Essay on Etemad Newspaper October 23, 2021 -
The original text is in Persian and the following translation was done by Ai.
Iran's foreign policy is taking shape today after the change of government. Of course, according to the procedure and in accordance with the constitution, the general line of foreign policy is determined in the upstream institutions and as a result, they are largely immune to general changes. However, at the same time, following the changes in the Pastor, both due to the brokerage role of the groups under the supervision of the government and, most importantly, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and considering the changes that are taking place in the government members of the Supreme National Security Council, we can expect meaningful changes in foreign policy commensurate with the winner of the presidential election competition.
In this regard, and with the appointments that we have witnessed in the new government at the level of ministers and deputy ministers, and also considering the comments we have witnessed on diplomacy and especially the nuclear negotiations, it seems meaningful to mention a few points.
The new government has some advantages over the previous government regarding nuclear negotiations:
The first advantage of the new nuclear negotiation team over the previous team is the low expectations from this new team: both from the social body and the opposing parties, probably due to their reputation and history. Because they are not expected to understand the internal power relations in the West as before, nor are they expected to have enough color, flavor, and pretense to solve the problem to the point of disrupting the work, and this is a favorable environment for focusing on the main issue.
Another positive point for the new team is their openness in the domestic political scene. Regardless of official positions, and considering the origin of the 13th government and the records of the diplomats installed at the head of the diplomatic apparatus, it can be assumed that there will probably not be the slightest friction between them and the various relevant institutions. Therefore, the current team can focus more calmly and without worrying about the reflection of their policies, positions, and negotiations domestically on the specific work of the diplomatic apparatus, especially nuclear diplomacy as a specific project.
On the other hand, the new delegation in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is supposed to follow the nuclear issue, has two negotiation records - both the negotiations leading to the JCPOA and the so-called Vienna negotiations - and their documents in its hands, and can avoid starting from scratch. By utilizing anti-sanctions, nuclear, political, and legal expert teams that can continue their expert work regardless of upstream changes, there are significant amounts of information and records at hand that can be relied on in each new round of negotiations and their achievements can be preserved.
The international context and the presence of the moderate government in the United States, which in foreign policy is seeking to conclude the JCPOA and demonstrate its success over the Trump administration on the issue of Iran, can also benefit the negotiations that the 13th government and its Ministry of Foreign Affairs are facing.
Also, the fact that Iran has become somewhat hardened regarding sanctions can reduce the other party's motivation for any sanctions policy.
But at the same time, and in parallel with the points that can help the new government's foreign policy work, there are also issues that can potentially cause failure: Cognitive problems are the first type of potential threats to the success of the new core team. If the core team is plagued by sloganeering, personal and identity conflicts, and a lack of belief in the mere self-interest of all parties, it can make us unable to negotiate in the medium term. Highlighting marginal and unimportant matters such as the geography of negotiations, the language of negotiations and its time, and finding a decisive role under such axes will definitely be harmful to us. We must go beyond these details and margins and advance the content with any mechanism for which a major decision has been made. The view of negotiations should be concrete and largely free from preconceptions about the negotiating parties and their intentions, and this discourse can only be used occasionally to create psychological and media pressure. Excessive use of such literature and positions can reduce the effect and a kind of vaccination on the other side and the external observer. In other words, propaganda, showing toughness, and boasting are certainly part of the negotiation campaign, but they are only part of it, and the dominant aspect of foreign policy should not be tainted with this meaning.
The expert power and average intelligence of the nuclear team is another thing that should be monitored. It is clear that only being on the same side or having maximum commitment to the country's position cannot be enough to win in a battle like the nuclear negotiations. This issue requires expertise in negotiation, foreign language, nuclear matters, law, and text writing, both at the expert level and at the political level and in leading the team. Each of these matters requires its own experts, and the top of the negotiating team pyramid should also benefit from these capabilities.
In any case, it is clear that the members of the current negotiating team, at least at the top, have been far from the foreign policy space and its details during the years of negotiations leading to the JCPOA and the Vienna negotiations. This is while the opposing parties, especially the US foreign policy team, are the same teams as during these two negotiations. Secondly, it is undeniable that the culture of documentation and writing that prevails in the administrative procedure in the West, especially diplomatic negotiations, and their lack of reliance on official organizational reports simplifies the work for current diplomats. This could potentially become a point in favor of the opposing parties and allow them to ride on the upcoming negotiations. It should be noted that we are not the only ones who see our domestic political competitions. Certainly, all the opposing parties have a clear understanding of our domestic political issues, especially the margins of the negotiations and the nuclear issue, and they are determined to benefit from these issues to advance their interests in the negotiations. Therefore, the negotiating team, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the new government in general should try to avoid falling into this trap. Criticizing the previous nuclear team will certainly not help the new team, nor will questioning everything that the previous teams have achieved in the negotiations leading to the JCPOA and the recent negotiations in Vienna. Rather, the first thing that should be done during the negotiations and discourage the opposing sides from exploiting our internal differences is to emphasize the achievements of the previous team and demand all of them. To call the JCPOA a nullity, the Vienna talks a deadlock, and to start everything over again, at least publicly, will both greatly increase the time to our detriment and will also open the hands of the opposing sides to raise the issue in a different way in a style that they are certainly better aware of than before. Another risk that the current team of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs faces on the nuclear issue is the risk of polarizing the negotiations and seeing it as two-sided. This will reduce the differences between the various sides within the JCPOA and the countries on its periphery and will lead to a consensus against us in a longer period of time. Something that, given the presence of the Biden team in the White House, at least Europe seems more susceptible to. Meanwhile, experience has shown that in this path, political investment in any other country, even allies, will cause losses. Because the allies sometimes exchange the Iran card for greater interests for themselves and suddenly leave us behind under some pretext. Therefore, common sense dictates that the issue between Iran and the US or Iran and the West should be avoided and that we pursue our national interests by adopting multilateral diplomacy and focusing on the interests and differences between the various parties to these negotiations (whether the official members of the JCPOA or the major countries that influence the negotiations in the world and the region). Beyond the issues of dispute between the various countries directly and indirectly involved in the JCPOA, the new nuclear team needs to be aware of the domestic politics of the above countries. Given that most of the respected figures who have been introduced at the helm of the negotiations so far and who we know may not have had a permanent diplomatic mission in the countries in question or have not lived or studied in them, and their specialized and study subjects are not focused on the above regions and countries, it is necessary to make continuous and continuous use of the advice of experts and academic groups in regional studies in this field.
Finally, considering the soft strengths and weaknesses that were listed for the new nuclear team and considering the costs that the US sanctions have imposed on our country, it is necessary to accelerate and refine the work as much as possible by adopting a calm, professional and decisive policy and also by utilizing expert teams in the relevant nuclear, political, legal, media and negotiation fields. In any case, it is clear that despite the existence of other options for all parties - and first of all for us - returning to the current nuclear, non-missile and non-regional JCPOA, most of whose restrictions have also passed, is still the least expensive and most beneficial option for most parties. Therefore, the best method on the part of the nuclear negotiation brokers is decisiveness, transparency, expertise and professionalism, which can be easily done with specific planning at the head of the negotiation team.
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