Background and explanation of the issue: In recent days, the nuclear issue and the negotiations to revive the JCPOA have returned to the news and activities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. An issue that has continuously affected life in Iran for about eighteen years. We have also tried various strategies, techniques, and methods at different times in dealing with this issue: once the Atomic Energy Organization was responsible for resolving these ambiguities and interacting with outsiders, later the Supreme National Security Council, and finally the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In a period of time, in order to take the poison of the animosities that were becoming more intense every day and the atmosphere that was being created against us every day, we voluntarily suspended enrichment and voluntarily implemented the Additional Protocol, and later, by opening the locks, we began a new phase of the story. The Iranian nuclear case, which, to be fair, was nothing more than a pessimistic excuse and abuse of ambiguity, went to the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency and was sent to the United Nations Security Council with the issuance of resolutions. Ultimately, Iran received six resolutions for a crime it had not committed, each one more severe than the previous one. Ultimately, Iran was placed under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter and was unjustly recognized as a threat to international peace and security. Sanctions were imposed on the country that severely affected economic indicators. This was, incidentally, what ill-wishers like Israel had in mind for Iran.
On the other hand, with the change of government in Iran and the emergence of a new Iranian will, and with the transfer of the case from the Supreme National Security Council to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and after twenty-one months of extensive efforts at the ministerial level and unprecedented meetings and negotiations, the JCPOA was achieved. The deal, which was not internationally withdrawn by Trump and the imposition of sanctions, this time unilaterally by the US government, rendered many of its economic and especially financial aspects ineffective, and yet it is still alive. After the Democrats returned to the White House, negotiations were held in Vienna at the beginning of this year under the chairmanship of Abbas Araghchi, but after reaching a promising but incomplete point, they were halted again due to the electoral conditions in Iran. Now, although two meetings have been held at the level of the Deputy Coordinator of the European Union and the Deputy Foreign Minister of Iran in Tehran and Brussels, the new government in Tehran has not yet returned to the negotiations on the implementation of the JCPOA and these negotiations have not been resumed; something that is said to begin by the end of November.
The main point is that today the nuclear issue has become a symbol of authority, political decision-making, and independent sovereignty, otherwise, calculating its purely material benefits and losses for electricity production and marginal health technologies, etc., may not have much economic justification. This is basically one of the arguments that makes those in the world doubt the main intention of the Islamic Republic of Iran on the nuclear issue. Because, by setting aside the political and sovereign aspects of independence in decision-making and non-acceptance of force, accepting this cost for the matters mentioned above, and that too by one of the largest owners of energy reserves in the world, is not justified in their view (i.e. observers who do not consider the political aspect).
The nature of the JCPOA: But what is the JCPOA really? Has it had and can it have significant effects for Iran or is it not more of a compliment? What are its implementation guarantees?
First, it should be said that the JCPOA is not a treaty, nor a contract, nor a political statement, but rather a political document that has been negotiated and written within the framework of international relations (and not international law). This means that first of all, the presence and all actions of the various parties within it rely on their political will, and this, by the way, is the same for all parties. That is, just as the United States unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA and violated it, any of the other members, including Iran, can always do the same and return to zero. Therefore, the implementation guarantee and the arbitration mechanism of the JCPOA are foreseen within it.
The reason for this is both Iran's desire (to not be bound under any circumstances) and the conditions of the United States at that time, when the Congress was in the hands of the Republicans and there was no certainty that it would be approved if it were a treaty. In addition, given the great distance between Iran and the United States, neither side was ready to sign a legal text such as an international treaty that would be binding on them in terms of international law, and they saw it better to take shorter steps to lighten the burden of disputes.
In international relations, the implementation or violation of agreements of any kind is more focused on interests than anything else. Because politics governs it more than anything else. It is as if withdrawing from a legal interaction would not have such consequences for a country like the United States, which is a permanent member of the Security Council and has the right to veto.
Therefore, in the case of a political text that has been drafted in international relations, implementation is important, not non-implementation. That is, when it is not implemented, everything can be returned to before the negotiation of that text. However, by implementing even a partial text, the fire of disagreements may gradually subside and gradually even be removed from priority.
It was for this reason and because of these achievements that Iran did not completely withdraw from the JCPOA and still has a glimpse of its revival.
Guarantee: Now, Iran's concern for returning to the effective implementation of the JCPOA is understandable: after all, it was the United States that withdrew from the JCPOA and deprived Iran of its benefits for several years. What guarantee is there that the United States will not withdraw again? This was also requested by Iran during the Vienna negotiations, and of course the United States refused to provide it.
The fact is that there is no revised concept of "guarantee" in international relations. Even in international law, when a state is ultimately convicted in a specific case and it submits itself to the court, there is a possibility that the convicted state will refuse to pay compensation. Something that in the rarest of cases may be sent to the Security Council for condemnation of that government, which again does not seem to be very meaningful in the case of the United States of America.
Therefore, it can be said that the most important guarantee in international relations is that the conditions are such that violating the commitment has no value or benefit for that country. This is guaranteed in some cases by expanding trade relations between them, which is not so relevant in the case of Iran and the United States. However, normalizing relations with wealthy neighbors (meaning the Persian Gulf countries) can reduce the pressure on the United States - even the Republicans - and provide convincing financial resources to pressure Iran, and summarize all the hostility of the region only to the Zionist regime.
Another is that, taking advantage of the presence of the supporters of the JCPOA or its return to it in Washington (i.e., the Democrats who consider the JCPOA and now its revival as their achievement), they have increased their trade and economic relations with other countries that have no other obstacles in their way except for US sanctions, and have made these clauses strengthening the JCPOA more and more powerful: whether Europe, Russia, China, or other Asian and South American countries. The vast and increasing volume of trade and economic relations is the most important guarantee for a political agreement not to collapse in the international arena.
Let us remember that whatever the guarantee is, it is still just a piece of paper: a political or legal agreement that, if there are no real clauses such as trade and capital, will have no executive guarantee or deterrent power, and this is the reality of today's world.
The last point: Another thing to know is that the order ruling the region is changing for various reasons, and by calming the level of tensions, one of which is Iran, and by mentioning the country's name as little as possible in the headlines, we should try to gain a proper share and position by imposing the country's conditions and national interests on the major players in this new order. Instead of being introduced by others as one of the challenges in the region, Iran should be recognized as a powerful, main player shaping the new order and an important part of the solution. Of course, it is emphasized again that with the recognition of Iran's limits and interests, as well as criticism-to-criticism interactions and no delay in receiving a share in any issue.
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