Essay on Etemad Newspaper November 4, 2021 -
The original text is in Persian and the following translation was done by Ai.
Three months have passed since the 13th government of Annan took office in mid-August, and there is still no news of a new strategy on foreign policy, especially the nuclear negotiations. What has happened are two trips between Iran and the European Union at the level of deputies, which cannot be considered anything more than expressing a position and laying the groundwork for new negotiations. This has gone to the point where many analysts and even American, European and Russian diplomats have considered the delay of the new government in Iran in “resuming and continuing” the negotiations to revive the JCPOA in Vienna incomprehensible and have expressed doubts about the motive for this delay, making excuses. Even on the sidelines of the G20 meeting in Italy, we witnessed a joint statement by the Troika and the United States in this regard, which does not seem to be a positive thing. Those involved in foreign policy today should pay more attention to “creating space around the issue” than anything else. Because this statement can be considered the first step in the re-convergence of Europe and the United States in this case.
It is clear that for many reasons during the Trump era, Europe had become politically distant from the United States. Regardless of the practical possibilities and options that Europe did not have, it can be said that the greatest angle and confrontation between these two main wings in the West was during the Trump era, and this atmosphere, of course, also cast a shadow on the issue of the JCPOA and the United States' withdrawal from it.
But now, it is clear that the recent statement can be assessed as the first step in a new round of convergence between Europe and the United States.
It should be noted that the JCPOA was basically set in the space of international relations, and therefore the atmosphere surrounding it is very effective on the fate of this political agreement at any stage. Therefore, the new team headed by Mr. Bagheri must pay much more attention to the margins and atmospheres and prevent the formation of a coalition against Iran at various stages. Because taking a tough stance against the coalitions that have been formed will be useless, and it is as if it is gradually forgotten that it was the United States that unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA, and Iran, after only a year of strategic patience, while maintaining its presence in the agreement and in the form of compensatory measures foreseen in the text, began to reduce its commitments, and after a while, with the coalitions that are formed, the Islamic Republic of Iran will be shown as an inconsistent country that lacks the will to return to its JCPOA commitments. Incidentally, it is due to these specific functions of multilateral diplomacy that today's experiences in diplomacy are moving towards multilateral diplomacy. The first function of multilateral diplomacy and "sitting around a round table" instead of "sitting face to face with each member" is the possibility of preventing the formation of coalitions, the emergence of serious differences between both members, the collective will to solve the problem, and also to put everyone on the same level and side of negotiation. Determining the tactics of bilateral diplomacy with the members of the JCPOA does not seem efficient and may further put us in the corner of the ring. Of course, multilateral diplomacy is a narrow and unique specialization in negotiation and requires special spirit and ability.
At the same time, what is facing Iran and the P5+1 today is how to return all parties to their JCPOA commitments. There are several solutions in this direction:
More for more: Regardless of the author's or reader's agreement or disagreement, given the emphasis of Western and regional parties on new axes of dialogue with Iran, namely defense and regional, a solution in the mind and in the field of opinion could be to enter into post-nuclear talks with the aim of obtaining post-JCPOA concessions. For example, in addition to extending JCPOA restrictions such as escape time, nuclear sunset, etc., agreeing on missile ranges, etc., placing negotiations with Saudi Arabia under this program, as well as reducing tensions in other regional areas in a de facto manner, could be concession cards that Iran can use to seek the lifting of post-JCPOA sanctions that have been imposed by the United States and Europe since the beginning of the revolution, as well as more economic, strategic, and military concessions. This is, of course, a way to resolve all areas of tension between Iran and the West, which does not seem very realistic in the current situation. Less for less: Given the US withdrawal from the JCPOA and what Iran calls the US and the West's non-compliance during the implementation of the JCPOA (i.e. the failure of Western banks and companies to work with Iran normally despite the removal of effective sanctions barriers), there may be a tendency in the Islamic Republic to consider giving up all the privileges included in the JCPOA and, in return for the lifting of part of its nuclear sanctions, not complying with all the restrictions of its JCPOA: for example, in terms of enrichment levels, their quantities, or the permitted amount of enriched materials on Iranian soil. This issue is of course raised above all as a guarantee that the US will not withdraw from the JCPOA again or that it will not be implemented properly. However, in any case, since this version leads to a new contract, it will require acceptance by the parties and obtaining a minimum political agreement within the countries and parliaments.
End of the JCPOA: By announcing its withdrawal from the negotiations and withdrawal from the JCPOA, Iran will not consider itself committed to any JCPOA restrictions or even the Additional Protocol and will reduce the Agency’s inspections. In return, the JCPOA and non-JCPOA parties will use their possible tools: Iran’s case may be referred to the IAEA Board of Governors again and then to the UN Security Council, UN sanctions may be returned through the six resolutions leading up to 1929, and even new soft and even hard confrontations may be implemented if possible, if they are within the ability and courage of the different parties. In fact, in this matter, each party sees itself as authorized to use all its possibilities, and if it does not do what it does, it is solely due to its own discretion and not external restrictions.
Of course, the path of no negotiations or its long duration, considering the issue of nuclear escape time and the inspections of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the greater convergence of Europe and the United States, and the neutralization of Russia and China, will pave the way for such an option and will ultimately lead Iran and other countries to actually withdraw from the JCPOA and end it with or without a declaration.
The original text of the JCPOA: Return to the existing and original text of the JCPOA without any demand from any party for any issue beyond the text. This is naturally the first solution that comes to mind. In this case, the United States and Europe will not be able to demand any more inspections or restrictions, they cannot try to renegotiate clauses such as nuclear sunset and arms restrictions that are being terminated, or even make anything conditional on negotiations on other issues such as missiles and regional issues. This is because the text of the JCPOA and Security Council Resolution 2231 are clear and are not subject to any secondary negotiations or resolution of other issues. In addition, the P5+1 is bound not to impose the lifted sanctions and restrictions on Iran under the pretext of another issue.
A marginal issue in this case that may prolong the return to negotiations and the essence of the talks is the internal competition and political label of the 11th and 12th governments on the current JCPOA, which may delay the work with the intention of removing this label if viewed unprofessionally, and of course, it is hoped that this will not be the case.
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The first fact is that the possibility of obtaining more concessions without providing more concessions in return is very unlikely, and it can be said that the basic score cards for this new balance are not visible on the scene.
The second fact is that the Islamic Republic of Iran is paying financial and political losses daily due to the current sanctions, which it should have prevented as much as possible.
The third fact is that postponing decision-making, rather than confusing and further tiring the opposing parties, makes Iran appear more indecisive every day and consequently puts it in a corner.
Therefore, one should try to choose and implement one of the above solutions or new initiatives, while ignoring the sidelines such as the place of negotiation or trying to change the form from multilateral diplomacy to bilateral talks with realism, decisiveness in decision-making, and efficiency in negotiation (which is only possible by using various teams of legal, diplomatic, financial, and nuclear experts).
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