere is an easier choice, but it will definitely deprive us of the blessings of this scene.
Finally, care must be taken that no team, especially the Russian team, shines more than the other parties and does not become the undisputed winner of the negotiations. Because it must be certain that in this case, and as soon as Russia is confident in its authority, it will not defend Iran's interests. Perhaps the view of relying on Russia to achieve rights against the United States is a Cold War view and is not compatible with today's equations of international relations, and basically we are not supposed to trust or rely on a foreign party in any scenario: whether it is the United States and Europe or China and Russia.
Of course, in contrast to the above, the opportunities under which the negotiations are underway can also be mentioned:
The first strong point for the current negotiations is the existence of a main text in which all the details have been seen. This has freed the nuclear team from dealing with technical and legal details at the level of writing a main text, and what remains is how to return to the specific obligations that are carefully specified in the JCPOA.
One of the most important positive points of this series of negotiations is the will of the various parties to achieve the results of the negotiations. Even the haste shown by the Western teams makes the issue somewhat more comfortable for the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran, on the other hand, has sufficient motivation at the government level to lift the sanctions restrictions. The European Union, given its usual spirit of not paying much, has its traditional desire to resolve conflicts through diplomacy, while at the same time nurturing economic motivations in the back of its mind. Russia and China, although they are currently enjoying no small benefits due to the sanctions imposed on Iran, have more incentives to enter the regional economy (from China) and possibly sell weapons (from Russia) to Iran following the lifting of the sanctions. In the region, unlike during the JCPOA negotiations, we see that the Saudi government, despite the cold and severed official relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran, does not openly oppose the revival of the JCPOA. Naftali Bennett and his government have also, at least inevitably, adopted a more moderate stance on the ongoing negotiations compared to Benjamin Netanyahu. In fact, the experience of the JCPOA and the subsequent withdrawal of the United States, since it did not calm the region, did not make Saudi Arabia victorious in Yemen, did not take the missile from Iran, and most importantly, maximum pressure did not come close to its goal of collapsing the Iranian political system, all of which led regional adversaries and rivals to immediately try to control Iran’s nuclear position to the extent of the JCPOA and to demand more certainty from their point of view.
Another opportunity that the current negotiating team has is the internal space: in fact, the internal rivals of the government and the new team are the biggest advocates of reviving the JCPOA, and if we look at it fairly, they have either supported it or remained silent. This, of course, has provided a much calmer situation for Ali Bagheri’s team compared to the space behind the JCPOA negotiators.
The body of society also agrees with all aspects of the negotiation and its results, which are accompanied by economic and political openness, and welcomes and supports it.
Finally, Iran's expert team is more or less the same team that remained from previous negotiations and therefore has a great deal of control over the details of the issue.
Finally, it seems that, considering the issues mentioned above, if the negotiating team is sufficiently efficient and adopts the right negotiation tactics, the necessary flexibility, the appropriate use of expert manpower, and finally, realism and pragmatism, the path to operationalizing the political will that governs the negotiations and achieving an agreement to revive the JCPOA will not be a long one.
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