Published in the Shargh newspaper on Tuesday, October 1, 2024
Abdulrahman Fathollahi: In the 406 days that have passed since Abbas Araghchi took the helm of the foreign policy apparatus of the Fourteenth Government, what has occurred resembles more a list of all negative possibilities than a path out of the country's impasse—from the continuation of stagnation, chill, and even freeze in relations with some countries to the failure of nuclear negotiations, the outbreak of war in the country, and finally the return of sanctions and UN Security Council resolutions. All these events are like links in a chain that have ultimately dragged the country into the unprecedented current situation. Undoubtedly, one cannot ignore the role of difficult internal, regional, and international conditions; at the same time, Araghchi's share of mistakes in adopting positions, decisions, appointments, and team compositions is prominent and undeniable in this process. His one-year, one-month, and 9-day record clearly displays a collection of crises—a record that, contrary to initial expectations, not only brought no hope for exiting the crisis but placed Tehran in an exceedingly more critical point. At the outset, it was imagined that Araghchi's diplomatic experience and background, both in the JCPOA era and the JCPOA revival period, could create an opening for Iran; but now, in the face of the bitter reality of the "super-crisis," there is no doubt that his art and ability in managing conditions face serious questions. Although regional developments and intensified international rivalries have imposed a heavy atmosphere on foreign policy, one must not forget that miscalculations in decision-making, unstable positions, and lack of initiative have also squandered existing opportunities. What lies before Iran today is not merely a collection of external problems, but a combination of internal errors and external pressures that has created a complex and intertwined structure. Based on this, it can be said that the Fourteenth Government, in the realm of foreign policy, has moved in the opposite direction of repairing and reconstructing relations and now stands in a position where fundamental rethinking of strategies, rebuilding lost trust, and seeking new methods of diplomatic management is more necessary than ever. For a more precise and clearer examination of Abbas Araghchi's record, we have sat down for a conversation with Dr. Sasan Karimi, a faculty member at the University of Tehran and deputy director of the Payab Institute, to dissect the reasons and consequences of the Fourteenth Government's Foreign Minister's performance from his perspective.406 Days LaterIn the 406 days that have passed since Abbas Araghchi took the helm of the foreign policy apparatus of the Fourteenth Government, what has occurred resembles more a list of all negative possibilities than a path out of the country's impasse—from the continuation of stagnation, chill, and even freeze in relations with some countries to the failure of nuclear negotiations, the outbreak of war in the country, and finally the return of sanctions and UN Security Council resolutions. All these events are like links in a chain that have ultimately dragged the country into the unprecedented current situation.Undoubtedly, one cannot ignore the role of difficult internal, regional, and international conditions; at the same time, Araghchi's share of mistakes in adopting positions, decisions, appointments, and team compositions is prominent and undeniable in this process. His one-year, one-month, and 9-day record clearly displays a collection of crises—a record that, contrary to initial expectations, not only brought no hope for exiting the crisis but placed Tehran in an exceedingly more critical point. At the outset, it was imagined that Araghchi's diplomatic experience and background, both in the JCPOA era and the JCPOA revival period, could create an opening for Iran; but now, in the face of the bitter reality of the "super-crisis," there is no doubt that his art and ability in managing conditions face serious questions.Although regional developments and intensified international rivalries have imposed a heavy atmosphere on foreign policy, one must not forget that miscalculations in decision-making, unstable positions, and lack of initiative have also squandered existing opportunities. What lies before Iran today is not merely a collection of external problems, but a combination of internal errors and external pressures that has created a complex and intertwined structure. Based on this, it can be said that the Fourteenth Government, in the realm of foreign policy, has moved in the opposite direction of repairing and reconstructing relations and now stands in a position where fundamental rethinking of strategies, rebuilding lost trust, and seeking new methods of diplomatic management is more necessary than ever. For a more precise and clearer examination of Abbas Araghchi's record, we have sat down for a conversation with Dr. Sasan Karimi, a faculty member at the University of Tehran and deputy director of the Payab Institute, to dissect the reasons and consequences of the Fourteenth Government's Foreign Minister's performance from his perspective.Mr. Karimi, the focus of our discussion with you is on the pathology and pathological perspective of Abbas Araghchi's 406-day record. Contrary to our initial assumptions and assessments, we are now at a point where many say sarcastically that even if Saeed Jalili had been Foreign Minister, the same events would have occurred. But knowing the structure-agent dynamic and the Foreign Minister's scope of authority in shaping and implementing major foreign policy decisions, and considering the array of crises—from the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh that coincided with the start of Masoud Pezeshkian's presidency to the "Sadegh 2" promise, Donald Trump's return to the White House, the launch of the maximum pressure campaign on Tehran, the 12-day war, and so on—Araghchi is still positioned in a place with many critics. Before delving into the critique and details of these failures, I want to return to our previous interview with you about Araghchi's record, in which you defended him. Now, after one year, one month, and 9 days of Araghchi's leadership, do you still hold the same view as before?I disagree with your statement and do not accept the premise you raised at all; because first, the situation has changed, and second, I have always presented a combination of criticism and support regarding Mr. Dr. Araghchi's record at the Foreign Ministry.Do you remember that in the previous interview in this very newspaper "Shargh," you were a supporter of Araghchi and defended his actions?I still don't accept your statement. I supported him, but that doesn't mean I agree with all his actions, decisions, and statements, and I explicitly tell you in this same newspaper "Shargh" that if I were in Mr. Dr. Araghchi's place, I might have acted differently and taken a different path in managing the foreign policy apparatus and resolving the assigned files. Therefore, neither I nor anyone else can defend every single action, decision, and position of Mr. Dr. Araghchi during this period. So, just like in the previous interview, my positions now are still a combination of defense and criticism.Let's pause here. For the rest of the interview, we'll focus solely on the criticisms, keeping in mind the premise that rivals and even enemies of the country—and specifically Trump and Netanyahu—are seeking to impose pressure, war, sanctions, resolutions, etc., in line with their interests based on the logic of enmity and competition. So, we'll set that parameter aside and focus only on pathologizing Araghchi's performance that led Iran to this point. What really happened that Araghchi failed to meet expectations? Not only did he fail to meet expectations, but we ended up at the exact opposite of what was imagined.I don't want to proceed with the interview with the sharpness you mentioned. In any case, Mr. Dr. Araghchi has put in tremendous effort during this more-than-one-year period, but it must be acknowledged that the Fourteenth Government's foreign policy apparatus, both in 2024 and 2025, performed weakly and inadequately in reading the game and scenarios of rivals and enemies. Despite recommendations made to Mr. Dr. Araghchi and the foreign policy apparatus, they did not take the issues seriously and ignored the recommendations.Was that the only problem that brought us here?No, another weakness was the guild-like approach of the foreign policy apparatus, which did not have a very friendly interaction with those outside the foreign policy establishment, and there is a kind of repulsion.Why?Because there seems to be no inclination to seek consultation and input from friends outside the Foreign Ministry. They always isolate themselves, to the point where a lack of self-confidence is apparent in them. But following the valid point you made, we all know that the actions of Israel, America, and Europe against the Islamic Republic of Iran are unjust. International politics relations are fundamentally unfair, and the West's behavior toward us is completely bullying. We know all that. But we can't just wait for them to change their behavior and expect them to act in our interests. The interesting point is that all countries in the world define and pursue their diplomacy and foreign policy within this framework and under these conditions to secure their national interests and security. So, the expectation was that Mr. Dr. Araghchi and the Fourteenth Government's foreign policy apparatus would strive to create or define a situation for Iran under these very conditions, which I believe was not done sufficiently.On the other hand, Mr. Dr. Araghchi must also be "time-aware" and "measure-aware"; meaning that in the world of foreign policy, not every proposal or solution can be pursued at any time. Foreign policy is like a game of tennis or ping-pong. If you raise the tennis racket five seconds late, the ball won't stay fixed in that spot; meaning when you make the same move, but the ball is no longer there, you see no output. The world of foreign policy is the same; because we face a highly fluid space and situation. Everything changes rapidly and intensely, and decisions must be made in accordance with time and place. Decision-making a moment later or earlier does not yield the desired result. Therefore, Mr. Dr. Araghchi and the foreign policy team lacked precision in timing solutions. Unfortunately, all proposals, solutions, and remedies were pursued with delay. Moreover, Mr. Dr. Araghchi and the foreign policy apparatus did not apply a dose worthy of attention and appropriate to the crisis situation. For example, in the 12-day war, if the Islamic Republic of Iran fires one rocket toward Israel every day, on the surface, Tehran appears to be responding and continuing military operations, but it certainly does not have the necessary effect for superiority in the war.When we act so weakly that it has no effect, it effectively becomes no different from inaction. So, in summary, it must be said that Mr. Dr. Araghchi acted both "late" and "low-impact." As a result, in the past one year and one month, we could have put numerous initiatives on the table, but when it was late, even the best solutions no longer worked. The counterparts also act according to their own imperatives and interests and continue their mischief and bullying behavior as much as they want or can. So, the fact that the Americans and Europeans were looking for pretexts, pressure, and bullying—yes, there is no doubt about that. But pretext removal and effective foreign policy have their own time, place, and solutions.Now, before we get into the rest of the examples, let me also ask this question: If, from your perspective, Europe, America, and Israel were seeking pretexts, pressure, and bullying, and effective foreign policy has its own time, place, and solutions, if Sasan Karimi were the Foreign Minister, what time would he choose for this effective foreign policy to take effect? I want a specific timeframe.In my view, from the second round of Muscat negotiations, we could have implemented an effective foreign policy by presenting solutions and remedies, rather than deferring everything to the last week, last day, last hours, and last minutes of the negotiations.Really, as some believe, was the 12-day war the result of Araghchi's weak performance in the Muscat negotiations, even though he recently stated that in each round of negotiations with Witkoff, he entered the talks with a new agenda from Washington?No, I also disagree with this analytical line that the 12-day war was the outcome of Mr. Dr. Araghchi's failure in the Muscat negotiations.At least, couldn't he have acted in a way that the Troika wouldn't play on Israel's front?I don't accept that either; because the Troika fundamentally acts based on its own interests.So, do you deny that Germany, France, and the UK acted along the line drawn by Israel and America against Iran, and ultimately the Troika sided with Israel?I believe the Troika did not side with Israel...Then why did they act this way against us?Because they took revenge for the Ukraine war on us.I see a contradiction here. So, according to you, if revenge for the Ukraine war is involved—which it certainly is—couldn't Germany, France, and the UK have been satisfied in some way and at some time?No, you've prejudged. What I mean is that we could have, but our solutions, proposals, and remedies were placed on the table too late. We could have acted earlier and more innovatively.In line with your very statement, we witnessed two proposal packages from Abbas Araghchi—both in contacts with European foreign ministers and during the trip to New York, and even before that, the Cairo agreement. But why did the Foreign Minister, with his JCPOA-era experience, effectively defer everything to the last days and hours, after the Troika's letter to activate the snapback mechanism? Why did he think that with 90th-minute diplomacy, he could manage the crisis successfully with minimal cost?The fundamental issue regarding Mr. Dr. Araghchi is "boldness." Meaning that the individual in the position of Foreign Minister must have the courage and ability to bear internal costs. Truly, a Foreign Minister, especially in the current crisis conditions, must step out of the safe margins and have the boldness and ability to accept internal costs so that the necessary action and positive impact can emerge.Does Araghchi certainly fear the consequences and internal costs of boldness?Yes, your point is correct. These kinds of boldness and internal cost-bearing have no end or consequence, but in any case, I say explicitly: if someone doesn't want to be bold and act boldly, they shouldn't accept the responsibility of the Foreign Ministry either. You can't play both sides; on one hand, become Foreign Minister, and on the other, stay in the safe margins. In any case, the country is in a difficult, complex, and intricate situation, and Mr. Dr. Araghchi knew the conditions under which he was becoming Foreign Minister, what the solutions were, and what costs he had to bear.Whether he knew and didn't accept, or didn't know and didn't accept, both are excuses worse than the crime?Exactly, because, for example, Mr. Dr. Salehi, as our country's former Foreign Minister, started and pursued the Oman negotiations—which laid the groundwork for the JCPOA negotiations—under conditions where such negotiations were not even on the agenda, and we were completely at an impasse. But Mr. Dr. Salehi proceeded boldly and created a situation by bearing internal costs. Meaning, by accepting all responsibilities and internal costs, he initiated the Oman negotiations. Mr. Dr. Salehi showed boldness.And this cost-bearing for creating a situation is absent in Araghchi?It's not that it's absent. Unfortunately, in the case of Mr. Dr. Araghchi, this cost-bearing for creating a situation is fainter, and indeed, it is because of this faintness of boldness that the other events occurred. Now, whether we could have prevented the war or brought the Muscat negotiations to fruition is another matter. But in specific junctures, he could have assembled the negotiating team differently.Who do you mean specifically? Meaning, shouldn't Rouhani and Gharibabadi have continued the negotiations?It's not necessary for the negotiating team to necessarily be the Council of Deputy Foreign Ministers. Here, it was appropriate for Mr. Dr. Araghchi, as Foreign Minister, to pursue less guild-like thinking and, by bearing costs, creating a situation, and with a broader vision and scope of authority, pursue the talks with a different negotiating team.With these considerations and in your view, is Araghchi's statement an excuse—that each time Witkoff negotiated in the five rounds, he changed his words, or Trump's negotiating team wasn't clear on what it wanted or did, and such position-takings?The fact that we negotiated each round and then in the next, the Americans changed their tune has no meaning in the world of foreign policy, especially regarding the Americans. This issue is very clear.The temperament of Americans, especially the Trump administration, is such that they never stick to their positions, and numerous books on American diplomacy refer to this. But with this very temperament, all countries are negotiating and reaching agreements with America and this Trump administration. Even their enemies are negotiating. We too negotiated with the Americans in previous periods and even reached an agreement in the JCPOA phase. Naturally, two hours of indirect negotiation in Oman, Italy, or anywhere else, spaced weeks apart—that's not negotiation. It was completely clear and predictable that this type of negotiation, with that method and those time intervals, would not lead to results.Another contradiction. In a way, you're confirming my point that Araghchi's negotiation method paved the way for the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution and ultimately Israel's aggression?No, I'm saying the type of negotiations could have been conducted in a better, more serious, more cohesive, more continuous manner, and with shorter time intervals. You can't expect that for a complex crisis like the nuclear file, with a complex party like America and the Trump administration, or the European Troika, and considering various and even conflicting interests, both in the region and the global environment, one could reach a result with a two-hour negotiation, spaced weeks or a month apart—especially indirect negotiations. If we break it down, the five rounds of Oman negotiations average 15 minutes to half an hour of indirect negotiation per week. Now, imagine for the nuclear crisis, wanting to reach a result with 15 minutes a week of indirect negotiation with America and the Trump administration? It was obvious that this type of performance was not realistic. Despite the points I mentioned, here it is appropriate to also defend Mr. Dr. Araghchi and the negotiating team, that they ultimately did their best within their scope of authority. It's not possible to put all the blame, shortcomings, and current conditions on Mr. Dr. Araghchi and the negotiation team.Why not? Because from the beginning of the interview, we said the status of Iran's rivals and enemies is completely clear, and they act according to their own logic. The plan was to clarify the share of Araghchi and the negotiation team in this...Your point is correct. But also consider this: from a certain point onward, no matter what proposal Mr. Dr. Araghchi, the negotiation team, or the Islamic Republic of Iran put on the table, the other side wouldn't accept it, and no matter how much flexibility Tehran showed, the Westerners—specifically Washington—were no longer receptive. Of course, as I said in response to previous questions, part of it also relates to that time management and presenting the right, precise solution appropriate to the crisis at the right time. Perhaps we had the right solution with the proposal package or the Cairo agreement, but it was late, and because time had passed, even the best proposal no longer worked.It's like that tennis racket: if it comes up a few seconds late, it's no use. However, we must also see the share of the rivals and emphasize that anyone—not just Mr. Dr. Araghchi—who negotiates with them will face this American temperament. However, one must know the counterpart's behavior and, with awareness of these complexities and the American temperament, pursue negotiations under the right conditions, with the right solutions, at the right time and place. Especially for Mr. Dr. Araghchi, who has a long history in the Foreign Ministry and was present in the JCPOA negotiations, this expectation was even greater.Let's talk about other examples. Mohammad Sadr (member of the Expediency Discernment Council) in his recent controversial interview had a serious criticism of Araghchi, saying he lacks diplomatic language and constantly uses military rhetoric to draw lines and threaten. It's true that we witnessed the 12-day war and a securitized atmosphere, but as Hashemollah Falahatpisheh says, a diplomat's only job is to keep war away from the country, and when the country enters war, it means the Foreign Minister and foreign policy team have failed. To what extent do you accept this critique?The Foreign Minister's rhetoric is one that some may like and others may not.And you? Do you like it or not?No, I don't like this rhetoric.Why?Military rhetoric is specific to military and security officials, and diplomatic rhetoric is specific to the Foreign Minister and diplomats. Perhaps those who like this rhetoric believe that the kind of language Mr. Dr. Araghchi has used will create balance and more bargaining leverage through bravado, but unfortunately, this kind of positions leads to uniformity in the statements of domestic officials and, in external readings, has less firmness. The reality is that the enemies and rivals of the Islamic Republic of Iran never base their military assessments on statements, verbal positions, or line-drawing by Mr. Dr. Araghchi; rather, with informational dominance and awareness of military capabilities, they proceed with their initiatives and actions. They have more reliable sources for obtaining information. Although we witnessed the 12-day war, the idea that Mr. Dr. Araghchi, as Foreign Minister, could scare the other side or create inaction and flexibility in them through a tone, military rhetoric, and line-drawing is completely unrealistic. Things that are truly scary to the West frighten them, and things that are not scary have no effect on them. With Mr. Dr. Araghchi's tone and rhetoric, nothing changes—just as we saw that even with Mr. Dr. Araghchi's threats, nothing changed. War happened, assassination happened, snapback was activated, and sanctions returned. Therefore, I don't see this rhetoric, in the current conditions, as the right and appropriate language for Mr. Dr. Araghchi and other foreign policy officials.Regarding the guild-like perspective you mentioned, we can approach the issue from another angle. That Araghchi, during this period, has made appointments in the Foreign Ministry that are in no way defensible. From selecting Vahid Jalalzadeh as Deputy for Consular Affairs to Hossein Noshabadi as Deputy for Parliamentary Affairs... neither of whom has any diplomatic knowledge or experience. Indeed, these kinds of appointments in the Foreign Ministry have been criticized by a spectrum of diplomats and raise suspicions of Araghchi's political deals with certain domestic factions...Your question is more related to domestic politics, which I won't delve into. Regarding the appointments of the people you named or others, there may be calculations and arrangements that, in their discretion and management style, it was deemed necessary to use these individuals now. I'm not very involved in the games of reformist and principalist factions, I don't have full knowledge of it, and I don't have much interest or inclination to comment on it. But my specific point about the guild-like issue or guild-like approach of the Foreign Ministry under Mr. Dr. Araghchi was that some individuals outside the Foreign Ministry who have academic knowledge in this field and higher qualifications, abilities, and experience are not consulted by the Foreign Ministry, and there is a kind of repulsion in this regard.Another critical example against Abbas Araghchi is accurate predictions alongside wrong analyses. Araghchi, whether before becoming Foreign Minister or after taking the helm of the Fourteenth Government's foreign policy, had almost accurate predictions of developments, but what happened that the accurate prediction didn't lead to accurate analysis and accurate decision-making?The low-cost, high-benefit solution method is highly desirable, but it's not possible to pursue it at every time. Therefore, if some don't propose these methods, it's not that their intellect doesn't reach it or they're betraying the country's national interests and security; rather, the conditions don't exist. Just as we saw the same situation in the late Raisi government. Why wasn't the JCPOA revived at the end of the Twelfth Government or even in the Thirteenth Government? Because it was thought that the JCPOA could be revived with more concessions and at a lower cost, but in the end, we saw it couldn't. Now, the same claim exists again, and this wrong analysis overshadowed Mr. Dr. Araghchi's correct predictions. In this period too, it was thought that they could pay a lower cost and receive more concessions, or at least give what the Westerners want but with less cost. But in the end, we saw this didn't happen, and someone who hasn't agreed can't be held accountable, because an unwritten dictation has no mistakes. For example, regarding the JCPOA, now all criticisms are directed at the nuclear agreement because it's an agreement that was made, and its strengths and weaknesses are clear.And here, the parameter of boldness and cost-bearing by the Foreign Minister becomes more prominent again?Exactly. In a crisis situation, the Foreign Minister must choose between personal cost and national interest cost.I have many questions, but for the final question, let's also put this to the test of critique: After the 12-day war and Israel's aggression, the keyword "paradigm shift" became prominent in the country. The most obvious, serious, and direct paradigm shift pertained to foreign policy, and it was thought that foreign policy after the war would differ significantly from before. What happened that this rail change didn't form, and ultimately we reached the point where, from the morning of this Sunday, we witnessed the return of the six UN Security Council resolutions? Has the cautionary mirror named Mohammad Javad Zarif caused subsequent ministers to no longer seek boldness and self-cost-bearing, and not define and pursue a desirable low-cost path in line with national interests and security?Your question has two parts. Regarding the final part, whether Mr. Dr. Zarif has truly become a cautionary mirror for other ministers—well, naturally, when you see that the most capable and qualified diplomat in the past 40 years, who exerted the best and most initiatives and boldly bore and bears costs to secure national interests and security, is treated this way and Mr. Dr. Zarif becomes a victim, it naturally creates conditions where other ministers exercise more caution and are unwilling to show boldness and bear costs. This is in no way good for the country's management apparatus to create conditions where the official or minister is unwilling to bear costs and strip him of the power and ability for boldness. Successful managers were and are those who had boldness and bore costs. But the reason the 12-day war didn't become a turning point in foreign policy and we didn't witness a paradigm shift in the Fourteenth Government's diplomacy is that we are trapped in our previous analyses. In other words, we're standing in line for our own soup, so to speak. Truly, in the world, we rarely see cases where officials and their responsibilities are constantly taking positions and analyzing on television and other media. Well, this amount of verbosity creates a rhetoric and discourse that, like a long rope, ties the hands and feet of officials and deprives them of opportunities for initiative.
