Published on IRNA 26th July 2025
These days, the most attention regarding nuclear diplomacy issues revolves around the "snapback" or the Dispute Resolution Mechanism of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The first reality is that the United States' withdrawal from the JCPOA, coupled with the relatively neutral and, in practice, passive stance of China and Russia, makes it clear that the only actors technically capable of utilizing this mechanism at this juncture are the three European countries.The second clear reality is that, gradually over the past years, and especially following Donald Trump’s return to power in Washington, the position of Europe—particularly its three key countries—has noticeably declined. In today’s post-polar world, Europe is neither an unwavering, unconditional, and permanent ally of the United States as a primary global power, nor does it retain its former tradition of being a decisive and powerful global actor.But what is the JCPOA Dispute Resolution Mechanism? Why was such a mechanism included in the text? Is it treacherous? Was it an oversight, negligence, or a result of the negotiators’ incompetence? Do "snapback" and the "trigger mechanism" actually exist in the JCPOA?Answers to these questions, which are widely discussed, may have been given multiple times, but they have either not been heard sufficiently, not expressed clearly enough, or, as is often the case, the impact of the answers is always narrower than the questions and ambiguities themselves.The first reality is that, in terms of terminology, neither "snapback" nor "trigger mechanism" is mentioned in the JCPOA. The precise term is the JCPOA Dispute Resolution Mechanism, which is primarily outlined in paragraphs 36 and 37 of the JCPOA, with some relevance to paragraph 26 as well. The other two terms have merely been popularized in public opinion and the media.The second reality regarding the foundation of this mechanism is that, for better or worse, there is no guarantee for any agreement in the global arena (whether political, a treaty, or otherwise). Therefore, despite all mechanisms stemming from the International Court of Justice, subsidiary arbitration bodies, and so forth, when disputes escalate into confrontation, it is physical elements and mutual interests (economic, political, etc.) that may sway governments’ policies from one decision to another.The JCPOA was no exception, and the decision-makers and negotiators of the country were aware of this. The basis for including such a mechanism was the Iranian negotiating team’s guideline rooted in distrust of the West. The agreement was structured so that, in the event of a significant violation or breach by the other party that prevents Iran from benefiting from the JCPOA, Iran would retain the ability to take action.Naturally, this action could not involve reciprocally depriving other parties of economic or other benefits. Nor did Iran want its permitted response to a breach by the other parties to be merely filing a complaint with international bodies. Therefore, the intention was that, in the event of Iran not benefiting from the JCPOA, it could, through a mechanism, return to the pre-JCPOA state.This demand naturally prompted a reciprocal request from the other parties. Consequently, all parties agreed that if they were not benefiting from the JCPOA, they could revert all parties to the pre-agreement state without needing anyone’s approval or confirmation. Thus, what is outlined in the aforementioned paragraphs is the reversibility to the pre-agreement state due to any party’s dissatisfaction, regardless of the foreseen processes and based on the voluntary nature of the JCPOA.It is noteworthy that, due to the United States’ withdrawal from the agreement and the insufficient and ineffective actions of the other parties to ensure Iran’s benefits from the JCPOA, Iran, at its own discretion and pursuant to paragraphs 26 and 36, has reduced its compliance with JCPOA commitments. For years now, Iran has not adhered to any of the technical, supervisory, or other restrictions under the agreement. So far, it is only the Islamic Republic of Iran that has utilized the JCPOA Dispute Resolution Mechanism.It should be noted that the pre-JCPOA state includes, on one hand, the absence of technical and supervisory restrictions and, on the other, the reinstatement of the six UN Security Council sanctions resolutions (passed between 2006 and 2010).There are two differences here: first, Iran has reduced its compliance without following formal procedures, and thus, up to this moment, it has done so unilaterally. Second, the reversibility of the agreement, as described, is unlimited for Iran but limited to ten years (until October of this year) for the other parties. This means Iran’s ability to act remains open indefinitely, while the other parties have this option only for ten years.However, as one of the leverage points for European governments to assert themselves, the JCPOA Dispute Resolution Mechanism is at hand. The United Kingdom, Germany, and France, the only Western members of the JCPOA, have not taken any effective actions to fulfill their commitments, particularly in mitigating the impact of sanctions on Iran, since the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA. Nevertheless, they can still mechanically exploit their position in this political agreement.In the absence of the United States, it is only these three European countries that, by potentially exploiting Iran’s corrective and compensatory nuclear actions, might attempt to reinstate the sanctions under the six UN Security Council resolutions passed against Iran until 2010, effectively returning everything to the pre-JCPOA negotiation state for Iran and others.The stance of the European parties, while not "legitimate" in the author’s view, has the potential for mechanical execution, though not legal legitimacy. However, it could potentially damage Iran’s relations with Europe, particularly with these three countries, and render Iran’s already faltering cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency obsolete.One interpretation is that the three European JCPOA members are not active participants but merely parties to the agreement, as they have not taken effective actions to preserve or make it effective in recent years. Furthermore, based on the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in the South Africa and Namibia case in 1971, a party to an agreement that does not fulfill its commitments cannot selectively benefit from the agreement’s provisions or mechanisms that may favor it.Additionally, in line with the above principle and the spirit governing the JCPOA, the Dispute Resolution Mechanism can only be utilized by a party if another party has violated the JCPOA. Iran’s actions, however, were first taken after a year of restraint, and second, they have been gradual, reversible, and, most importantly, corrective. In other words, in response to the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA and the violation of the agreement by other parties, which—contrary to the text in the preamble and annexes—has prevented Iran from gaining economic benefits, Iran has taken compensatory (corrective) actions in accordance with paragraphs 36 and 26 of the JCPOA. These actions do not constitute a violation of the JCPOA. Therefore, from a legal legitimacy perspective, the Western parties’ reliance on paragraph 37 lacks validity, especially since this issue is openly used as a threat in relation to other matters, such as reaching or not reaching a new agreement.Europe could use Iran’s nuclear issue and the lifting of UN Security Council sanctions as a fulcrum to reclaim its independent identity and commitment to justice, as well as to rebuild relations with Iran, thereby restoring its credibility above all.What Europe should pursue through Iran’s nuclear issue, instead of destroying everything and eliminating any motivation for the Islamic Republic of Iran regarding its nuclear program and rapprochement with European countries, is a policy of rebuilding relations. With the dominant actor, the United States, absent, Europe could use Iran’s nuclear issue and the lifting of UN Security Council sanctions as a fulcrum to reclaim its independent identity and commitment to justice, as well as to rebuild relations with Iran—restoring its credibility, which has been particularly damaged following the genocide by the Israeli regime in Gaza. Rebuilding relations with Iran is sufficiently significant and motivating for both European parties and Iran. One must recall the 1990s when Europe could act far more independently than it can today, securing its position and interests.What should not be overlooked in this essay is that the JCPOA Dispute Resolution Mechanism was designed based on the Islamic Republic of Iran’s guidelines and the principle of reversibility (to the pre-JCPOA state). However, despite our arguments regarding the lack of competence of the European parties, it is practically feasible in the current environment. Discussions regarding competence and similar issues can serve as the basis for the legal efforts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Vice Presidency for Legal Affairs.
