The primary focus of Iran’s current foreign policy is the potential activation of the JCPOA Dispute Resolution Mechanism, commonly referred to as "snapback." Setting aside its use in domestic political disputes, which is not the concern of this author, the main questions revolve around why the snapback exists, the likelihood of its implementation, the legitimacy and competence of European parties to enact it, and, finally, the conditions that would follow its activation. Given the explanations provided by the author and other foreign policy experts in recent days and weeks regarding most of these questions, this article focuses on the final aspect.To address the post-snapback scenario concisely, snapback means reverting all conditions to the pre-JCPOA state. On the Iranian side, the gradual cessation of JCPOA inspections and restrictions began in 2020 as compensatory measures, and today, none of these commitments or inspections are effectively implemented. On the other side, the return of other parties to the pre-JCPOA state would mean the reinstatement of the six UN Security Council sanctions resolutions against Iran, which have not been in effect over the past decade. It is evident that if the October 26 deadline (the "sunset" date) passes without the activation of the Dispute Resolution Mechanism, the JCPOA will ensure that these resolutions are permanently and irreversibly terminated, and any new sanctions against Iran would require a fresh vote in the UN Security Council.Five of these six resolutions fall under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, falsely designating Iran as a threat to international peace and security. The reality is that, in any case, the reinstatement of these UN Security Council resolutions would impose significant sanctions on Iran. Notably, Resolution 1929, passed in 2010, includes substantial restrictions, such as requiring countries to inspect all shipments to Iran suspected of containing prohibited materials and raising concerns about Iran’s missile industry.It would be naive to assume that the impact of UN sanctions is comparable to U.S. unilateral sanctions. While U.S. unilateral sanctions impose significant restrictions on countries engaging with Iran, they are not legally binding, and many small and medium-sized companies with limited trade ties to the U.S. continue to do business with Iran, often without their governments intervening, as these actions fall outside legal restrictions.However, UN Security Council sanctions legally obligate governments, their nationals, and companies to comply, and non-compliance is considered a violation of UN Security Council resolutions, not merely a loss of interests in the U.S. In many cases, governments enforce compliance to prevent the normalization of disregarding UN Security Council resolutions without consequences.This places the burden and infrastructure of circumventing sanctions squarely on Iran, rather than on risk-taking foreign traders or companies. This fundamentally increases the costs and challenges of sustaining sanction-evasion routes for the Islamic Republic of Iran, particularly for its private companies.China and Russia, as veto-wielding members of the UN Security Council, will prioritize maintaining the authority of the Council’s resolutions to preserve their influence. It should not be forgotten that Russia (and France in Europe) considers its veto power, alongside nuclear capabilities, as its only relative advantages in the global arena. If this veto power is undermined, a significant portion of their leverage would be lost. China, which prioritizes its economy, technology, and trade above all else, is unlikely to challenge the U.S. over the structure or decisions of the UN Security Council in the current environment.Although Iran has many neighbors, some of which it has effectively utilized for trade and financial exchanges, relying on the region for cheap and effective sanctions circumvention is neither prudent nor realistic. This is particularly true given that most of Iran’s neighbors traditionally prioritize the U.S. as their primary partner in foreign relations.The reality is that if the snapback mechanism is activated, pressure on various sectors in Iran will significantly increase. Circumventing sanctions will become more difficult, slower, and costlier, with stricter enforcement by more countries.A key point is that the lifting of UN Security Council sanctions, which has been in place for the past decade, is unprecedented in the history of the UN Security Council. The Islamic Republic of Iran refused to implement these sanctions even symbolically for a few hours, and the lifting of Chapter VII resolutions without implementation by the targeted country is unprecedented. It is speculated that with the reinstatement of the six resolutions, this precedent may not be repeated, and full implementation might be required before sanctions can be lifted as before.Relying more heavily on domestic production also has its limits. The perception of importing goods from the West as excessively consumerist leads to rhetorical emphasis on domestic production. However, this is not the whole story. The country requires foreign currency to function, as well as the exchange of personnel, travel for academics and students, participation in international forums, and access to advanced and up-to-date technologies—all of which would be further restricted under comprehensive UN Security Council sanctions.It is clear that activating this mechanism will exert significant pressure on Iran’s foreign exchange market (including currencies and currency-based goods), and the routes for circumventing sanctions will become both more limited and more expensive. Moreover, these routes are gradually discovered and blocked, and establishing alternative routes, given today’s security considerations, is more challenging and costly.Despite all this, it must be said that neither the activation of the Dispute Resolution Mechanism will bring the world to an end, halting diplomacy and trade, nor will accepting certain conditions to navigate past this sunset clause necessarily resolve the issue. Additionally, rumors are circulating about delaying or extending the mechanism, which involves significant legal complexities and, if accepted by Iran, would significantly undermine Iran’s objections to the competence of European countries to implement snapback. Furthermore, implementing snapback would likely diminish the prospects of any future agreement even further. To assess the post-snapback economy, one must consider whether Iran’s allies, such as China, will continue purchasing Iranian oil under UN sanctions or, as in the past, significantly reduce their purchases.Iran is too significant to have its survival threatened or its economy broken by sanctions, yet it is also too significant to achieve development through barter trade, reliance on neighbors, alignment with Russia and China, or avoidance of a comprehensive balancing approach. A new approach is needed to identify and address the fundamental challenges in Iran’s foreign policy.
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